2026-06-092025/26:UU9 · p.2UUForeign affairs
Application of the regulations
Application of the regulatory framework for war-materiel exports
What's at stake: How the framework is applied determines whether Sweden can continue exporting war materiel to states accused of serious violations of international law, with consequences for civilians in conflict-affected areas and for the Swedish defence industry.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is whether the current application of the export-control framework – an overall assessment based on guidelines, absolute and conditional obstacles, and authority review – gives sufficient protection against arms exports to states accused of serious violations of international law, or whether it should be tightened.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The Committee notes that Swedish licensing review rests on an overall assessment based on the government's guidelines, the EU common position, and the UN Arms Trade Treaty, with independent authority review (ISP) and a split between absolute and conditional obstacles where human rights and the recipient state's democratic status are already central criteria, and therefore rejects the motions.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 3 (S)
S believes Sweden should not conduct arms exports with states that violate or fail to live up to their obligations under the Genocide Convention, and points out that several major international actors assess that the conduct in the conflict between Israel and Hamas meets the criteria for genocide; Sweden should therefore act more forcefully and not export materiel or technology that can be used in violation of international law.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 3 by S.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
The decision would have held
Explicit commitments that contradicted the vote: KDKristdemokraterna
Ja 195–108Ja 177–126
Counterfactual: the parties above are moved to the position their own documents explicitly point at, carrying their whole contingent present. Every other party keeps its real figures, including dissenters and absentees.
How the AI parties would have voted
For each party: what its own plan – election manifesto and party programme – argues for in this case, next to how the party actually voted. The AI can only answer Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| AI | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | No | Abstain 0/1/19/1 | differs | confidence: high | explicit |
| S | No | No 0/106/0/0 | match | confidence: medium | derived |
| MP | No | Abstain 0/0/18/0 | differs | confidence: high | explicit |
| C | No | Yes 23/0/0/1 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| L | No | Yes 16/0/0/0 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| KD | No | Yes 18/0/0/1 | differsagainst own programme | confidence: high | explicit |
| M | Yes | Yes 65/0/0/1 | match | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| SD | Yes | Yes 68/0/0/2 | match | confidence: medium | not addressed |
Broke with the party line
| VVasiliki Tsouplaki (V, Västmanlands län) | No — party line: Abstain |
MPs whose vote differs from their party's majority position in this division. Marked with a dark ring in the chamber view.
Committee proposal
Parliament rejects the motions 2025/26:1363 by Dzenan Cisija et al. (S) demand 9, 2025/26:1814 by Aylin Nouri (S) demand 6, 2025/26:3372 by Jacob Risberg et al. (MP) demand 15, 2025/26:3440 by Håkan Svenneling et al. (V) demand 43 and 2025/26:4102 by Håkan Svenneling et al. (V) demands 8, 15 and 18.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2025/26:1363 av Dzenan Cisija m.fl. (S) yrkande 9, 2025/26:1814 av Aylin Nouri (S) yrkande 6, 2025/26:3372 av Jacob Risberg m.fl. (MP) yrkande 15, 2025/26:3440 av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V) yrkande 43 och 2025/26:4102 av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V) yrkandena 8, 15 och 18.
Riksdag decision: Every year since 1985, the government submits a document to Parliament on Sweden's export of war material. The document highlights Swedish export control policy regarding war material and products with dual-use applications. The document contains a report on the export of war material that has occurred during 2025. Furthermore, the government describes cooperation within the EU and in other international forums regarding strategic export control of war material and products with dual-use applications. Parliament has decided to file the document. Parliament also decided to reject proposals on export control of war material and products with dual-use applications in motions, of which 23 proposals are from the general motion period 2025.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants Sweden not to export defense material to states that violate the Genocide Convention. (S) — Reservation 3
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The plan explicitly demands a ban on arms exports to states that wage wars of aggression and to regimes that commit human rights violations, which is precisely what the counter-proposal demands regarding states accused of violations of the genocide convention.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan explicitly demands a ban on arms exports to states that wage wars of aggression and to regimes that commit human rights violations, which is precisely what the counter-proposal demands regarding states accused of violations of the genocide convention. The plan also states that international law must be defended and that the world needs to move toward fewer weapons. The committee's reasons—that human rights and the recipient state's democratic status are already central conditions—concern the same criteria, but the plan demands that they actually take effect.
Original (Swedish)
Planen kräver uttryckligen förbud mot vapenexport till stater som för angreppskrig och till regimer som begår brott mot de mänskliga rättigheterna, vilket är precis vad motförslaget kräver i fråga om stater som anklagas för brott mot folkmordskonventionen. Planen slår också fast att folkrätten ska försvaras och att världen behöver gå mot färre vapen. Utskottets skäl - att mänskliga rättigheter och mottagarstatens demokratiska status redan är centrala villkor - handlar om samma kriterier, men planen kräver att de faktiskt får genomslag.
