2024-05-302023/24:UU11 · p.1UUForeign affairs
Security policy direction
Sweden's security policy direction as a NATO member
What's at stake: The decision shapes how Sweden balances strong alliance commitment against independent demands on NATO regarding nuclear weapons use, democratic backsliding within the alliance, and parliamentary insight into NATO decisions, affecting Sweden's security, international credibility, and the degree of democratic control over alliance matters.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is whether Sweden, as a NATO member, should continue an unconditional solidarity-based alliance security policy, or whether Sweden should push specific demands within NATO - such as a no-first-use pledge on nuclear weapons, a democracy requirement for member states, and greater transparency and parliamentary oversight - while refusing permanent NATO troops on Swedish territory.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee agrees with the government that Sweden, as a loyal member of NATO and the EU, should continue building security together with others and pursue a solidarity-based alliance policy that strengthens security in its neighbourhood and across the Euro-Atlantic area. Sweden should uphold binding mutual defence guarantees and a strong national defence capability, while its foreign and security policy safeguards international law, human rights and the rules-based world order within NATO, the EU, the UN and the OSCE.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 3 (V, MP)
The reservation (V, MP) calls for Sweden to push the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons within NATO, work for the alliance to introduce a democracy requirement for member states, press for greater transparency in NATO and stronger parliamentary scrutiny of NATO matters, hold consultations with relevant committees ahead of NATO ministerial and summit meetings, and for Sweden to have no permanent NATO troops on Swedish soil in peacetime. The reasoning is that NATO's reservation of the right to use nuclear weapons first hampers disarmament, that democratic standards are deteriorating in several member states, and that transparency and democratic anchoring need to be strengthened.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 3 by V, MP.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
What each plan points to — and how the party voted
For each party: the vote its own election manifesto and party programme point to in this case, next to how the party actually voted. A plan can only point to Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| Plan | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | No | No 0/19/0/5 | follows the plan | confidence: high | explicit |
| S | Yes | Abstain 0/0/90/16 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
| MP | No | No 0/14/0/4 | follows the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
| C | Yes | Abstain 0/0/18/6 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | derived |
| L | Yes | Yes 12/0/0/4 | follows the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
| KD | Yes | Yes 15/0/0/4 | follows the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
| M | Yes | Yes 57/0/0/11 | follows the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
| SD | Yes | Abstain 2/0/58/12 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | derived |
Broke with the party line
| SDJulia Kronlid (SD, Stockholms län) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SDYasmine Eriksson (SD, Västra Götalands läns västra) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
MPs whose vote differs from their party's majority position in this division. Marked with a dark ring in the chamber view.
Committee proposal
The Riksdag rejects the motions 2022/23:849 by Kerstin Lundgren et al. (C) proposals 3 and 6, 2022/23:850 by Mikael Larsson et al. (C) proposal 2, 2022/23:1465 by Emma Berginger et al. (MP) proposal 5, 2022/23:1764 by Aron Emilsson et al. (SD) proposal 4, 2023/24:482 by Aron Emilsson et al. (SD) proposal 4, 2023/24:1879 by Emma Berginger et al. (MP) proposals 3-6, 2023/24:2466 by Kerstin Lundgren et al. (C) proposals 6, 8, 9 and 11 as well as 2023/24:2562 by Morgan Johansson et al. (S) proposals 2 and 12.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2022/23:849 av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C) yrkandena 3 och 6, 2022/23:850 av Mikael Larsson m.fl. (C) yrkande 2, 2022/23:1465 av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP) yrkande 5, 2022/23:1764 av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD) yrkande 4, 2023/24:482 av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD) yrkande 4, 2023/24:1879 av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP) yrkandena 3-6, 2023/24:2466 av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C) yrkandena 6, 8, 9 och 11 samt 2023/24:2562 av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S) yrkandena 2 och 12.
