2026-03-182025/26:FöU10 · p.3FöUDefence

Sweden's territory and territorial integrity

Defence of Sweden's territory and investment on Gotland

What's at stake: The decision concerns where in the country defence resources are prioritised and how quickly a strategically exposed area like Gotland can be reinforced, which matters for security in the Baltic Sea region and for those who live and work on the island.

Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.

What the vote decides

The question is whether the Riksdag should already call for specific reinforcements of the defence on Gotland - a new amphibious battalion and brigade-level air defence - or whether the build-up of war units' capability should proceed uniformly across the whole country under the already decided direction.

Yes Yes — the committee proposal

The committee places great weight on building up the war organisation so that it can defend the whole of Sweden against armed attack and assert territorial integrity everywhere, without singling out any particular area, and therefore rejects calls to strengthen the defence of one specific area; motions on the Armed Forces' operational capability are rejected on the same grounds, with reference to building it up using existing resources under the goals the Riksdag has already decided.

No No — the reservations

Reservation 5 (S)

The dissenters want the investment on Gotland to continue by establishing a new operational amphibious battalion and setting up brigade-level air defence on the island, arguing that Gotland lies in the friction zone between Russia and Sweden and risks becoming a target for strategic coercion, and that the battle group already stationed there should be developed into a full tactical unit.

Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.

VSMPCLKDMSD
YesNoAbstainAbsent

What do the votes mean here?

Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).

No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 5 by S.

Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.

What each plan points to — and how the party voted

For each party: the vote its own election manifesto and party programme point to in this case, next to how the party actually voted. A plan can only point to Yes or No; a party can also abstain.

PlanVoteConfidenceEvidence
VYesYes 14/0/0/8follows the planconfidence: mediumderived
Sown reservationNoNo 0/92/0/14follows the planconfidence: mediumderived
MPYesYes 15/0/1/2follows the planconfidence: lownot addressed
CNoAbstain 0/1/20/3departs from the planconfidence: lowderived
LNoYes 10/0/0/6departs from the planconfidence: mediumderived
KDNoYes 17/0/0/2departs from the planconfidence: lowderived
MNoYes 60/0/0/8departs from the planconfidence: mediumderived
SDNoYes 62/0/0/9departs from the planconfidence: mediumderived

Broke with the party line

MPDaniel Helldén (MP, Stockholms kommun)Abstain — party line: Yes
CNiels Paarup-Petersen (C, Malmö kommun)No — party line: Abstain

MPs whose vote differs from their party's majority position in this division. Marked with a dark ring in the chamber view.

Committee proposal

The Riksdag rejects the motions 2025/26:225 by Björn Tidland (SD), 2025/26:399 by Gudrun Brunegård (KD), 2025/26:544 by Isak From et al. (S) request 4, 2025/26:1069 by Fredrik Lundh Sammeli et al. (S) request 1, 2025/26:1616 by Jennie Nilsson et al. (S), 2025/26:1659 by David Josefsson and Marie-Louise Hänel Sandström (both M), 2025/26:2475 by Jesper Skalberg Karlsson (M), 2025/26:2503 by Anna af Sillén and Ann-Sofie Lifvenhage (both M), 2025/26:2822 by Mikael Larsson et al. (C) request 1, 2025/26:2887 by David Josefsson and Marie-Louise Hänel Sandström (both M), 2025/26:3443 by Ludvig Ceimertz et al. (M) request 1, and 2025/26:3556 by Peter Hultqvist et al. (S) requests 8 and 9.

Original (Swedish)

Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2025/26:225 av Björn Tidland (SD), 2025/26:399 av Gudrun Brunegård (KD), 2025/26:544 av Isak From m.fl. (S) yrkande 4, 2025/26:1069 av Fredrik Lundh Sammeli m.fl. (S) yrkande 1, 2025/26:1616 av Jennie Nilsson m.fl. (S), 2025/26:1659 av David Josefsson och Marie-Louise Hänel Sandström (båda M), 2025/26:2475 av Jesper Skalberg Karlsson (M), 2025/26:2503 av Anna af Sillén och Ann-Sofie Lifvenhage (båda M), 2025/26:2822 av Mikael Larsson m.fl. (C) yrkande 1, 2025/26:2887 av David Josefsson och Marie-Louise Hänel Sandström (båda M), 2025/26:3443 av Ludvig Ceimertz m.fl. (M) yrkande 1 och 2025/26:3556 av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S) yrkandena 8 och 9.

Riksdag decision: The Riksdag rejected 160 proposals on total defence. The proposals were submitted during the general motion period 2025 and concern, among other things, the Swedish Armed Forces' operational capability and war organization, exercise activities and Sweden's support to Ukraine. The Riksdag refers primarily to the fact that the considerations made in the decision on total defence for the period 2025–2030 stand firm and to the ongoing work in many of the various areas that the proposers raised.