- ban on export for human rights violationsdecisive»förbjuda vapenexport till diktaturer, stater som för angreppskrig och« (party programme ↗)“ban arms exports to dictatorships, states that wage wars of aggression and”
- defend international law»Folkrätten behöver försvaras och« (party programme ↗)“International law needs to be defended and”
- disarmament and fewer weapons»Världen behöver gå mot fred, nedrustning« (party programme ↗)“The world needs to move toward peace, disarmament”
- voice for peace and justice»Vänsterpartiet anser att Sverige ska vara en röst för fred och rättvisa, inte för ökad militarisering.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Left Party believes that Sweden should be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarization.”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The plan's commitment that there shall be no impunity for genocide and war crimes, and about defending international law, bears the position.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan's commitment that there shall be no impunity for genocide and war crimes, and about defending international law, bears the position. Not exporting war materiel to states that do not live up to the genocide convention follows from Sweden standing up for international law in all circumstances. The plan values Swedish exports and defence industry, but not at the expense of international law commitments.
Original (Swedish)
Planens åtagande om att det inte ska finnas någon straffrihet för folkmord och krigsförbrytelser, och om försvar av folkrätten, bär ställningstagandet. Att inte exportera krigsmateriel till stater som inte lever upp till folkmordskonventionen följer av att Sverige ska stå upp för folkrätten i alla lägen. Planen värnar svensk export och försvarsindustri, men inte på bekostnad av folkrättsliga åtaganden.
- no impunity for genocidedecisive»Ingen straffrihet för folkmord, krigsförbrytelser och brott mot mänskligheten.« (party programme ↗)“No impunity for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
- international law as foundation»Försvar för folkrätten och en regelbaserad världsordning.« (party programme ↗)“Defence for international law and a rules-based world order.”
- international law tradition»Vi har en lång historia av att stå upp för folkrätten, solidaritet, nedrustning, demokrati och jämställdhet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We have a long history of standing up for international law, solidarity, disarmament, democracy and equality.”
- UN Charter's prohibition on force»Våldsförbudet i FN-stadgan respekteras i världspolitiken.« (party programme ↗)“The prohibition on force in the UN Charter is respected in world politics.”
The plan explicitly states that Sweden shall not export weapons to countries where serious violations of human rights occur and that Sweden shall follow the genocide convention and protect populations subjected to genocide and war crimes.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan explicitly states that Sweden shall not export weapons to countries where serious violations of human rights occur and that Sweden shall follow the genocide convention and protect populations subjected to genocide and war crimes. The counter-proposal's requirement that weapons exports shall not occur to states that violate the genocide convention is the same commitment in substance.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår uttryckligen fast att Sverige inte ska exportera vapen till länder där allvarliga kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter förekommer och att Sverige ska följa folkmordskonventionen och skydda befolkningar som utsätts för folkmord och krigsbrott. Motförslagets krav att vapenexport inte ska ske till stater som bryter mot folkmordskonventionen är samma åtagande i sak.
- no export with human rights violationsdecisive»Sverige ska inte exportera vapen till diktaturer eller länder där allvarliga kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter förekommer.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall not export weapons to dictatorships or countries where serious violations of human rights occur.”
- follow the genocide convention»Sverige ska följa den folkmordskonvention som Sverige ratificerat samt skydda befolkningar som i sina länder utsätts för folkmord, krigsbrott, etnisk rensning och brott mot mänskligheten.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall follow the genocide convention that Sweden has ratified and protect populations in their countries subjected to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”
- exports must not undermine peace work»Den svenska vapenindustrin, importen och exporten av vapen, får aldrig urholka arbetet för fred, demokratisering och mänskliga rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“The Swedish weapons industry, the import and export of weapons, must never undermine the work for peace, democratization and human rights.”
- act against genocide»Omvärldens oförmåga att ingripa mot Israels folkmord i Gaza har allvarligt skadat förtroendet för arbetet för mänskliga rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“The world's inability to intervene against Israel's genocide in Gaza has seriously damaged confidence in the work for human rights.”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The plan binds foreign policy to universal human rights and freedoms and explicitly requires that ethical considerations be taken in trade and that stricter requirements be placed in trade agreements.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan binds foreign policy to universal human rights and freedoms and explicitly requires that ethical considerations be taken in trade and that stricter requirements be placed in trade agreements. Not exporting war material to states that violate the genocide convention follows directly from that principle. The plan gives no support for economic export interests to outweigh international law.
Original (Swedish)
Planen binder utrikespolitiken vid universella mänskliga fri- och rättigheter och kräver uttryckligen att etiska hänsyn tas i handeln och att hårdare krav ställs i handelsavtal. Att inte exportera krigsmateriel till stater som bryter mot folkmordskonventionen följer direkt av den principen. Planen ger inget stöd för att ekonomiska exportintressen ska väga tyngre än folkrätten.
