Direct investments

The plan establishes that Sweden needs to be able to act independently toward great powers like the USA, China and Russia and not be drawn into their geopolitical games. It simultaneously wants to strengthen common ownership in key sectors such as infrastructure and that the state acts strategically against unreasonable capital power positions. To quickly investigate a ban on Russian state-linked ownership of companies, properties and infrastructure lies in line with that.

• independence from great powersdecisive»Det är viktigt att Sverige kan agera självständigt från stormakter som« (party programme ↗)“It is important that Sweden can act independently from great powers such as”
• avoid geopolitical dependence»USA, Kina och Ryssland för att inte dras in i geopolitiska konflikter« (party programme ↗)“USA, China and Russia in order not to be drawn into geopolitical conflicts”
• common ownership in key sectors»strategiska naturtillgångar, energiförsörjning, infrastruktur, bostadsproduktion och den finansiella sektorn.« (party programme ↗)“strategic natural resources, energy supply, infrastructure, housing production and the financial sector.”
• strategic state against capital power»Staten behöver agera strategiskt för att kapitalet inte ska sitta på« (party programme ↗)“The state needs to act strategically so that capital does not sit on”

Worldstate weighed in: Sharply deteriorated security situation with outbreak of war between USA/Israel and Iran — Increases the weight of the plan's demands for national control over strategic infrastructure

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan establishes that Sweden must be able to defend itself against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyberattacks and sees it as serious when socially critical functions are owned by actors who can be controlled by foreign powers. This supports the counter-proposal's demand to quickly investigate a ban on Russian state ownership of companies, real estate and infrastructure. The plan also stands firm that Sweden in all cases shall stand up against the Russian war of invasion.

• protection against espionage and sabotagedecisive»Vi måste kunna försvara oss militärt, men också mot hybridattacker, spionage och cyberangrepp.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We must be able to defend ourselves militarily, but also against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyberattacks.”
• preparedness against hybrid threats»Beredskap mot hybridattacker.« (party programme ↗)“Preparedness against hybrid attacks.”
• firm stance against Russia»Sverige måste i alla lägen stå upp för Ukraina och mot det ryska invasionskriget.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden must in all cases stand up for Ukraine and against the Russian war of invasion.”
• protected critical infrastructure»Stark infrastruktur för stärkt beredskap.« (party programme ↗)“Strong infrastructure for strengthened preparedness.”

The plan demands that society secures control over critical infrastructure and that welfare, communication, water and electricity grid function in crises. To investigate a ban on Russian state-linked ownership of companies, properties and infrastructure is a direct expression of that demand. The plan also states that the security situation has deteriorated significantly after Russia's war of aggression and that preparedness must meet both military and other threats.

• control over critical infrastructuredecisive»kritisk infrastruktur och att välfärd, kommunikation, vatten, energiproduktion och elnät« (party programme ↗)“critical infrastructure and that welfare, communication, water, energy production and electricity grid”
• deteriorated security situation»Efter Rysslands fullskaliga och olagliga anfallskrig mot Ukraina har den säkerhets- och« (party programme ↗)“After Russia's full-scale and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the security and”
• broad threat picture»beredda att möta både militära och andra hot – såsom terrorism, klimatförändringar,« (party programme ↗)“prepared to meet both military and other threats – such as terrorism, climate change,”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan requires that Putin's war chest be drained and that all energy trade with Russia be halted, and that Sweden be rapidly and focused armed against external threats. Russian ownership of companies, properties and infrastructure that can be used for espionage and sabotage is such a threat. The plan's strong defense of property rights argues that a ban must be carefully delimited, but the direction is clear.

• drain Russian revenuedecisive»Stryp Putins krigskassa nu. Vi vill stoppa all energihandel med Ryssland och fasa ut fossila bränslen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Drain Putin's war chest now. We want to halt all energy trade with Russia and phase out fossil fuels.”
• protection against external threats»Sverige måste rustas snabbt och fokuserat; ingen ska kunna ta vårt demokratiska samhälle ifrån oss.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden must be rapidly and focused armed; no one should be able to take our democratic society away from us.”
• civil preparedness against sabotage»Även det civila försvaret är livsviktigt. Vi måste rusta civilförsvaret och samhällets beredskap inför krig och kris.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Civil defence is also vital. We must arm civil defence and society's preparedness for war and crisis.”
• property rights as counterweight»Äganderätten är central för ett samhälle där människor kan förverkliga sig själva och sina drömmar.« (party programme ↗)“Property rights are central to a society where people can realize themselves and their dreams.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan states that undemocratic and totalitarian states' acquisition of strategic assets in democratic countries must be seen as a security question, and that there is a clear risk that such assets will be used for political coercion. It also sees Russia's war of aggression as an acute threat to all of Europe's security order. That a rapid investigation of a ban on Russian state ownership in Sweden follows directly from this.

