Critical infrastructure

The plan demands that socially important activities and infrastructure be taken back and that the state increase its control over infrastructure, and states that public ownership must be strong in key sectors such as communications and energy supply. Legally restricting which foreign actors can own or provide critical infrastructure is in line with this.

• reclaim socially important infrastructuredecisive»Det är hög tid att agera och ta tillbaka den samhällsviktiga verksamhet och infrastruktur som har privatiserats.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“It is high time to act and take back the socially important activities and infrastructure that have been privatized.”
• state control of infrastructure»Staten måste öka sin kontroll över infrastruktur och resurser som behövs för att genomföra klimatomställningen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The state must increase its control over infrastructure and resources needed to implement the climate transition.”
• public ownership in key sectors»transportsystem, kommunikationer och övrig infrastruktur, finansiell sektor, bostadsproduktion, energiförsörjning, strategiska naturtillgångar och så vidare.« (party programme ↗)“transport systems, communications and other infrastructure, financial sector, housing production, energy supply, strategic natural resources and so forth.”
• right to protect one's economy»Därför ska inte bara fattiga länder ha rätt att skydda och kontrollera« (party programme ↗)“Therefore, not only poor countries have the right to protect and control”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan requires that Sweden be able to defend itself against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyberattacks and counts disturbances of critical infrastructure such as electricity, water and communications among serious threats. The plan also sees a serious threat in non-democratic states growing in influence. Legislation that limits such regimes' acquisition of critical infrastructure therefore follows from the plan's security perspective.

• protection against espionagedecisive»Vi måste kunna försvara oss militärt, men också mot hybridattacker, spionage och cyberangrepp.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We must be able to defend ourselves militarily, but also against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyberattacks.”
• protect critical infrastructure»Hoten är av annat slag: konflikter inom nationer, övergrepp mot de mänskliga rättigheterna, terrorism och våld mot demokratiska institutioner samt störningar av kritisk infrastruktur som el, vatten och kommunikationer.« (party programme ↗)“The threats are of another kind: conflicts within nations, abuses of human rights, terrorism and violence against democratic institutions as well as disturbances of critical infrastructure such as electricity, water and communications.”
• threat from non-democracies»är det ett allvarligt hot mot friheten och demokratin när vissa av de länder som spelar en växande roll är ickedemokratiska och saknar respekt för de mänskliga rättigheterna« (party programme ↗)“it is a serious threat to freedom and democracy when certain countries that play a growing role are non-democratic and lack respect for human rights”
• democracy sets the boundaries»Men ekonomiska intressen har aldrig rätt att sätta gränser för demokratin.« (party programme ↗)“But economic interests shall never be permitted to set limits to democracy.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The party programme warns that society relies on large-scale infrastructure vulnerable to disruption and requires Sweden and local communities to become less vulnerable, and the election manifesto refuses to adapt Swedish policy to the demands of authoritarian states. Excluding by law companies linked to non-democratic regimes' intelligence services from critical infrastructure points in that direction. The plan therefore supports the counter-proposal.

• vulnerable critical infrastructuredecisive»Samhället förlitar sig i dag i alltför hög grad på en« (party programme ↗)“Today society relies to far too high a degree on large-scale”
• reduced vulnerability»Sverige som land och även lokalsamhällena måste« (party programme ↗)“Sweden as a country and also local communities must”
• no to authoritarian influence»inte att Sverige ska anpassa sin utrikespolitik efter auktoritära staters krav för kunna att bli medlem i Nato och Sverige ska inte börja sälja vapen till Turkiet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“not that Sweden should adapt its foreign policy to authoritarian states' demands in order to be able to become a member of NATO and Sweden should not start selling weapons to Turkey.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan makes the struggle against authoritarian forces a main issue and says that Sweden must be armed against both external and internal threats, with civil defence and society's preparedness to be strengthened. To restrict non-democratic regimes' ability to acquire companies in critical infrastructure through law follows from this security commitment. The plan's openness to the world is a counterweight but concerns trade, not security threats.

• protection against internal and external threatsdecisive»Sverige måste rustas även mot dessa hot.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden must also be armed against these threats.”
• resistance against authoritarian forces»Runtom i världen pågår en kamp mellan anhängare av den liberala demokratin och auktoritära krafter. Den måste vi vinna.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Around the world, a struggle is taking place between supporters of liberal democracy and authoritarian forces. We must win it.”
• society's preparedness»Vi måste rusta civilförsvaret och samhällets beredskap inför krig och kris.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We must strengthen civil defence and society's preparedness for war and crisis.”
• openness to the world»Sverige behöver mer frihandel och internationellt samarbete, inte protektionism och stängda gränser.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden needs more free trade and international cooperation, not protectionism and closed borders.”

Worldstate weighed in: Chinese balloon over the USA and Russian nuclear rhetoric after New START — Heightens the need for security screening of foreign acquisitions in critical infrastructure

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The party programme explicitly takes up that undemocratic and totalitarian states acquire strategic assets such as ports and power grids in democratic countries, and establishes that this must be seen in a security-political perspective with clear risk of political extortion. That is precisely what the counter-proposal wants to legislate about. The plan moreover wants to prevent undemocratic foreign actors from owning businesses in Sweden and rejects the naivety towards Chinese and Russian power politics.

