2024-05-302023/24:UU11 · p.6UUForeign affairs
Disarmament
Sweden's role in nuclear disarmament and its relationship to the UN nuclear weapons ban treaty (TPNW)
What's at stake: The decision affects how actively Sweden pushes the international effort for nuclear disarmament, including ahead of the NPT review conference, and how Sweden, as a NATO member, relates to a treaty that bans nuclear weapons outright. It concerns the global disarmament process and Sweden's credibility on the issue.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is whether Sweden, beyond its current engagement in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Stockholm Initiative, should actively push for the UN's nuclear weapons ban treaty (TPNW) to be developed further and gain global support, or whether the existing disarmament approach is sufficient.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee rejects the motions for a more assertive Swedish stance on TPNW. The reason is that the committee stands by its earlier assessment that Sweden's disarmament work is not affected by NATO membership, and that its engagement through the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Stockholm Initiative - where Sweden holds a leading role alongside, among others, Germany - is judged to be the right path ahead of the next review conference.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 13 (S)
The reservation calls for Sweden to take a more leading and assertive role in nuclear disarmament, including by actively contributing, as an observer to the UN's nuclear weapons ban treaty (TPNW), to the treaty being developed, gaining global support and leading to real disarmament. The reason given is that the trend is moving in the wrong direction - countries are rearming and modernising their arsenals, distrust is rising, and one country has elevated the role of nuclear weapons in its military doctrine - which means the lack of trust between countries must be bridged through concrete commitments.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 13 by S.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
The decision would have gone the other way
Explicit commitments that contradicted the vote: MPMiljöpartiet, VVänsterpartiet
Ja 120–88Nej 87–121
Counterfactual: the parties above are moved to the position their own documents explicitly point at, carrying their whole contingent present. Every other party keeps its real figures, including dissenters and absentees.
How the AI parties would have voted
For each party: what its own plan – election manifesto and party programme – argues for in this case, next to how the party actually voted. The AI can only answer Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| AI | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | No | Yes 19/0/0/5 | differsagainst own programme | confidence: high | explicit |
| S | No | No 2/88/0/16 | match | confidence: medium | derived |
| MP | No | Yes 14/0/0/4 | differsagainst own programme | confidence: high | explicit |
| C | Yes | Abstain 0/0/18/6 | differs | confidence: low | not addressed |
| L | Yes | Yes 12/0/0/4 | match | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| KD | Yes | Yes 15/0/0/4 | match | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| M | Yes | Yes 57/0/0/11 | match | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| SD | Yes | Abstain 1/0/59/12 | differs | confidence: medium | not addressed |
Broke with the party line
| SAnders Ygeman (S, Stockholms kommun) | Yes — party line: No |
| SOlle Thorell (S, Västmanlands län) | Yes — party line: No |
| SDYasmine Eriksson (SD, Västra Götalands läns västra) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
MPs whose vote differs from their party's majority position in this division. Marked with a dark ring in the chamber view.
Committee proposal
The Riksdag rejects the motions 2022/23:849 by Kerstin Lundgren et al. (C) proposals 56 and 57, 2022/23:1764 by Aron Emilsson et al. (SD) proposals 5 and 18, 2022/23:2041 by Morgan Johansson et al. (S) proposal 7, 2023/24:482 by Aron Emilsson et al. (SD) proposals 5 and 16, 2023/24:1879 by Emma Berginger et al. (MP) proposals 1 and 2, 2023/24:2466 by Kerstin Lundgren et al. (C) proposal 45 and 2023/24:2562 by Morgan Johansson et al. (S) proposal 9 in this part.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2022/23:849 av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C) yrkandena 56 och 57, 2022/23:1764 av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD) yrkandena 5 och 18, 2022/23:2041 av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S) yrkande 7, 2023/24:482 av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD) yrkandena 5 och 16, 2023/24:1879 av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP) yrkandena 1 och 2, 2023/24:2466 av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C) yrkande 45 och 2023/24:2562 av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S) yrkande 9 i denna del.