• strategic acquisitions as a security issuedecisive»Den utveckling där odemokratiska eller rentav totalitära stater förvärvar strategiska« (party programme ↗)“The development where undemocratic or even totalitarian states acquire strategic”
• risk of political coercion»Det finns en tydlig risk för att dessa utnyttjas för politisk« (party programme ↗)“There is a clear risk that these will be used for political”
• acute threat to the security order»Med det ryska anfallskriget mot Ukraina – detta angrepp mot hela Europa – är hotet mot vår säkerhetsordning akut.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“With Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine – this attack on all of Europe – the threat to our security order is acute.”
• hard line against Russia»Sverige ska vara pådrivande för att så breda globala koalitioner som möjligt bygger ut en så heltäckande sanktionsregim mot Ryssland som möjligt.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall be a driving force for as broad global coalitions as possible to build as comprehensive a sanctions regime against Russia as possible.”

The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.

The plan establishes that the threat landscape has widened and that Sweden must be able to meet attacks from international crime, terrorism and cyber warfare, which affects assets that can be used as a platform for espionage and sabotage. That aggression must never pay off speaks for rapidly investigating a ban on ownership linked to the Russian state of companies, property and infrastructure. The plan's protection of property rights simultaneously requires that such a restriction is carefully justified and legally regulated.

• protection against new threatsdecisive»Sverige måste kunna möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet, terrorism,« (party programme ↗)“Sweden must be able to meet attacks from international crime, terrorism,”
• expanded security concept»Nya typer av konflikter och hot leder till ett vidgat säkerhetsbegrepp.« (party programme ↗)“New types of conflict and threat lead to an expanded security concept.”
• aggression must not pay off»Aggression får aldrig löna sig« (party programme ↗)“Aggression must never pay off”
• protection of property rights»Rätten till egendom är en mänsklig rättighet« (party programme ↗)“The right to property is a human right”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan wants to give companies in security-sensitive activities better state support against espionage and attacks from foreign powers and promises an action plan against hybrid threats. Quickly investigating a ban on Russian state-connected ownership of companies, property and infrastructure lies directly in that line. The plan also establishes that the state's core interests are never negotiable.

• protection against foreign powersdecisive»Ge företag som är engagerade i säkerhetskänslig verksamhet bättre stöd från staten att kunna möta cyberattacker, spionage och stöldförsök från främmande makt« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Give companies engaged in security-sensitive activities better support from the state to be able to meet cyber attacks, espionage and theft attempts from foreign powers”
• measures against hybrid threats»Införa en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och cyberattacker« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Introduce an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyber attacks”
• strengthened security service»Stärka Säkerhetspolisen för att öka deras förmåga att skydda den liberala demokratin och landets alla medborgare« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen the Security Police to increase their ability to protect liberal democracy and all citizens of the country”
• inviolable state integrity»Statens hårda kärna får aldrig vara förhandlingsbar.« (party programme ↗)“The state's core interests must never be negotiable.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The counter-proposal wants a rapid investigation of a ban on the Russian state and interests linked to it owning companies, properties and infrastructure in Sweden. The plan requires clear sanctions against Russia and a policy that prevents Russian and Chinese advances and protects Swedish economic interests, and the party programme wants strategic infrastructure to be under strong public control. The requirement follows from these commitments.

• sanctions against Russiadecisive»Sverige bör verka för tydliga sanktioner mot Turkiet, Belarus, Ryssland och andra länder med en negativ utveckling.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should work for clear sanctions against Turkey, Belarus, Russia and other countries with negative development.”
• prevent Russian advances»En tydlig Arktispolitik ska tas fram som hindrar ryska och kinesiska framflyttningar och bejakar svenska ekonomiska intressen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“A clear Arctic policy should be developed that prevents Russian and Chinese advances and embraces Swedish economic interests.”
• public control over infrastructure»behålla ett betydande mått av inflytande över infrastruktur och kollektivtrafik.« (party programme ↗)“retain significant influence over infrastructure and public transport.”
• heightened security policy readiness»Rusta Sverige inför en ny säkerhetspolitisk situation i vårt närområde« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Prepare Sweden for a new security policy situation in our region”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.