• undemocratic acquisitions as threatdecisive»odemokratiska eller rentav totalitära stater förvärvar strategiska tillgångar i demokratiska länder« (party programme ↗)“undemocratic or even totalitarian states acquire strategic assets in democratic countries”
• security-political assessment»hamnar, elnät eller liknande, måste ses i ett säkerhetspolitiskt perspektiv.« (party programme ↗)“ports, power grids or similar, must be seen in a security-political perspective.”
• no naivety towards China and Russia»Handels- och främjandepolitiken ska stärka Sverige som aktör för en friare värld och dra nytta av frihandelns fördelar utan den naivitet som alltför länge uppvisats för kinesisk och rysk maktpolitik.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Trade and promotion policy shall strengthen Sweden as an actor for a freer world and take advantage of free trade's advantages without the naivety that has long been shown towards Chinese and Russian power politics.”
• stop undemocratic ownership»Vi vill sätta stopp för religiösa friskolor och hindra utländska icke-demokratiska aktörer från att äga skolor i Sverige.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We want to stop religious free schools and prevent undemocratic foreign actors from owning schools in Sweden.”

The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.

The counter-proposal wants to restrict by law the possibility of non-democratic regimes to acquire enterprises within critical infrastructure. The party programme states that new types of threats require a broadened security concept and that Sweden must be able to meet attacks from, among other things, international crime and cyber warfare, and Christian democracy stands against all kinds of totalitarian tendencies. The plan therefore supports legislation that keeps actors linked to authoritarian regimes away from critical infrastructure.

• broadened security conceptdecisive»Nya typer av konflikter och hot leder till ett vidgat« (party programme ↗)“New types of conflicts and threats lead to a broadened”
• capacity against compound threats»möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet, terrorism, cyberkrigföring, biologiska vapen, kemiska vapen« (party programme ↗)“meet attacks from international crime, terrorism, cyber warfare, biological weapons, chemical weapons”
• front against totalitarian tendencies»Kristdemokratin bildar front såväl mot anarki som« (party programme ↗)“Christian democracy stands against both anarchy and”
• preventive measures»Kriser måste mötas med politikens alla preventiva« (party programme ↗)“Crises must be met with all preventive measures in politics”

Worldstate weighed in: The Chinese balloon incident over the USA — Actualizes the plan's requirement for protection against intelligence operations by authoritarian states

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan wants to give businesses in security-sensitive operations better state support against espionage and acquisition attempts by foreign powers, strengthen the Security Police and meet hybrid threats with a concrete action plan. The party programme states that large authoritarian countries must not be able to play off small Western democracies against each other. Legislation that excludes businesses linked to non-democratic regimes from critical infrastructure follows that line and the demand is supported.

• protection against foreign powersdecisive»Ge företag som är engagerade i säkerhetskänslig verksamhet bättre stöd från staten att kunna möta cyberattacker, spionage och stöldförsök från främmande makt« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Give businesses engaged in security-sensitive operations better support from the state to meet cyberattacks, espionage and theft attempts by foreign powers”
• resistance to authoritarian states»Stora auktoritära länder ska inte kunna spela ut enskilda små västerländska demokratier mot varandra.« (party programme ↗)“Large authoritarian countries must not be able to play off individual small Western democracies against each other.”
• strengthened security police»Stärka Säkerhetspolisen för att öka deras förmåga att skydda den liberala demokratin och landets alla medborgare« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen the Security Police to increase their ability to protect liberal democracy and the country's all citizens”
• counter hybrid threats»Införa en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och cyberattacker« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Introduce an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyberattacks”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The counter-proposal wants to limit non-democratic regimes' ability to acquire and deliver critical infrastructure through law. The plan establishes that central societal functions and essential parts of infrastructure should be under state control and that electricity and water distribution are of strategic and security policy significance. The plan also wants to explicitly prevent Russian and Chinese advances and equip Sweden for the new security situation.

• infrastructure under state controldecisive»centrala samhällsfunktioner såsom rättsväsende, försvar och väsentliga delar av vår infrastruktur« (party programme ↗)“central societal functions such as justice, defence and essential parts of our infrastructure”
• prevent authoritarian states' advances»En tydlig Arktispolitik ska tas fram som hindrar ryska och kinesiska framflyttningar och bejakar svenska ekonomiska intressen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“A clear Arctic policy shall be developed that prevents Russian and Chinese advances and embraces Swedish economic interests.”
• sharpened security policy situation»Rusta Sverige inför en ny säkerhetspolitisk situation i vårt närområde« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Equip Sweden for a new security policy situation in our surrounding area”
• resist hybrid threats»Förstärka det europeiska samarbetet mot islamistiska organisationer, hybridhot och terrorism« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen European cooperation against Islamist organizations, hybrid threats and terrorism”

Worldstate weighed in: Chinese surveillance balloon shot down over the USA in February 2023 — Underscores the plan's requirement to prevent authoritarian states' advances and strengthens the reasons for legislation on critical infrastructure