Riksdag decision: The Riksdag voted no to approximately 60 proposals in motions about certain security policy issues from the general motion period 2023. The proposals deal with, for example, security policy direction, international operations, and disarmament. The Riksdag refers, among other things, to the fact that work is already underway within the areas that the motions address.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants Sweden to continue its military, economic, and humanitarian support to Ukraine and not permit nuclear weapons or permanent military bases on Swedish territory. (S) — Reservation 13
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The election manifesto explicitly requires that Sweden signs the nuclear weapons convention and strengthens the UN, and the party programme wants to see a ban on nuclear weapons on Swedish soil and works for a world completely free from nuclear weapons.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto explicitly requires that Sweden signs the nuclear weapons convention and strengthens the UN, and the party programme wants to see a ban on nuclear weapons on Swedish soil and works for a world completely free from nuclear weapons. The counter-proposal's requirement for a more driving role in nuclear weapons disarmament, including as an observer to the prohibition convention, thus lies within the plan's stated commitment. That disarmament would be sufficient through the NPT track is not encompassed by the plan's ambition level.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet kräver uttryckligen att Sverige skriver under kärnvapenkonventionen och stärker FN, och partiprogrammet vill se ett förbud mot kärnvapen på svensk mark och arbetar för en värld helt fri från kärnvapen. Motförslagets krav på en mer pådrivande roll i kärnvapennedrustningen, bland annat som observatör till förbudskonventionen, ligger därmed inom planens uttalade åtagande. Att nedrustningen skulle vara tillräcklig genom NPT-spåret ryms inte i planens ambitionsnivå.
- sign the nuclear weapons conventiondecisive»Sverige ska öka biståndet, stärka FN och skriva under kärnvapenkonventionen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should increase aid, strengthen the UN and sign the nuclear weapons convention.”
- nuclear weapon-free world»Vi vill se ett förbud mot kärnvapen på svensk mark och arbetar för en« (party programme ↗)“We want to see a ban on nuclear weapons on Swedish soil and work for a”
- disarmament and fewer weapons»Världen behöver gå mot fred, nedrustning« (party programme ↗)“The world needs to move towards peace, disarmament”
- driving peace voice»Vänsterpartiet anser att Sverige ska vara en röst för fred och rättvisa, inte för ökad militarisering.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Left Party believes that Sweden should be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarisation.”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The election manifesto establishes that the party continues to work for a world free from nuclear weapons, and the party programme wants Sweden to again take a leading role in disarmament work.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto establishes that the party continues to work for a world free from nuclear weapons, and the party programme wants Sweden to again take a leading role in disarmament work. The counter-proposal precisely demands a more pushing role, including active observer status to the ban treaty, which fits within these commitments. The plan therefore speaks in favour of the counter-proposal's demand.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet slår fast att partiet fortsätter verka för en värld fri från kärnvapen, och partiprogrammet vill att Sverige åter tar en ledande roll i nedrustningsarbetet. Motförslaget kräver just en mer pådrivande roll, inklusive aktivt observatörskap till förbudskonventionen, vilket ryms inom dessa åtaganden. Planen talar därför för motförslagets krav.
- world free from nuclear weaponsdecisive»Vi fördömer allt hot om användning av kärnvapen och fortsätter verka för det enda rimliga slutmålet: en värld fri från kärnvapen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We condemn any threat of use of nuclear weapons and continue to work for the only reasonable end goal: a world free from nuclear weapons.”
- leading role in disarmament»ledande roll i det internationella arbetet för avspänning, nedrustning och icke-spridning.« (party programme ↗)“leading role in international work for détente, disarmament and non-proliferation.”
- disarmament as main task»Militär nedrustning är en fundamental uppgift för det internationella samarbetet.« (party programme ↗)“Military disarmament is a fundamental task for international cooperation.”
- strong global voice»Sverige ska vara en stark global röst. Vi har en lång historia av att stå upp för folkrätten, solidaritet, nedrustning, demokrati och jämställdhet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should be a strong global voice. We have a long history of standing up for international law, solidarity, disarmament, democracy and equality.”
The election manifesto demands that Sweden ratifies the nuclear weapons ban convention and enacts a law banning nuclear weapons on Swedish soil, and the party programme wants Sweden to take the initiative for international disarmament and go ahead.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto demands that Sweden ratifies the nuclear weapons ban convention and enacts a law banning nuclear weapons on Swedish soil, and the party programme wants Sweden to take the initiative for international disarmament and go ahead. The counter-proposal's demand for a more leading and driving role, among other things as an active observer to the ban convention, directly aligns with the plan—which goes even further.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet kräver att Sverige ratificerar konventionen om kärnvapenförbud och inför en lag som förbjuder kärnvapen på svensk mark, och partiprogrammet vill att Sverige tar initiativ till internationell nedrustning och går före. Motförslagets krav på en mer ledande och pådrivande roll, bland annat som aktiv observatör till förbudskonventionen, ligger direkt i linje med planen - som går ännu längre.
- ratify the nuclear weapons bandecisive»ratificera konventionen om kärnvapenförbud och arbeta för ett totalförbud mot att använda autonoma vapensystem.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“ratify the nuclear weapons ban convention and work for a total ban on the use of autonomous weapon systems.”