- human rights guide foreign policydecisive»Utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken syftar ytterst till att värna universella mänskliga fri- och rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“Foreign and security policy ultimately aims to protect universal human rights and freedoms.”
- ethical consideration in trade»Hänsyn måste tas till etiska och miljömässiga perspektiv.« (party programme ↗)“Ethical and environmental perspectives must be taken into account.”
- stricter requirements in trade agreements»Ställ hårdare krav på arbetsvillkor, miljö och klimat i handelsavtal.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Set stricter requirements for working conditions, environment and climate in trade agreements.”
- shared responsibility for international law»Fred, skyddet av mänskliga rättigheter och hållbar utveckling är hela världens ansvar.« (party programme ↗)“Peace, protection of human rights and sustainable development are the responsibility of the whole world.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan's clearest commitment in this area is that Sweden shall not export weapons to dictatorships and that business relations with undemocratic regimes shall be conditional.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan's clearest commitment in this area is that Sweden shall not export weapons to dictatorships and that business relations with undemocratic regimes shall be conditional. Not supplying materiel to a state considered to be in breach of the Genocide Convention follows from the same principle, reinforced by the plan wanting to strengthen the International Criminal Court's role in prosecuting crimes against human rights. However, the plan does not mention the Genocide Convention as an export criterion.
Original (Swedish)
Planens tydligaste åtagande på området är att Sverige inte ska exportera vapen till diktaturer och att affärsrelationer med odemokratiska regimer ska villkoras. Att inte leverera materiel till en stat som anses bryta mot folkmordskonventionen följer av samma princip, förstärkt av att planen vill stärka Internationella brottmålsdomstolens roll för att lagföra brott mot mänskliga rättigheter. Planen nämner dock inte folkmordskonventionen som exportkriterium.
- no weapons export to dictatorshipsdecisive»Sverige ska inte exportera vapen till diktaturer.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall not export weapons to dictatorships.”
- accountability for violations of international law»Internationella brottmålsdomstolens roll för att lagföra brott mot mänskliga rättigheter ska stärkas.« (party programme ↗)“The International Criminal Court's role in prosecuting crimes against human rights shall be strengthened.”
- conditional business relations»I företag som helt eller delvis ägs av den svenska staten ska det finnas kriterier gällande affärsrelationer med odemokratiska regimer.« (party programme ↗)“In companies wholly or partly owned by the Swedish state there shall be criteria regarding business relations with undemocratic regimes.”
- freedom as a foreign policy goal»Målet med vår utrikespolitik är en friare värld för alla.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The goal of our foreign policy is a freer world for everyone.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan is explicit: weapons exports shall be limited to democratic states and may not go to countries waging offensive warfare or to states where systematic violations of human rights occur.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan is explicit: weapons exports shall be limited to democratic states and may not go to countries waging offensive warfare or to states where systematic violations of human rights occur. The counter-proposal's demand to not export to states that violate the genocide convention is a direct application of that commitment. The plan also wants to strengthen international courts and compliance with international law.
Original (Swedish)
Planen är uttrycklig: vapenexport ska begränsas till demokratiska stater och får inte gå till offensivt krigförande länder eller till stater där systematiska kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter förekommer. Motförslagets krav på att inte exportera till stater som bryter mot folkmordskonventionen är en direkt tillämpning av det åtagandet. Planen vill dessutom stärka internationella domstolar och folkrättens efterlevnad.
- export ban on human rights violationsdecisive»eller till stater där det förekommer systematiska kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“or to states where systematic violations of human rights occur.”
- no export to warring parties»stater och omgärdas av noggrann kontroll. Export ska ej gå till offensivt krigförande länder« (party programme ↗)“states and surrounded by careful control. Exports shall not go to countries waging offensive warfare”
- export only to democracies»förutsätter en inhemsk försvarsindustri. Vapenexporten ska begränsas till demokratiska« (party programme ↗)“presupposes a domestic defence industry. Weapons exports shall be limited to democratic”
- strengthened international courts»internationella domstolar och rättssystem inom FN-systemet.« (party programme ↗)“international courts and justice systems within the UN system.”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The plan's clearest commitment on military materiel is continued arms supplies and that Swedish defence industry shall serve all of NATO.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan's clearest commitment on military materiel is continued arms supplies and that Swedish defence industry shall serve all of NATO. A general political restriction on exports based on the genocide convention cuts into that line and into the administrative scrutiny the plan does not question. The plan establishes that foreign policy shall protect Swedish interests, even though it protects international law and human rights. The demand is rejected.
