NATO's strategic deterrence etc.

The counter-proposal wants NATO to strengthen its non-conventional, that is, nuclear-weapon-based, deterrence. The party programme works for a world completely free from nuclear weapons, requires a ban on nuclear weapons on Swedish soil and opposes militarisation and arms racing. The requirement therefore stands in direct contradiction to the plan's disarmament commitment.

• nuclear-weapon-free worlddecisive»värld helt fri från kärnvapen.« (party programme ↗)“world completely free from nuclear weapons.”
• ban on nuclear weapons»Vi vill se ett förbud mot kärnvapen på svensk mark och arbetar för en« (party programme ↗)“We want to see a ban on nuclear weapons on Swedish soil and work for a”
• against arms racing»Vi vänder oss emot militarisering och kapprustning.« (party programme ↗)“We oppose militarisation and arms racing.”
• nuclear weapons convention»Sverige ska öka biståndet, stärka FN och skriva under kärnvapenkonventionen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should increase aid, strengthen the UN and sign the nuclear weapons convention.”

The counter-proposal requires NATO to strengthen its non-conventional, that is nuclear-based, deterrence. The election manifesto condemns all threats of use of nuclear weapons and works for a world free from nuclear weapons, and the party programme wants to see a convention that bans nuclear weapons and that Sweden takes a leading role for disarmament and non-proliferation. The plan thus speaks against driving for expanded nuclear deterrence.

• nuclear-weapon-free worlddecisive»Vi fördömer allt hot om användning av kärnvapen och fortsätter verka för det enda rimliga slutmålet: en värld fri från kärnvapen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We condemn all threats of use of nuclear weapons and continue to work for the only reasonable end goal: a world free from nuclear weapons.”
• convention against nuclear weapons»vill vi verka för en konvention som förbjuder« (party programme ↗)“we want to work for a convention that prohibits”
• leading role for non-proliferation»I kampen mot massförstörelsevapen ska Sverige åter ta en« (party programme ↗)“In the fight against weapons of mass destruction Sweden must again take a”
• military disarmament»Militär nedrustning är en fundamental uppgift för det internationella samarbetet.« (party programme ↗)“Military disarmament is a fundamental task for international cooperation.”

The counter-proposal wants NATO to strengthen its non-conventional, that is to say nuclear-based, deterrence. The plan goes in the opposite direction: the party wants to ratify the convention on nuclear weapons prohibition, ban nuclear weapons on Swedish soil and see the elimination of nuclear weapons. The party programme's statement that no nation can threaten itself to security rejects the logic of deterrence as such.

• nuclear weapons prohibitiondecisive»ratificera konventionen om kärnvapenförbud och arbeta för ett totalförbud mot att använda autonoma vapensystem.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“ratify the convention on nuclear weapons prohibition and work for a total ban on the use of autonomous weapons systems.”
• elimination of nuclear weapons»Vi vill se en avveckling av kärnvapen och andra massförstörelsevapen.« (party programme ↗)“We want to see the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.”
• deterrence does not provide security»Ingen nation kan hota sig till säkerhet eller kriga sig till fred.« (party programme ↗)“No nation can threaten itself to security or war itself to peace.”
• disarmament ahead of rearmament»Sverige ska ta initiativ till internationell nedrustning och bör gå före och nedrusta utifrån aktuella och politiskt förankrade hotbildsbedömningar.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden should take the initiative for international disarmament and should lead by example and disarm based on current and politically anchored threat assessments.”

The plan does not take a position on nuclear deterrence or on NATO's China policy. The closest commitments are that defence shall be strengthened rapidly and forcefully within NATO, that détente cannot be assumed and that defence capability shall be adapted to new threats. Derived from this, the plan supports the counter-proposal's demand for strengthened deterrence, but the conclusion is uncertain.

• rearmament within NATOdecisive»Sverige ska försvaras. Vi vill rusta det militära försvaret snabbt, kraftfullt och långsiktigt. Sverige behöver satsa två procent av BNP på försvaret så snart det är praktiskt möjligt och gå med i Nato.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall be defended. We want to strengthen the military defence rapidly, forcefully and long-term. Sweden needs to invest two per cent of GDP in defence as soon as practically possible and join NATO.”
• no assumed détente»Vi kan inte förutsätta att avspänning och demilitarisering ska prägla vår värld.« (party programme ↗)“We cannot assume that détente and demilitarization will characterize our world.”
• resist authoritarian forces»Runtom i världen pågår en kamp mellan anhängare av den liberala demokratin och auktoritära krafter. Den måste vi vinna.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Around the world there is a struggle between supporters of liberal democracy and authoritarian forces. We must win it.”
• adapted defence capability»Därför måste vi också anpassa vår försvarsförmåga efter nya hot mot landet.« (party programme ↗)“Therefore we must also adapt our defence capability to new threats to the country.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The election manifesto establishes that the global defence alliance needs to strengthen its work against the threat from China, which is the core of the counter-proposal's China component. The plan also builds on security being created through alliances and that the threat to the security order from Russia is acute, which supports strengthened deterrence within NATO. The nuclear weapons question is not addressed explicitly, so support is derived from the plan's alliance and threat perception line.

