Relations with China

The party programme requires a conscious and strategic approach to the great powers that build power positions, and that Sweden can act independently from great powers such as the USA, China and Russia. The counter-proposal's demand for a new China strategy with updated analysis and effective measures follows that line; the plan speaks for such strategic awareness being formulated, not for abstaining. The plan's commitments to human rights and international law point in the same direction.

• strategic approach to great powersdecisive»Sverige behöver ett medvetet och strategiskt förhållningssätt till« (party programme ↗)“Sweden needs a conscious and strategic approach to”
• independence from great powers»Det är viktigt att Sverige kan agera självständigt från stormakter som« (party programme ↗)“It is important that Sweden can act independently from great powers such as”
• voice for human rights»en stadig röst i världen som talar för mänskliga rättigheter, fred och« (party programme ↗)“a steady voice in the world that speaks for human rights, peace and”
• defend international law»Folkrätten behöver försvaras och« (party programme ↗)“International law needs to be defended and”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The election manifesto establishes that Sweden must be able to defend itself against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyber-attacks and that capacity against cyber-attacks and disinformation shall be strengthened. The party programme sees it as a serious threat to freedom when growing, non-democratic powers lack respect for human rights. A new China strategy with updated threat analysis is an application of these commitments, particularly as support is given to Russia's invasion which the plan requires Sweden always to oppose.

• defence against hybrid threatsdecisive»Vi måste kunna försvara oss militärt, men också mot hybridattacker, spionage och cyberangrepp.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We must be able to defend ourselves militarily, but also against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyber-attacks.”
• threat from non-democratic superpowers»hot mot friheten och demokratin när vissa av de länder som spelar en växande roll är ickedemokratiska och saknar respekt för de mänskliga rättigheterna.« (party programme ↗)“threat to freedom and democracy when some of the countries that play a growing role are non-democratic and lack respect for human rights.”
• resistance to disinformation»Arbetet för att stärka förmågan att stå emot cyberattacker och desinformation ska stärkas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The work to strengthen capacity to resist cyber-attacks and disinformation shall be strengthened.”
• support for Ukraine»Sverige måste i alla lägen stå upp för Ukraina och mot det ryska invasionskriget.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden must in all cases stand up for Ukraine and against the Russian invasion war.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan does not mention China, but states that Sweden should not adapt its foreign policy to the demands of authoritarian states and that international law and human rights shall be at the centre of foreign policy. An updated strategy with current threat analysis for an increasingly authoritarian China follows from that stance. Since the plan does not take a position on the form of China policy, the positioning is derived and uncertain.

• no adaptation to authoritarian statesdecisive»inte att Sverige ska anpassa sin utrikespolitik efter auktoritära staters krav för kunna att bli medlem i Nato och Sverige ska inte börja sälja vapen till Turkiet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“not that Sweden should adapt its foreign policy to the demands of authoritarian states in order to become a member of NATO and Sweden should not start selling weapons to Turkey.”
• international law and human rights at the centre»Miljöpartiet de gröna sätter folkrätten och de mänskliga rättigheterna i centrum.« (party programme ↗)“The Greens place international law and human rights at the centre.”
• human rights in foreign policy»Sverige ska arbeta för mänskliga rättigheter nationellt och internationellt.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall work for human rights nationally and internationally.”
• requirements on trade relations»Sverige ska ställa krav på att importerade varor är tillverkade med hänsyn till miljö, mänskliga rättigheter och arbetsförhållanden för anställda i tillverkningsländerna.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall require that imported goods are manufactured with regard to environment, human rights and working conditions for employees in manufacturing countries.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The election manifesto describes an ongoing struggle between liberal democracy and authoritarian forces that must be won, and the party programme states that defense capability must be adapted to new threats and that détente cannot be assumed. China is identified in the manifesto as a major emitter that should be pressured through trade policy. An updated China strategy with new threat analysis thus follows the plan's line. On the One China policy the plan says nothing.

• struggle against authoritarian forcesdecisive»Runtom i världen pågår en kamp mellan anhängare av den liberala demokratin och auktoritära krafter. Den måste vi vinna.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Around the world there is a struggle between supporters of liberal democracy and authoritarian forces. We must win it.”
• adapt defense to new threats»Därför måste vi också anpassa vår försvarsförmåga efter nya hot mot landet.« (party programme ↗)“Therefore we must also adapt our defense capability to new threats to the country.”
• no automatic détente»Vi kan inte förutsätta att avspänning och demilitarisering ska prägla vår värld.« (party programme ↗)“We cannot assume that détente and demilitarization will characterize our world.”
• pressure on China in trade policy»pressa stora utsläppare som Kina att stänga ner sina kolkraftverk« (2022 manifesto ↗)“pressure major emitters like China to shut down their coal power plants”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan points out China as a threat that the defence alliance needs to strengthen its work against and demands that development policy be conducted without the naivety that has long been shown towards Chinese power politics. It also wants undemocratic states' acquisition of strategic assets in democracies to be viewed from a national security perspective. An updated threat assessment analysis with effective measures is an application of these commitments, although the plan does not mention any strategy document.

