GPS interference

The plan is consistently skeptical of meeting problems with expanded criminal law and demands that penalties be designed carefully to actually reduce crime. Generally classifying GPS jamming as terrorism is such an expansion that the plan does not call for, while legal certainty is highlighted as central. The documents do not directly address hybrid threats, so the position is derived from criminal policy.

• repression does not solve problemsdecisive»Alltför ofta lyfts repression och hårdare tag upp som lösningar istället för att ta itu med problemen på allvar.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Far too often, repression and harsher measures are lifted up as solutions instead of seriously addressing the problems.”
• carefully designed penalties»Straff och andra påföljder för brott behöver vara noggrant« (party programme ↗)“Penalties and other consequences for crime need to be carefully”
• legal certainty in criminal law»Utvecklingen av ett rättsväsende byggt på rättssäkerhet är viktig« (party programme ↗)“Development of a judicial system built on legal certainty is important”

The plan requires preparedness against hybrid attacks and states that Sweden must be able to defend itself against hybrid warfare, espionage and cyber attacks. Systematic and politically motivated GPS disruptions are exactly such an attack, and stricter legal classification with international wanted notices follows the plan's line. However, the requirement for rule of law in criminal policy urges careful examination of the criminal category.

• preparedness against hybrid threatsdecisive»Beredskap mot hybridattacker.« (party programme ↗)“Preparedness against hybrid attacks.”
• defence against hybrid warfare»Vi måste kunna försvara oss militärt, men också mot hybridattacker, spionage och cyberangrepp.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We must be able to defend ourselves militarily, but also against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyber attacks.”
• prevented terrorist acts»Bekämpande av våldsbejakande extremism och förhindrande av terrordåd.« (party programme ↗)“Combating violent extremism and preventing terrorist acts.”
• rule of law in criminal policy»Kriminalpolitik byggd på evidens, effektivitet och rättssäkerhet.« (party programme ↗)“Criminal policy built on evidence, efficiency and rule of law.”

The plan wants to strengthen resilience against hybrid threats and secure control over critical infrastructure, but it also requires that all new criminal legislation is tested carefully from a legal certainty perspective and that crime fighting does not occur at the expense of rule of law principles. Generally classifying GPS disruptions as terrorist crimes is such an expansion that the plan does not support. The conclusion is derived from rule of law principles.

• rättsstatens principerdecisive»Brottsbekämpning ska inte ske på bekostnad av« (party programme ↗)“Crime fighting shall not occur at the expense of”
• noggrann rättssäkerhetsprövning»Vi vill säkerställa att all ny lagstiftning« (party programme ↗)“We want to ensure that all new legislation”
• skydd av kritisk infrastruktur»Samhället måste säkra kontroll över« (party programme ↗)“Society must secure control over”

The plan sees Russia's war as a threat to the security of all of Europe and requires that defense capability be adapted to new threats to the country and that civil preparedness be strengthened. Treating systematic GPS disruptions as part of the hybrid threat with sharper legal tools is in line with this. The plan says nothing explicit about the classification of terrorism offences, so the conclusion is derived.

• strengthen defense and preparednessdecisive»Centerpartiet vill rusta försvaret, stärka Sveriges civila beredskap och fullfölja inträdet i Nato.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Centre Party wants to strengthen defense, strengthen Sweden's civil preparedness and complete entry into NATO.”
• adaptation to new threats»Därför måste vi också anpassa vår försvarsförmåga efter nya hot mot landet.« (party programme ↗)“Therefore, we must also adapt our defense capability to new threats to the country.”
• pressure on Russian actors»Stryp Putins krigskassa nu.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Starve Putin's war chest now.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The election manifesto describes the Russian attack as an acute threat to our security order and wants Sweden to drive for as comprehensive a sanctions regime against Russia as possible and for cross-border crime control. The party programme opens for increased penalties for specific crime types to mark the seriousness of the violation. To classify systematic GPS disruptions as terrorism and link them to international arrest warrants follows that line.