Riksdag decision: The Riksdag voted no to approximately 60 proposals in motions about certain security policy issues from the general motion period 2023. The proposals deal with, for example, security policy direction, international operations, and disarmament. The Riksdag refers, among other things, to the fact that work is already underway within the areas that the motions address.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants Sweden to advocate for a nuclear policy based on the no first use principle within NATO and oppose permanent NATO bases on Swedish territory. (V, MP) — Reservation 3
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The plan wants to tear up the host nation agreement with NATO, ban nuclear weapons on Swedish territory and holds firm on the goal of leaving the alliance and that Sweden should be free from foreign military bases.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan wants to tear up the host nation agreement with NATO, ban nuclear weapons on Swedish territory and holds firm on the goal of leaving the alliance and that Sweden should be free from foreign military bases. The counter-proposal's requirements for no first use, democracy requirements, increased openness, sharpened parliamentary scrutiny and no permanent foreign troops in peacetime point in the same direction as these commitments. The plan therefore speaks for the counter-proposal's requirements in substance.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vill riva upp värdlandsavtalet med Nato, förbjuda kärnvapen på svensk mark och håller fast vid siktet på att lämna alliansen samt att Sverige ska vara fritt från främmande militärbaser. Motförslagets krav på no first use, demokratikrav, ökad öppenhet, skärpt riksdagsgranskning och inga permanenta utländska trupper i fredstid pekar i samma riktning som dessa åtaganden. Planen talar därför för motförslagets krav i sak.
- no foreign troops via host nation agreementdecisive»Vänsterpartiet vill att Sverige river upp värdlandsavtalet med NATO.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Left Party wants Sweden to tear up the host nation agreement with NATO.”
- nuclear weapons ban on Swedish territory»Vi vill se ett förbud mot kärnvapen på svensk mark och arbetar för en« (party programme ↗)“We want to see a ban on nuclear weapons on Swedish territory and work for a”
- goal of leaving NATO»med sikte på att lämna Nato.« (party programme ↗)“with the goal of leaving NATO.”
- opposition to deeper NATO integration»Därför är Vänsterpartiet motståndare till Sveriges allt djupare militära samarbete med NATO och EU, och vi är det enda riksdagspartiet som konsekvent värnar och vill återupprätta svensk alliansfrihet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Therefore, the Left Party is an opponent of Sweden's increasingly deeper military cooperation with NATO and the EU, and we are the only Riksdag party that consistently values and wants to restore Swedish non-alignment.”
The election manifesto establishes that NATO membership is the best path for Sweden's security and that cooperation with security guarantees needs to be deepened, without reservations about democracy requirements on allies or limitations of allied presence.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto establishes that NATO membership is the best path for Sweden's security and that cooperation with security guarantees needs to be deepened, without reservations about democracy requirements on allies or limitations of allied presence. The counter-proposal's package conditions membership in a way the plan does not endorse, although the plan shares the goal of nuclear disarmament. The plan therefore speaks against the counter-proposal's requirements.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet slår fast att Nato-medlemskapet är den bästa vägen för Sveriges säkerhet och att samarbetet med säkerhetsgarantier behöver fördjupas, utan förbehåll om demokratikrav på allierade eller begränsningar av allierad närvaro. Motförslagets paket villkorar medlemskapet på ett sätt planen inte ställer sig bakom, även om planen delar målet om kärnvapennedrustning. Planen talar därför emot motförslagets krav.
- NATO membership as a security choicedecisive»Sverige ska gå med i Nato. Ett svenskt medlemskap i Nato är den bästa vägen för vårt lands säkerhet och Sverige har därför lämnat in sin medlemsansökan.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden must join NATO. A Swedish membership in NATO is the best path for our country's security and Sweden has therefore submitted its membership application.”
- deepened security cooperation»nu krävs ännu mer samarbete, med säkerhetsgarantier, för att trygga vår fred och frihet« (2022 manifesto ↗)“now more cooperation is required, with security guarantees, to secure our peace and freedom”
- increased rearmament pace»Takten i upprustningen ska öka ytterligare.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The pace of rearmament must increase further.”