• the threat from Chinadecisive»Globalt behöver försvarsalliansen vidare stärka sitt arbete mot hotet från Kina.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Globally the defence alliance must further strengthen its work against the threat from China.”
• no naivety towards China»Handels- och främjandepolitiken ska stärka Sverige som aktör för en friare värld och dra nytta av frihandelns fördelar utan den naivitet som alltför länge uppvisats för kinesisk och rysk maktpolitik.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Trade and development policy shall strengthen Sweden as a champion for a freer world and benefit from the advantages of free trade without the naivety that for too long has been shown towards Chinese and Russian power politics.”
• strategic acquisitions as security issue»Den utveckling där odemokratiska eller rentav totalitära stater förvärvar strategiska tillgångar i« (party programme ↗)“The development where undemocratic or indeed totalitarian states acquire strategic assets in”
• democratization of China»mycket till ökad frihet som om Kina skulle demokratiseras.« (party programme ↗)“much to increased freedom as if China were to become democratized.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan establishes that new types of conflicts and threats require a broadened security concept and that security policy should be characterized by foresight and comprehensive solutions, while foreign policy should promote democracy and human rights. An updated strategy with new threat analysis against an increasingly authoritarian great power follows from this, with sanctions as a last resort. The demand is supported.

• broadened security conceptdecisive»Nya typer av konflikter och hot leder till ett vidgat« (party programme ↗)“New types of conflicts and threats lead to a broadened”
• foresighted security policy»Sveriges säkerhetspolitik ska präglas av samarbete, förutseende och helhetslösningar« (party programme ↗)“Sweden's security policy should be characterized by cooperation, foresight and comprehensive solutions”
• democracy and human rights in foreign policy»Svensk utrikespolitik ska främja fred, frihet, demokrati och utveckling samt mänskliga rättigheter« (party programme ↗)“Swedish foreign policy should promote peace, freedom, democracy and development as well as human rights”
• sanctions as a last resort»utväg kan bojkott och sanktioner bli aktuella.« (party programme ↗)“as a last resort, boycotts and sanctions may become relevant.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan wants to strengthen protection against foreign power's cyberattacks, espionage and theft, introduce an action plan against hybrid threats and establish a national security council for comprehensive threat assessment. The party programme states that large authoritarian countries must not be able to pit small Western democracies against each other. An updated threat picture analysis and strategy for China is in line with these commitments.

• protection against foreign powerdecisive»Ge företag som är engagerade i säkerhetskänslig verksamhet bättre stöd från staten att kunna möta cyberattacker, spionage och stöldförsök från främmande makt« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Give companies engaged in security-sensitive operations better support from the state to be able to meet cyberattacks, espionage and theft by foreign power”
• action plan against hybrid threats»Införa en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och cyberattacker« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Introduce an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyberattacks”
• comprehensive threat picture assessment»Inrätta ett nationellt säkerhetsråd på Statsrådsberedningen« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Establish a national security council at the Office of the Prime Minister”
• resist authoritarian powers»Stora auktoritära länder ska inte kunna spela ut enskilda små västerländska demokratier mot varandra.« (party programme ↗)“Large authoritarian countries must not be able to pit individual small Western democracies against each other.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan wants to develop a clear Arctic policy that prevents Chinese advances and embraces Swedish economic interests, and work for sanctions against countries with negative development. The counter-proposal's requirement for a new China strategy with updated threat assessment and effective measures follows from these commitments and from the plan's requirement that Sweden be prepared for the new security situation.

• counter Chinese advancesdecisive»En tydlig Arktispolitik ska tas fram som hindrar ryska och kinesiska framflyttningar och bejakar svenska ekonomiska intressen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“A clear Arctic policy should be developed that prevents Russian and Chinese advances and embraces Swedish economic interests.”
• sanctions against authoritarian states»Sverige bör verka för tydliga sanktioner mot Turkiet, Belarus, Ryssland och andra länder med en negativ utveckling.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should work for clear sanctions against Turkey, Belarus, Russia and other countries with negative development.”
• new security policy situation»Rusta Sverige inför en ny säkerhetspolitisk situation i vårt närområde« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Prepare Sweden for a new security policy situation in our region”
• Swedish interests protected»Värna svenska intressen i internationella sammanhang« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Protect Swedish interests in international contexts”