• tough measures against Russiadecisive»Sverige ska vara pådrivande för att så breda globala koalitioner som möjligt bygger ut en så heltäckande sanktionsregim mot Ryssland som möjligt.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall be driving for the broadest possible global coalitions to build out as comprehensive a sanctions regime against Russia as possible.”
• cross-border crime control»Gränsöverskridande brottslighet måste mötas med en gränsöverskridande polis.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Cross-border crime must be met with cross-border policing.”
• increased penalties mark seriousness»Det kan även finnas särskilda brottstyper där det kan vara befogat att skärpa straffsatserna för att underlätta rehabilitering eller markera allvaret i den kränkning som brottet utgör.« (party programme ↗)“There may also be specific crime types where it may be justified to increase penalties to facilitate rehabilitation or mark the seriousness of the violation that the crime constitutes.”
• acute threat to the security order»Med det ryska anfallskriget mot Ukraina – detta angrepp mot hela Europa – är hotet mot vår säkerhetsordning akut.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“With the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine—this attack on all of Europe—the threat to our security order is acute.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan establishes that new types of threats give a broadened security concept and that Sweden must be able to meet attacks from international crime, terrorism and cyber warfare. Systematic, politically motivated GPS interference against maritime and aviation is precisely such a threat, and classifying them as terrorist crime and linking them to international alerts follow from the commitment. The plan further requires developed international police cooperation against transnational crime.

• meet terrorism and cyber threatsdecisive»Sverige måste kunna möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet, terrorism,« (party programme ↗)“Sweden must be able to meet attacks from international crime, terrorism,”
• broadened security concept»Nya typer av konflikter och hot leder till ett vidgat säkerhetsbegrepp.« (party programme ↗)“New types of conflicts and threats lead to a broadened security concept.”
• international police cooperation»För att möta den internationella brottsutvecklingen krävs ett väl fungerande samarbete över« (party programme ↗)“To meet international crime development, well-functioning cooperation across”
• EU cooperation against serious crime»Det krävs ett nära samarbete på EU-nivå för att motverka allvarlig gränsöverskridande« (party programme ↗)“Close cooperation at the EU level is required to counter serious transnational”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan promises an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyber attacks and that cyber defence is developed, against the background that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has created the most serious security policy crisis in Europe since the Second World War. Systematic, politically motivated GPS disruptions against maritime and aviation are exactly such a hybrid threat, and the plan believes that the state's hard core is never negotiable. Classifying them as terrorist crimes therefore aligns with the plan's line, even though the plan does not mention the classification.

• handlingsplan mot hybridhotdecisive»Införa en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och cyberattacker« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Introduce an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyber attacks”
• stärkt cyberförsvar»Utveckla cyberförsvaret« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Develop cyber defence”
• statens hårda kärna»Statens hårda kärna får aldrig vara förhandlingsbar.« (party programme ↗)“The state's hard core must never be negotiable.”
• skärpt hotbild från Ryssland»Rysslands invasion av Ukraina har skapat den allvarligaste säkerhetspolitiska krisen i Europa sedan andra världskriget.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Russia's invasion of Ukraine has created the most serious security policy crisis in Europe since the Second World War.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan explicitly commits to strengthened European cooperation against hybrid threats and terrorism and to clear sanctions against Russia. To treat systematic, politically motivated GPS disruptions as terrorism and link them to international alerts is in line with that and with the plan's requirement that Sweden be prepared for the new security situation. However, the plan does not take a position on the crime classification as such.

• counter hybrid threats and terrorismdecisive»Förstärka det europeiska samarbetet mot islamistiska organisationer, hybridhot och terrorism« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen European cooperation against Islamist organizations, hybrid threats and terrorism”
• sanctions against Russia»Sverige bör verka för tydliga sanktioner mot Turkiet, Belarus, Ryssland och andra länder med en negativ utveckling.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should work for clear sanctions against Turkey, Belarus, Russia and other countries with negative development.”
• heightened security policy preparedness»Rusta Sverige inför en ny säkerhetspolitisk situation i vårt närområde« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Prepare Sweden for a new security policy situation in our region”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.