- nuclear disarmament as goal»Vi fördömer allt hot om användning av kärnvapen och fortsätter verka för det enda rimliga slutmålet: en värld fri från kärnvapen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We condemn all threats of use of nuclear weapons and continue to work for the only reasonable end goal: a world free from nuclear weapons.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The election manifesto wants to ban nuclear weapons on Swedish territory and rejects that Sweden adapts its foreign policy according to authoritarian states' demands on the NATO question, while the party programme requires that the leasing of Swedish territory to NATO forces ceases and that power can always be scrutinized.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto wants to ban nuclear weapons on Swedish territory and rejects that Sweden adapts its foreign policy according to authoritarian states' demands on the NATO question, while the party programme requires that the leasing of Swedish territory to NATO forces ceases and that power can always be scrutinized. The counter-proposal's requirement for no first use, democracy requirements, increased transparency and no permanent foreign troops follows from these commitments.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet vill förbjuda kärnvapen på svensk mark och avvisar att Sverige anpassar sin utrikespolitik efter auktoritära staters krav i Natofrågan, medan partiprogrammet kräver att uthyrningen av svensk mark till Nato-styrkor upphör och att makten alltid ska kunna granskas. Motförslagets krav på no first use, demokratikrav, ökad öppenhet och inga permanenta utländska trupper följer av dessa åtaganden.
- no nuclear weapons on Swedish territorydecisive»införa en lag som förbjuder kärnvapen på svensk mark.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“introduce a law that bans nuclear weapons on Swedish territory.”
- democracy requirements in NATO cooperation»inte att Sverige ska anpassa sin utrikespolitik efter auktoritära staters krav för kunna att bli medlem i Nato och Sverige ska inte börja sälja vapen till Turkiet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“not that Sweden should adapt its foreign policy according to authoritarian states' demands in order to become a NATO member and Sweden should not begin to sell weapons to Turkey.”
- no foreign troops on Swedish territory»Uthyrningen av svensk mark till NATO och andra utländska militärstyrkor för krigsövningar ska också upphöra.« (party programme ↗)“The leasing of Swedish territory to NATO and other foreign military forces for military exercises shall also cease.”
- transparency and scrutiny of power»Medborgarna ska alltid kunna granska makten.« (party programme ↗)“Citizens shall always be able to scrutinize power.”
The manifesto's decisive commitment is to carry through NATO accession and rapidly and powerfully strengthen defence.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The manifesto's decisive commitment is to carry through NATO accession and rapidly and powerfully strengthen defence. The counter-proposal's package, particularly the ban on permanent allied troops in peacetime and a no first use line, limits the defence cooperation the plan wants to deepen. The requirements for democracy requirements and increased transparency do lie close to the party's democracy commitments, but they do not outweigh the restriction on defence capability.
Original (Swedish)
Manifestets avgörande åtagande är att fullfölja Natointrädet och rusta försvaret snabbt och kraftfullt. Motförslagets paket, särskilt förbudet mot permanent allierad trupp i fredstid och en no first use-linje, begränsar det försvarssamarbete planen vill fördjupa. Kraven på demokratikrav och ökad öppenhet ligger visserligen nära partiets demokratiåtaganden, men de väger inte upp inskränkningen av försvarsförmågan.
- carry through NATO accessiondecisive»Centerpartiet vill rusta försvaret, stärka Sveriges civila beredskap och fullfölja inträdet i Nato.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Centre Party wants to strengthen defence, strengthen Sweden's civil preparedness and carry through NATO membership.”
- increased defence spending»Sverige behöver satsa två procent av BNP på försvaret så snart det är praktiskt möjligt och gå med i Nato.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden needs to spend two percent of GDP on defence as soon as practically possible and join NATO.”
- independent territorial defence»Sverige måste därför kunna försvara sitt eget territorium.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden must therefore be able to defend its own territory.”
- increased transparency»Sverige ska bli ännu mer transparent.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall become even more transparent.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan wants Sweden to participate fully in NATO and in particular contribute with the infrastructure that creates strategic depth for the defence of Finland and the Baltic, which is difficult to reconcile with the counter-proposal's requirement that no permanent foreign troops be present in Sweden in peacetime.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan wants Sweden to participate fully in NATO and in particular contribute with the infrastructure that creates strategic depth for the defence of Finland and the Baltic, which is difficult to reconcile with the counter-proposal's requirement that no permanent foreign troops be present in Sweden in peacetime. The requirement for a no first use principle similarly contradicts the plan's line that security is created in alliances and that defence capability shall be significantly strengthened. The plan does not express a position on nuclear doctrine, which is why the conclusion is derived.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vill att Sverige deltar fullt ut i Nato och särskilt bidrar med den infrastruktur som skapar strategiskt djup för försvaret av Finland och Baltikum, vilket är svårförenligt med motförslagets krav på att inga permanenta utländska trupper får finnas i Sverige i fredstid. Kravet på en no first use-princip går på samma sätt emot planens linje att trygghet skapas i allianser och att försvarsförmågan kraftigt ska stärkas. Planen uttalar sig inte om kärnvapendoktrin, varför slutsatsen är härledd.