Counter-proposals

Plan vs actual vote

Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.

VVänsterpartietYesYesfollows the planderived

The plan opposes militarisation and arms race and wants Sweden to be a voice for peace and de-escalation rather than for increased military presence in the friction zone against Russia.

Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto

Reasoning and quotes

The plan opposes militarisation and arms race and wants Sweden to be a voice for peace and de-escalation rather than for increased military presence in the friction zone against Russia. It certainly wants to see a modern total defence with broad capability, but builds it on general conscription and society's robustness, not on new offensive formations. To build up an amphibian battalion and brigade air defence on Gotland therefore contradicts the plan's line.

Original (Swedish)

Planen vänder sig mot militarisering och kapprustning och vill att Sverige är en röst för fred och deeskalering snarare än för ökad militär närvaro i friktionsytan mot Ryssland. Den vill visserligen se ett modernt totalförsvar med bred förmåga, men bygger det på allmän värnplikt och samhällets robusthet, inte på nya offensiva förband. Att bygga upp amfibiebataljon och brigadluftvärn på Gotland går därför emot planens linje.

  • against militarisation and arms racedecisive»Vi vänder oss emot militarisering och kapprustning.« (party programme ↗)“We oppose militarisation and arms race.”
  • Sweden as a voice for peace»Vänsterpartiet anser att Sverige ska vara en röst för fred och rättvisa, inte för ökad militarisering.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Left Party considers that Sweden shall be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarisation.”
  • peace and disarmament»Världen behöver gå mot fred, nedrustning« (party programme ↗)“The world needs to move towards peace, disarmament”
  • total defence on a conscription basis»Vi vill se ett modernt totalförsvar byggt på allmän värnplikt, med en« (party programme ↗)“We want to see a modern total defence built on general conscription, with a”
SSocialdemokraternaNoNofollows the planderived

The plan wants the increased defence appropriations to be implemented in more conscripts, modern materiel and strengthened military presence across the country, which supports the counter-proposal's demand for a new amphibious battalion and brigade air defence on Gotland.

Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme

Reasoning and quotes

The plan wants the increased defence appropriations to be implemented in more conscripts, modern materiel and strengthened military presence across the country, which supports the counter-proposal's demand for a new amphibious battalion and brigade air defence on Gotland. The plan is built on a strong people's defence and expanded conscription. Gotland is not singled out specifically in the documents, so the position is derived from the commitment to military presence across the country.

Original (Swedish)

Planen vill att de höjda försvarsanslagen omsätts i fler värnpliktiga, modern materiel och förstärkt militär närvaro över hela landet, vilket bär motförslagets krav på en ny amfibiebataljon och brigadluftvärn på Gotland. Planen bygger på ett starkt folkförsvar och en utbyggd värnplikt. Gotland pekas inte ut särskilt i dokumenten, så ställningstagandet härleds ur åtagandet om militär närvaro i hela landet.

  • military presence across the countrydecisive»Vi vill att ökningen ska omsättas i bland annat fler värnpliktiga, modern materiel samt förstärkt militär närvaro över hela landet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We want the increase to be implemented in, among other things, more conscripts, modern materiel and strengthened military presence across the country.”
  • increased defence appropriations»Anslagen till det militära försvaret ska öka till motsvarande två procent av BNP.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Appropriations for military defence shall increase to correspond to two percent of GDP.”
  • strong people's defence»Sverige behöver bygga ett starkt folkförsvar.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden needs to build a strong people's defence.”
  • expanded conscription»Svenskt folkförsvar med utbyggd värn- och civilplikt.« (party programme ↗)“Swedish people's defence with expanded conscription and civil defence obligation.”
MPMiljöpartietYesYesfollows the plannot addressed

The plan says nothing about Gotland or how defence forces shall be sized geographically.

Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme

Reasoning and quotes

The plan says nothing about Gotland or how defence forces shall be sized geographically. The closest principle is that a larger share of defence spending should go to civil defence and emergency preparedness, and that security policy shall be characterized by pursuit of peace, détente and diplomatic solutions. Based on that prioritization, new military units on the island lie outside the plan's line, even though the plan also wants a credible comprehensive defence.

Original (Swedish)

Planen säger ingenting om Gotland eller om hur krigsförbanden ska dimensioneras geografiskt. Den närmast liggande principen är att en större andel av försvarets pengar ska gå till det civila försvaret och krisberedskapen, och att säkerhetspolitiken ska präglas av strävan efter fred, avspänning och diplomatiska lösningar. Utifrån den prioriteringen ligger nya militära förband på ön utanför planens linje, även om planen också vill ha ett trovärdigt totalförsvar.