Original (Swedish)
Planens tydligaste åtagande om krigsmateriel är fortsatta vapenleveranser och att svensk försvarsindustri ska komma hela Nato till del. En generell politisk spärr mot export grundad på folkmordskonventionen skär in i den linjen och i den myndighetsprövning planen inte ifrågasätter. Planen slår fast att utrikespolitiken ska värna svenska intressen, även om den värnar folkrätt och mänskliga rättigheter. Kravet avvisas.
- continued arms suppliesdecisive»Sverige ska helhjärtat stå upp för Ukraina, även med fortsatta vapenleveranser.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall wholehearted stand up for Ukraine, including with continued arms supplies.”
- defence industry serving NATO»Verka för att Sveriges teknologiska kunnande och kompetenta försvarsindustri kommer hela Nato till del« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Ensure that Sweden's technological expertise and competent defence industry serve all of NATO”
- Swedish interests guide foreign policyweak support»Svensk utrikespolitik ska värna svenska intressen.« (party programme ↗)“Swedish foreign policy shall protect Swedish interests.”
- international law is protected»Genom FN-systemet är vi del av den folkrätt som värnar vår« (party programme ↗)“Through the UN system we are part of the international law that protects our”
flags: citat_svagt
The plan establishes that the relationship with Israel, as the only democracy in its region, shall be restored and maintained, which speaks against Sweden driving a more forceful line against export recipients in the current conflict.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan establishes that the relationship with Israel, as the only democracy in its region, shall be restored and maintained, which speaks against Sweden driving a more forceful line against export recipients in the current conflict. The plan also wants to strengthen Swedish defense industry and improve Sweden's position in trade. The counter-proposal's requirement for tightened export restrictions therefore goes against the plan's commitments.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår fast att relationen till Israel, som den enda demokratin i sin region, ska återupprättas och vårdas, vilket talar emot att Sverige driver en mer kraftfull linje mot exportmottagare i den aktuella konflikten. Planen vill dessutom stärka svensk försvarsindustri och förbättra Sveriges ställning i handeln. Motförslagets krav på skärpta exporthinder går därför emot planens åtaganden.
- maintained relation to Israeldecisive»Relationen till Israel, som den enda demokratin i sin region, bör återupprättas och vårdas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The relationship with Israel, as the only democracy in its region, should be restored and maintained.”
- strengthened defense industry»Svensk försvarsindustri ska också stärkas genom att fortsatt satsa på inhemsk försvarsteknologi och att tydligare värdera det strategiska intresset av svenska leverantörer vid inköp av försvarsmateriel.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Swedish defense industry shall also be strengthened by continuing to invest in domestic defense technology and by more clearly valuing the strategic interest of Swedish suppliers in purchases of defense material.”
- export and trade»Förbättra Sveriges ställning på den internationella marknaden och i handel« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Improve Sweden's position on the international market and in trade”
- Swedish interests first»Värna svenska intressen i internationella sammanhang« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Protect Swedish interests in international contexts”
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2025/26:UU9)
- Committee report full text (HD01UU9)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2025/26:1030 — Åtgärder för att stoppa folkmord mot civilbefolkningen i Gaza av Jamal El-Haj (-)
- Motion 2025/26:1042 — Gaza av Jamal El-Haj (-)
- Motion 2025/26:1363 — Hävande av ockupationen av Palestina av Dzenan Cisija m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2025/26:1814 — Folkmordskonventionen och den humanitära situationen i Gaza av Aylin Nouri (S)
- Motion 2025/26:2227 — Donation av inlösta vapen till Ukraina av Magnus Berntsson (KD)
- Motion 2025/26:2369 — Kina av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2025/26:2801 — Stärkt militärt samarbete och handel med Taiwan av Markus Wiechel (SD)
- Motion 2025/26:3372 — Ett slut på ockupationen av Palestina av Jacob Risberg m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2025/26:3407 — Exportkontroll, försvarsindustrins förutsättningar och reglering av autonoma vapen av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2025/26:3411 — Kina - mänskliga rättigheter, miljö och geopolitik av Jacob Risberg m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2025/26:3440 — Israels ockupation av Palestina av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2025/26:3725 — Palestina och Israel av Daniel Riazat (-)
- Motion 2025/26:406 — Vapenexport till Saudiarabien av Martin Ådahl (C)
- Motion 2025/26:4102 — med anledning av skr. 2025/26:114 Strategisk exportkontroll 2025 - krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2025/26:4106 — med anledning av skr. 2025/26:114 Strategisk exportkontroll 2025 - krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden av Rasmus Giertz m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2025/26:4115 — med anledning av skr. 2025/26:114 Strategisk exportkontroll 2025 - krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden av Jacob Risberg m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2025/26:4122 — med anledning av skr. 2025/26:114 Strategisk exportkontroll 2025 - krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden av Malcolm Momodou Jallow m.fl. (-)
- Regeringens skrivelse 2025/26:114 — Strategisk exportkontroll 2025 - krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden
Source: The Swedish Parliament