- Swedish host nation role in NATOdecisive»Sverige ska inom Nato särskilt kunna bidra med den infrastruktur som behövs för att skapa ett nödvändigt och strategiskt djup för försvaret av Finland och Baltikum.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall within NATO particularly be able to contribute with the infrastructure needed to create necessary strategic depth for the defence of Finland and the Baltic.”
- security through alliances»I dag skapas trygghet i allianser, inte i allianslöshet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Today, security is created in alliances, not in non-alignment.”
- cooperation with democracies»Grunden för Sveriges säkerhetspolitik ska vara samarbete med andra demokratier.« (party programme ↗)“The basis for Sweden's security policy shall be cooperation with other democracies.”
- strengthened defence capability»Sverige behöver ett betydligt starkare militärt försvar än i dag.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden needs significantly stronger military defence than today.”
The decisive point in the plan is a defence that can act as a deterrent and close cooperation with NATO as a natural part of security policy.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The decisive point in the plan is a defence that can act as a deterrent and close cooperation with NATO as a natural part of security policy. The counter-proposal's requirement for no first use and that no permanent foreign troops shall be present in peacetime contradicts this line. The plan instead supports democracy requirements for partner countries and national self-determination in defence matters. On balance, the requirement is rejected.
Original (Swedish)
Det avgörande i planen är ett försvar som kan verka krigsavhållande och ett nära samarbete med Nato som naturlig del av säkerhetspolitiken. Motförslagets krav på no first use och på att inga permanenta utländska trupper får finnas i fredstid motverkar den linjen. Planen stöder däremot demokratikrav på samarbetsländer och nationellt självbestämmande i försvarsfrågor. Sammantaget avvisas kravet.
- deterrent defence capabilitydecisive»kan verka krigsavhållande vid säkerhetspolitiska kriser« (party programme ↗)“can act as a deterrent in security policy crises”
- close cooperation with NATO»med NATO bör, givet nämnda kriterier, vara en naturlig del av svensk säkerhetspolitik.« (party programme ↗)“with NATO should, given the mentioned criteria, be a natural part of Swedish security policy.”
- national self-determination in defence»självständigt få ta ställning till deltagande i ett eventuellt gemensamt territorialförsvar.« (party programme ↗)“independently be able to take a position on participation in a possible collective territorial defence.”
- democracy requirements for partner countries»unionen är öppen för varje europeiskt land som delar grundläggande värden om demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter« (party programme ↗)“the union is open to every European country that shares fundamental values of democracy and human rights”
The plan wants to set a high ambition level in Nato and get the most possible effect from membership, including concrete troop contributions in the neighbourhood.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan wants to set a high ambition level in Nato and get the most possible effect from membership, including concrete troop contributions in the neighbourhood. The counter-proposal demands Swedish reservations in the form of no first use, democracy demands on member states and prohibition of permanent foreign troops in peacetime, which limits precisely the integration the plan seeks. The plan therefore rejects the demand in substance.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vill sätta en hög ambitionsnivå i Nato och få ut mesta möjliga effekt av medlemskapet, inklusive konkreta truppbidrag i närområdet. Motförslaget kräver svenska förbehåll i form av no first use, demokratikrav på medlemsländer och förbud mot permanent utländsk trupp i fredstid, vilket begränsar just den integration planen eftersträvar. Planen avvisar därför kravet i sak.