  • civil defence prioritizeddecisive»satsa en större andel av försvarets pengar på det civila försvaret, och öka anslagen till krisberedskap.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“allocate a larger share of defence spending to civil defence and increase budgets for emergency preparedness.”
  • peace and détente»säkerhets- och försvarspolitik ska präglas av en strävan efter fred, avspänning och« (party programme ↗)“security and defence policy shall be characterized by a pursuit of peace, détente and”
  • credible comprehensive defence»diplomatiska lösningar. Samtidigt är ett starkt och trovärdigt totalförsvar – både civilt« (party programme ↗)“diplomatic solutions. At the same time, a strong and credible comprehensive defence – both civil”
CCenterpartietNoAbstaindeparts from the planderived

The plan requires that the defence be armed quickly, powerfully and long-term because Russia's invasion has shown that Sweden could be drawn into war, and that the entire country should be safe from the country's borders and inward.

Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme

Reasoning and quotes

The plan requires that the defence be armed quickly, powerfully and long-term because Russia's invasion has shown that Sweden could be drawn into war, and that the entire country should be safe from the country's borders and inward. New units and air defence on Gotland are a concrete application of that. However, the plan does not identify any geographical area, so the security is low.

Original (Swedish)

Planen kräver att försvaret rustas snabbt, kraftfullt och långsiktigt eftersom Rysslands invasion visat att Sverige kan dras in i krig, och att hela landet ska vara tryggt från landets gränser och inåt. Nya förband och luftvärn på Gotland är en konkret tillämpning av det. Planen pekar dock inte ut något geografiskt område, varför säkerheten är låg.

  • rapid rearmamentdecisive»Sverige ska försvaras. Vi vill rusta det militära försvaret snabbt, kraftfullt och långsiktigt.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall be defended. We want to arm the military defence quickly, powerfully and long-term.”
  • the threat from Russia»Rysslands folkrättsvidriga invasion har visat att vi inte kan utesluta att Sverige dras in i krig.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Russia's violation of international law invasion has shown that we cannot rule out Sweden being drawn into war.”
  • territorial integrity»Sverige måste därför kunna försvara sitt eget territorium.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden must therefore be able to defend its own territory.”
  • safety throughout the country»Vi ska stärka samhällskontraktet för ett tryggare och starkare Sverige, från landets gränser till ditt kvarter.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We will strengthen the social contract for a safer and stronger Sweden, from the country's borders to your neighbourhood.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

LLiberalernaNoYesdeparts from the planderived

The plan requires a significantly stronger military defence and that Sweden within NATO particularly contributes the infrastructure that provides strategic depth for the defence of Finland and the Baltic states.

Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme

Reasoning and quotes

The plan requires a significantly stronger military defence and that Sweden within NATO particularly contributes the infrastructure that provides strategic depth for the defence of Finland and the Baltic states. Gotland is the Swedish key position for precisely that depth, and defence's main task is to defend the entire territory. New units on the island thus lie in the plan's line.

Original (Swedish)

Planen kräver ett betydligt starkare militärt försvar och att Sverige inom Nato särskilt bidrar med den infrastruktur som ger strategiskt djup för försvaret av Finland och Baltikum. Gotland är den svenska nyckelpositionen för just det djupet, och försvarets huvuduppgift är att försvara hela territoriet. Nya förband på ön ligger därför i planens linje.

  • strategic depth in the Balticdecisive»Sverige ska inom Nato särskilt kunna bidra med den infrastruktur som behövs för att skapa ett nödvändigt och strategiskt djup för försvaret av Finland och Baltikum.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall within NATO particularly be able to contribute the infrastructure needed to create a necessary and strategic depth for the defence of Finland and the Baltic states.”
  • stronger military defence»Sverige behöver ett betydligt starkare militärt försvar än i dag.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden needs significantly stronger military defence than today.”
  • entire territory shall be defended»försvara Sveriges territorium och dess befolkning« (party programme ↗)“defend Sweden's territory and its population”
  • increased defence capability»Sveriges nationella försvarsförmåga måste öka.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden's national defence capability must increase.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

KDKristdemokraternaNoYesdeparts from the planderived

The plan requires that the defence force has such strength, composition and deployment that it acts as a war deterrent during security policy crises in the near area, which is precisely the argument the counter-proposal uses for Gotland.

Plan documents: party programme

Reasoning and quotes

The plan requires that the defence force has such strength, composition and deployment that it acts as a war deterrent during security policy crises in the near area, which is precisely the argument the counter-proposal uses for Gotland. It also establishes that territorial integrity shall be valued and that Sweden cannot remain neutral if neighbouring countries are attacked. The plan, however, does not single out any specific area or unit type, which is why the conclusion about an amphibious battalion and brigade air defence on the island is derived and uncertain.