• NATO against the threat from Chinadecisive»Globalt behöver försvarsalliansen vidare stärka sitt arbete mot hotet från Kina.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Globally, the defence alliance needs to further strengthen its work against the threat from China.”
• deterrence through alliance»I dag skapas trygghet i allianser, inte i allianslöshet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Today security is created through alliances, not through alliance-free policies.”
• acute threat from Russia»Med det ryska anfallskriget mot Ukraina – detta angrepp mot hela Europa – är hotet mot vår säkerhetsordning akut.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“With the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine – this attack on all of Europe – the threat to our security order is acute.”
• no naivety towards China»dra nytta av frihandelns fördelar utan den naivitet som alltför länge uppvisats för kinesisk och rysk maktpolitik« (2022 manifesto ↗)“benefit from the advantages of free trade without the naivety that has been shown too long towards Chinese and Russian power politics”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan requires a defence force that can act as a deterrent and that Sweden shall be able to meet attacks including with nuclear weapons, while close NATO cooperation is a natural part of security policy. Strengthening deterrence thus lies within the plan's logic. The plan, however, says nothing about China or about the design of nuclear arsenals, and it conditions all weapons use with defensive purpose, which is why the basis is weak.

• deterrent capabilitydecisive»kan verka krigsavhållande vid säkerhetspolitiska kriser« (party programme ↗)“can act as a deterrent in security policy crises”
• meet nuclear weapons threats»möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet, terrorism, cyberkrigföring, biologiska vapen, kemiska vapen« (party programme ↗)“meet attacks from international crime, terrorism, cyberwarfare, biological weapons, chemical weapons”
• close NATO cooperation»med NATO bör, givet nämnda kriterier, vara en naturlig del av svensk säkerhetspolitik.« (party programme ↗)“with NATO should, given the mentioned criteria, be a natural part of Swedish security policy.”
• only defensive purpose»Aggression och offensivt krig är inte etiskt försvarbart.« (party programme ↗)“Aggression and offensive war are not ethically defensible.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan's goal for defence is explicitly deterrent effect and deterrence of a possible attacker, and Sweden shall have a high ambition level in Nato. The counter-proposal's demand for strengthened non-conventional deterrence and broader response to China's military build-up aligns with that deterrence logic and with the plan's line of building security together with like-minded nations. The documents however do not state positions on Nato's nuclear arsenals or on Southeast Asia, hence the conclusion is derived.

• deterrent defencedecisive»Målet är att det svenska försvaret ska vara krigsavhållande och avskräcka en eventuell motståndare från att angripa Sverige.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The goal is that Swedish defence shall be deterrent and deter a possible adversary from attacking Sweden.”
• high Nato ambition»Moderaterna vill sätta en hög ambitionsnivå för Sverige som blivande Natomedlem.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Moderates wish to set a high ambition level for Sweden as a future Nato member.”
• cooperation with like-minded»Sverige ska fortsätta att tillsammans med likasinnade nationer« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall continue to together with like-minded nations”
• resist authoritarian great powers»Stora auktoritära länder ska inte kunna spela ut enskilda små västerländska demokratier mot varandra.« (party programme ↗)“Large authoritarian states shall not be able to play individual small Western democracies off against each other.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan's defense goal is explicitly a war-deterrent capability, that is to say deterrence, and it wants to arm Sweden for the worsened situation in the near region. The plan also points to both Russian and Chinese advances as something Swedish policy should prevent and favors a hard line against Russia. NATO strengthening its deterrence and broadening its response to China's development thus aligns with the plan's direction.

• war-deterring deterrencedecisive»Målet är en krigsavhållande försvarsförmåga med kapacitet att möta främmande aggressioner, men som också kan bistå samhället i kris eller oro.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The goal is a war-deterring defense capability with the capacity to meet foreign aggression, but which can also assist society in crisis or unrest.”
• meet Russian and Chinese advance»En tydlig Arktispolitik ska tas fram som hindrar ryska och kinesiska framflyttningar och bejakar svenska ekonomiska intressen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“A clear Arctic policy shall be developed that prevents Russian and Chinese advances and embraces Swedish economic interests.”
• hard line against authoritarian states»Sverige bör verka för tydliga sanktioner mot Turkiet, Belarus, Ryssland och andra länder med en negativ utveckling.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should work for clear sanctions against Turkey, Belarus, Russia and other countries with negative developments.”
• rearmament in response to new threats»Rusta Sverige inför en ny säkerhetspolitisk situation i vårt närområde« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Arm Sweden for a new security policy situation in our near region”