- concrete contributions in the neighbourhooddecisive»Sverige bör bidra konkret till skyddet av våra vänner i de baltiska länderna, exempelvis genom att överväga att skicka bidrag till Natos stridsgrupper eller att delta med vårt stridsflyg i Natos incidentberedskap.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should contribute concretely to the protection of our friends in the Baltic countries, for example by considering sending contributions to Nato's battle groups or by participating with our fighter aircraft in Nato's incident readiness.”
- high ambition in Nato»Moderaterna vill sätta en hög ambitionsnivå för Sverige som blivande Natomedlem.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Moderate Party wants to set a high ambition level for Sweden as a future Nato member.”
- deterrent defence»Målet är att det svenska försvaret ska vara krigsavhållande och avskräcka en eventuell motståndare från att angripa Sverige.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The goal is that Swedish defence shall be deterrent and deter a potential adversary from attacking Sweden.”
- full membership»Vi ska vara en fullvärdig medlem i Nato« (party programme ↗)“We shall be a full member of Nato”
The counter-proposal wants to bind the alliance's nuclear doctrine through no first use and condition membership with democracy demands.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The counter-proposal wants to bind the alliance's nuclear doctrine through no first use and condition membership with democracy demands. The election manifesto's crucial commitment is a war-deterrent defense capability and deepened defense cooperation, which speaks against weakening the deterrent. At the same time the plan gives support to parts of the demand—national self-determination and clear markings against member countries with negative development—so the assessment is uncertain.
Original (Swedish)
Motförslaget vill binda alliansens kärnvapendoktrin genom no first use och villkora medlemskapet med demokratikrav. Valplattformens avgörande åtagande är en krigsavhållande försvarsförmåga och ett fördjupat försvarssamarbete, vilket talar mot att försvaga avskräckningen. Samtidigt ger planen stöd åt delar av kravet - nationellt självbestämmande och tydliga markeringar mot medlemsländer med negativ utveckling - varför bedömningen är osäker.
- war-deterrent defense capabilitydecisive»Målet är en krigsavhållande försvarsförmåga med kapacitet att möta främmande aggressioner« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The goal is a war-deterrent defense capability with capacity to meet foreign aggression”
- deepened defense cooperation»Fördjupa det nordiska försvars- och säkerhetssamarbetet« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Deepen Nordic defense and security cooperation”
- national self-determination»Stärka det nationella självbestämmandet« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen national self-determination”
- demands on authoritarian states»Sverige bör verka för tydliga sanktioner mot Turkiet, Belarus, Ryssland och andra länder med en negativ utveckling.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should work for clear sanctions against Turkey, Belarus, Russia, and other countries with a negative development.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2023/24:UU11)
- Committee report full text (HB01UU11)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2022/23:1465 — Förbud mot kärnvapen och krav på Sveriges framtida Natomedlemskap av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2022/23:1763 — Säkerhetspolitisk utredning av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2022/23:1764 — Säkerhetspolitik av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2022/23:2012 — Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2022/23:2041 — Utgiftsområde 5 Internationell samverkan av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2022/23:247 — Försvarsmakten, klimat och miljö av Nooshi Dadgostar m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2022/23:848 — En bättre digital säkerhet - stärkt cybersäkerhet för nutid och framtid av Niels Paarup-Petersen m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2022/23:849 — Internationellt samarbete i en ny tid av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2022/23:850 — Ett mer krigsdugligt militärt försvar i hela landet av Mikael Larsson m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2022/23:948 — Totalförsvaret av Sven-Olof Sällström m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2023/24:1879 — Arbete för kärnvapennedrustning och förhållningssätt till Nato av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2023/24:2466 — Utrikes- och biståndspolitik av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2023/24:2562 — Internationell samverkan av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2023/24:2564 — Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2023/24:2568 — Kärnvapenfritt Stockholm och Sverige av Daniel Vencu Velasquez Castro m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2023/24:2658 — Bevara förbehållet om att inte tillåta kärnvapen på svensk mark av Jytte Guteland (S)
- Motion 2023/24:461 — Cybersäkerhet av Hanna Gunnarsson m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2023/24:462 — Nordafrika och Mellanöstern av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2023/24:464 — Förbud mot mördarrobotar av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2023/24:478 — Rymdstrategi av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD)
Source: The Swedish Parliament