- driving disarmament role»Sverige ska ta initiativ till internationell nedrustning och bör gå före och nedrusta« (party programme ↗)“Sweden must take the initiative for international disarmament and should go ahead and disarm”
- no nuclear weapons on Swedish soil»införa en lag som förbjuder kärnvapen på svensk mark.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“enact a law banning nuclear weapons on Swedish soil.”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The plan does not address the UN nuclear weapons convention, but its core security policy commitment is NATO membership and rapid rearmament to two per cent of GDP.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan does not address the UN nuclear weapons convention, but its core security policy commitment is NATO membership and rapid rearmament to two per cent of GDP. A driving role in the prohibition convention stands in tension with the collective deterrence on which membership rests. The party programme's support for international agreements is insufficient to support the longer-reaching requirement.
Original (Swedish)
Planen behandlar inte FN:s kärnvapenkonvention, men dess bärande säkerhetspolitiska åtagande är Natomedlemskap och snabb upprustning till två procent av BNP. En pådrivande roll för förbudskonventionen står i spänning med den kollektiva avskräckning som medlemskapet vilar på. Partiprogrammets stöd för internationella överenskommelser räcker inte för att bära det längre gående kravet.
- NATO membership and rearmamentdecisive»Sverige behöver satsa två procent av BNP på försvaret så snart det är praktiskt möjligt och gå med i Nato.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden needs to invest two per cent of GDP in defence as soon as practically possible and join NATO.”
- complete NATO accession»Centerpartiet vill rusta försvaret, stärka Sveriges civila beredskap och fullfölja inträdet i Nato.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Centre Party wants to strengthen defence, enhance Sweden's civil preparedness and complete NATO accession.”
- own territorial defence»Sverige måste därför kunna försvara sitt eget territorium.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden must therefore be able to defend its own territory.”
- international peace engagement»Centerpartiet vill att Sverige ska bistå i internationella fredsinsatser, gärna i ökad utsträckning under direkt FN-ledning.« (party programme ↗)“The Centre Party wants Sweden to assist in international peacekeeping, preferably on an increased scale under direct UN leadership.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan builds security policy on alliance membership and rearmament: security is created in alliances, not in non-alignment, and defense spending shall reach two percent of GDP as early as 2025.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan builds security policy on alliance membership and rearmament: security is created in alliances, not in non-alignment, and defense spending shall reach two percent of GDP as early as 2025. Sweden as an observer actively driving through the UN's nuclear weapons ban convention is not in line with that approach, since the convention rejects the deterrence that the alliance is based on. The plan does not mention the convention, which is why the position is inferred.
Original (Swedish)
Planen bygger säkerhetspolitiken på alliansmedlemskap och upprustning: trygghet skapas i allianser, inte i allianslöshet, och försvarsanslaget ska nå två procent av BNP redan 2025. Att Sverige som observatör aktivt ska driva fram FN:s kärnvapenförbudskonvention ligger inte i linje med den linjen, eftersom konventionen underkänner den avskräckning som alliansen vilar på. Planen nämner inte konventionen, varför ställningstagandet är härlett.
- security through alliancesdecisive»I dag skapas trygghet i allianser, inte i allianslöshet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Today security is created in alliances, not in non-alignment.”
- NATO as security foundation»Grunden för Sveriges säkerhetspolitik ska vara samarbete med andra demokratier. Nato är den« (party programme ↗)“The foundation for Sweden's security policy shall be cooperation with other democracies. NATO is”
- rearmament over disarmament»Vi vill därför redan 2025 se ett försvarsanslag om 2 procent av BNP« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We therefore wish to see by 2025 defense spending of 2 percent of GDP”
The plan builds security on a defence force that can have a war-deterrent effect and on close cooperation with NATO as a natural part of security policy.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan builds security on a defence force that can have a war-deterrent effect and on close cooperation with NATO as a natural part of security policy. To take a driving role for the UN's nuclear weapons ban stands in tension with that line. The plan calls for appropriate common institutions for peace but does not make the ban convention a commitment. Therefore the demand is rejected.
Original (Swedish)
Planen bygger säkerheten på en försvarsmakt som kan verka krigsavhållande och på ett nära samarbete med Nato som en naturlig del av säkerhetspolitiken. Att ta en pådrivande roll för FN:s kärnvapenförbud står i spänning med den linjen. Planen efterlyser gemensamma institutioner för fred men gör inte förbudskonventionen till ett åtagande. Därför avvisas kravet.
- war-deterrent defence capabilitydecisive»kan verka krigsavhållande vid säkerhetspolitiska kriser« (party programme ↗)“can have a war-deterrent effect in security policy crises”
- close cooperation with NATO»med NATO bör, givet nämnda kriterier, vara en naturlig del av svensk säkerhetspolitik.« (party programme ↗)“with NATO should, given the stated criteria, be a natural part of Swedish security policy.”