Original (Swedish)

Planen kräver att försvaret har sådan styrka, sammansättning och gruppering att det verkar krigsavhållande vid säkerhetspolitiska kriser i närområdet, vilket är just det argument motförslaget använder för Gotland. Den slår också fast att territoriell integritet ska värnas och att Sverige inte kan stå neutralt om grannländer anfalls. Planen pekar däremot inte ut något enskilt område eller förbandstyp, varför slutsatsen om en amfibiebataljon och brigadluftvärn på ön är härledd och osäker.

  • war deterrent capability in the near areadecisive»gruppering att den kan verka krigsavhållande vid säkerhetspolitiska kriser i närområdet.« (party programme ↗)“deployment that it can act as a war deterrent during security policy crises in the near area.”
  • territorial integrity»genom att värna territoriell integritet och utöva gränsskydd samt värna fredstida yttre« (party programme ↗)“by valuing territorial integrity and exercising border protection and value peacetime external”
  • solidarity in near-area defence»Vi kan inte stå neutrala om våra grannländer anfalls.« (party programme ↗)“We cannot remain neutral if our neighbouring countries are attacked.”
  • sufficient defence resources»Det samlade totalförsvaret måste ha tillräckliga resurser för att kunna garantera« (party programme ↗)“The combined total defence must have sufficient resources to be able to guarantee”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

MModeraternaNoYesdeparts from the planderived

The plan promises to strengthen the Army, Air Force and Navy in capacity and equipment and that appropriations shall reach two per cent of GDP, and it wants Sweden to contribute concretely to security in the Baltic Sea region.

Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme

Reasoning and quotes

The plan promises to strengthen the Army, Air Force and Navy in capacity and equipment and that appropriations shall reach two per cent of GDP, and it wants Sweden to contribute concretely to security in the Baltic Sea region. New units and brigade air defence on Gotland are an application of precisely that commitment. The plan does not single out Gotland, so support is inferred.

Original (Swedish)

Planen lovar att stärka armén, flygvapnet och marinen i förmåga och materiel och att anslagen ska nå två procent av BNP, och den vill att Sverige bidrar konkret till säkerheten i Östersjöområdet. Nya förband och brigadluftvärn på Gotland är en tillämpning av just det åtagandet. Planen pekar inte ut Gotland särskilt, varför stödet härleds.

  • strengthened defence branchesdecisive(2022 manifesto)
  • security producer in the neighbourhood»Sverige bör bidra konkret till skyddet av våra vänner i de baltiska länderna, exempelvis genom att överväga att skicka bidrag till Natos stridsgrupper eller att delta med vårt stridsflyg i Natos incidentberedskap.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should contribute concretely to the protection of our friends in the Baltic countries, for example by considering sending contributions to NATO's battlegroups or participating with our fighter aircraft in NATO's incident readiness.”
  • increased defence budgets»Verka för att försvarsanslagen uppgår till motsvarande 2 procent av BNP redan år 2025« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Work towards defence appropriations amounting to 2 per cent of GDP already in 2025”
  • territorial integrity asserted»Sverige måste kunna hålla gränsen.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden must be able to hold the border.”

flags: citat_ej_verifierat

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

SDSverigedemokraternaNoYesdeparts from the planderived

The counter-proposal wants to continue investments in Gotland with an amphibious battalion and brigade air defense because the island lies in the friction zone against Russia.

Plan documents: 2022 manifesto

Reasoning and quotes

The counter-proposal wants to continue investments in Gotland with an amphibious battalion and brigade air defense because the island lies in the friction zone against Russia. The election manifesto requires that Sweden be armed for a new security policy situation in the region, that total defense be re-established with capacity to meet potential attackers and that equipment be procured. A strengthening of the most exposed area follows from these commitments.

Original (Swedish)

Motförslaget vill fortsätta satsningarna på Gotland med en amfibiebataljon och brigadluftvärn eftersom ön ligger i friktionsytan mot Ryssland. Valmanifestet kräver att Sverige rustas inför en ny säkerhetspolitisk situation i närområdet, att totalförsvaret återupprättas med förmåga att möta potentiella angripare och att materiel nyanskaffas. En förstärkning av det mest utsatta området följer av dessa åtaganden.

  • armament in the regiondecisive»Rusta Sverige inför en ny säkerhetspolitisk situation i vårt närområde« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Arm Sweden for a new security policy situation in our region”
  • capacity to meet attackers»Sverigedemokraterna vill återupprätta totalförsvaret och att Sverige ska ha förmåga att möta potentiella angripare.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden Democrats want to re-establish total defense and that Sweden shall have the capacity to meet potential attackers.”
  • total defense armed for war»Återupprätta ett totalförsvar som är rustat för krig« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Re-establish a total defense that is armed for war”
  • equipment procurement»Satsa på uppgradering, nyanskaffning och vidmakthållande av materiel« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Invest in upgrading, procurement and maintenance of equipment”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

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Sources and documents

Documents under consideration

Source: The Swedish Parliament