- common institutions for peace»bör lämpliga gemensamma institutioner finnas« (party programme ↗)“should appropriate common institutions exist”
The plan's core security policy commitment is full and active NATO membership where defence shall be war-deterring and deterring.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan's core security policy commitment is full and active NATO membership where defence shall be war-deterring and deterring. The counter-proposal requires a driving role for the UN's nuclear weapons ban, whose logic stands in opposition to the nuclear deterrence the alliance rests on. The plan therefore speaks against the counter-proposal's requirement.
Original (Swedish)
Planens bärande säkerhetspolitiska åtagande är fullt och aktivt Natomedlemskap där försvaret ska vara krigsavhållande och avskräckande. Motförslaget kräver en pådrivande roll för FN:s kärnvapenförbud, vars logik står i motsats till den kärnvapenavskräckning alliansen vilar på. Planen talar därför emot motförslagets krav.
- full NATO membershipdecisive»Vi välkomnar därför att Sverige ska gå med i Nato, en fråga vi drivit under 20 års tid.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We therefore welcome that Sweden shall join NATO, a matter we have championed for 20 years.”
- deterrence as foundation»Målet är att det svenska försvaret ska vara krigsavhållande och avskräcka en eventuell motståndare från att angripa Sverige.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The goal is that Swedish defence shall be war-deterring and deter a potential opponent from attacking Sweden.”
- maximize membership's benefit»Sverige ska som medlem i Nato vara en säkerhetsproducent i vårt närområde och även få ut mesta möjliga effekt av medlemskapet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall as a member of NATO be a security producer in our region and also get the greatest possible benefit from membership.”
- full NATO membership»Vi ska vara en fullvärdig medlem i Nato« (party programme ↗)“We shall be a full member of NATO”
The counter-proposal wants Sweden to take a driving role for the UN's nuclear weapons ban.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The counter-proposal wants Sweden to take a driving role for the UN's nuclear weapons ban. The election manifesto's guiding commitment is instead a war-deterrent defense capability, at least two percent of GDP to defense, and rearmament in the face of a worsened security situation in the region. That deterrence logic speaks against Sweden driving for a ban, even though the plan does not address the disarmament issue directly.
Original (Swedish)
Motförslaget vill att Sverige tar en pådrivande roll för FN:s kärnvapenförbud. Valplattformens bärande åtagande är i stället en krigsavhållande försvarsförmåga, minst två procent av BNP till försvaret och upprustning inför ett försämrat säkerhetsläge i närområdet. Den avskräckningslogiken talar emot att Sverige driver på för ett förbud, även om planen inte behandlar nedrustningsfrågan direkt.
- war-deterrent defense capabilitydecisive»Målet är en krigsavhållande försvarsförmåga med kapacitet att möta främmande aggressioner« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The goal is a war-deterrent defense capability with capacity to meet foreign aggression”
- raised defense appropriations»Sverigedemokraterna vill säkerställa långsiktig finansiering av försvaret om minst två procent av BNP inom en tioårsperiod.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden Democrats want to ensure long-term financing of the defense of at least two percent of GDP within a ten-year period.”
- rearmament in the region»Rusta Sverige inför en ny säkerhetspolitisk situation i vårt närområde« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Arm Sweden in the face of a new security policy situation in our region”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
Share and embed
Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2023/24:UU11)
- Committee report full text (HB01UU11)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2022/23:1465 — Förbud mot kärnvapen och krav på Sveriges framtida Natomedlemskap av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2022/23:1763 — Säkerhetspolitisk utredning av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2022/23:1764 — Säkerhetspolitik av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2022/23:2012 — Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2022/23:2041 — Utgiftsområde 5 Internationell samverkan av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2022/23:247 — Försvarsmakten, klimat och miljö av Nooshi Dadgostar m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2022/23:848 — En bättre digital säkerhet - stärkt cybersäkerhet för nutid och framtid av Niels Paarup-Petersen m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2022/23:849 — Internationellt samarbete i en ny tid av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2022/23:850 — Ett mer krigsdugligt militärt försvar i hela landet av Mikael Larsson m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2022/23:948 — Totalförsvaret av Sven-Olof Sällström m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2023/24:1879 — Arbete för kärnvapennedrustning och förhållningssätt till Nato av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2023/24:2466 — Utrikes- och biståndspolitik av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2023/24:2562 — Internationell samverkan av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2023/24:2564 — Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2023/24:2568 — Kärnvapenfritt Stockholm och Sverige av Daniel Vencu Velasquez Castro m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2023/24:2658 — Bevara förbehållet om att inte tillåta kärnvapen på svensk mark av Jytte Guteland (S)
- Motion 2023/24:461 — Cybersäkerhet av Hanna Gunnarsson m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2023/24:462 — Nordafrika och Mellanöstern av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2023/24:464 — Förbud mot mördarrobotar av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2023/24:478 — Rymdstrategi av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD)
Source: The Swedish Parliament