2026-03-252025/26:UU14 · p.1UUForeign affairs
International law
Sweden's stance on international law and support for the International Criminal Court
What's at stake: How assertive Sweden is on international-law issues affects support for international courts facing external pressure, and the degree of accountability for individuals suspected of grave violations of international law in ongoing conflicts.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is whether Sweden's current broad stance on international law and support for the International Criminal Court's independence is sufficient, or whether Sweden should take a more assertive line, including by criticizing Swedish arms trade and demanding more resources and investigation of suspected genocide.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee maintains that international law is a cornerstone of foreign policy, upholds the independence and integrity of international courts, deeply regrets the US sanctions against the International Criminal Court, and supports activating the EU's blocking statute once sufficiently broad member-state support exists, but does not consider it parliament's task to set up a parliamentary committee on genocide recognition, and therefore rejects the motions.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 2 (V)
The reservation (V) wants Sweden to take a firmer line, arguing that the government's continued arms trade with Israel amid an ongoing genocide in Gaza contradicts Sweden's international-law commitments, and calls for more resources for the ICC and ICJ, investigation of individuals suspected of complicity in genocide, condemnation of US sanctions against the ICC, and for the EU to activate its blocking statute.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 2 by V.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
The decision would have held
Explicit commitments that contradicted the vote: KDKristdemokraterna
Ja 149–22Ja 132–39
Counterfactual: the parties above are moved to the position their own documents explicitly point at, carrying their whole contingent present. Every other party keeps its real figures, including dissenters and absentees.
How the AI parties would have voted
For each party: what its own plan – election manifesto and party programme – argues for in this case, next to how the party actually voted. The AI can only answer Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| AI | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | No | No 0/19/0/3 | match | confidence: high | explicit |
| S | No | Abstain 0/0/92/14 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| MP | No | Abstain 0/0/15/3 | differs | confidence: high | explicit |
| C | No | Abstain 0/0/17/7 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| L | No | Yes 14/0/0/2 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| KD | No | Yes 17/0/0/2 | differsagainst own programme | confidence: high | explicit |
| M | Yes | Yes 59/0/0/9 | match | confidence: low | derived |
| SD | Yes | Yes 57/0/0/13 | match | confidence: medium | derived |
Committee proposal
The Riksdag rejects the motions 2024/25:1323 by Jacob Risberg et al. (MP) claims 1 and 3, 2024/25:1435 by Rasmus Giertz et al. (SD) claim 16, 2024/25:3020 by Nooshi Dadgostar et al. (V) claim 9, 2024/25:3107 by Morgan Johansson et al. (S) claim 9, 2024/25:3162 by Kerstin Lundgren et al. (C) claim 48, 2025/26:2368 by Nooshi Dadgostar et al. (V) claim 1, 2025/26:2776 by Håkan Svenneling et al. (V) claim 3, 2025/26:3411 by Jacob Risberg et al. (MP) claims 6 and 8, 2025/26:3440 by Håkan Svenneling et al. (V) claims 14-17, 2025/26:3509 by Daniel Helldén et al. (MP) claim 49, 2025/26:3527 by Ulrika Westerlund et al. (MP) claim 3, 2025/26:3623 by Morgan Johansson et al. (S) claims 13 and 45, and 2025/26:3729 by Kerstin Lundgren et al. (C) claims 60 and 61.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2024/25:1323 av Jacob Risberg m.fl. (MP) yrkandena 1 och 3, 2024/25:1435 av Rasmus Giertz m.fl. (SD) yrkande 16, 2024/25:3020 av Nooshi Dadgostar m.fl. (V) yrkande 9, 2024/25:3107 av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S) yrkande 9, 2024/25:3162 av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C) yrkande 48, 2025/26:2368 av Nooshi Dadgostar m.fl. (V) yrkande 1, 2025/26:2776 av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V) yrkande 3, 2025/26:3411 av Jacob Risberg m.fl. (MP) yrkandena 6 och 8, 2025/26:3440 av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V) yrkandena 14-17, 2025/26:3509 av Daniel Helldén m.fl. (MP) yrkande 49, 2025/26:3527 av Ulrika Westerlund m.fl. (MP) yrkande 3, 2025/26:3623 av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S) yrkandena 13 och 45 samt 2025/26:3729 av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C) yrkandena 60 och 61.
Riksdag decision: The Riksdag said no to approximately 190 proposals in motions from the general motion session 2024 and from the general motion session 2025 concerning international law, including humanitarian law, human rights, and democracy and the principles of the rule of law. The proposals concern, among other things, how Sweden should support the international courts that apply international law, whether ecocide should be introduced as a new crime in international law, what support Sweden should give to the democracy movement in Hong Kong, and how the human rights of women, children, and LGBTQ persons should be protected.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants to strengthen ICC and ICJ's work against violations of international law and protect the courts from sanctions. (V) — Reservation 2
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The plan works explicitly to ban arms exports to states that wage wars of aggression and regimes that commit human rights abuses.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan works explicitly to ban arms exports to states that wage wars of aggression and regimes that commit human rights abuses. It also wants to strengthen the United Nations and international law so that violations of international law by powerful military powers can be highlighted and countered. The counter-proposal's demands for a halt to arms sales, resources for the international courts and protection for the International Criminal Court follow directly from that.
Original (Swedish)
Planen arbetar uttryckligen för att förbjuda vapenexport till stater som för angreppskrig och regimer som begår brott mot de mänskliga rättigheterna. Den vill också stärka FN och folkrätten så att starka militärmakters brott mot internationell lag kan uppmärksammas och motverkas. Motförslagets krav på stopp för vapenhandeln, resurser till de internationella domstolarna och skydd för brottmålsdomstolen följer direkt av det.
- ban on arms exportsdecisive»förbjuda vapenexport till diktaturer, stater som för angreppskrig och« (party programme ↗)“ban arms exports to dictatorships, states that wage wars of aggression and”
- combat violations of international law»Sverige. Genom FN får även små länder en röst och starka militärmakters brott mot internationell lag kan uppmärksammas och motverkas.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden. Through the United Nations even small countries have a voice and violations of international law by powerful military powers can be highlighted and countered.”
- voice for peace and justice»Vänsterpartiet anser att Sverige ska vara en röst för fred och rättvisa, inte för ökad militarisering.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Left Party believes Sweden shall be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarization.”
- Sweden as human rights voice»en stadig röst i världen som talar för mänskliga rättigheter, fred och« (party programme ↗)“a steady voice in the world that speaks for human rights, peace and”
Worldstate weighed in: Israel and the USA launched an attack on Iran on 28 February 2026 — Sharpens the timeliness of the plan's demands to defend international law and stop arms sales to states that wage wars of aggression
The plan makes the defence of international law and a rules-based international order a guiding principle and demands that there is no impunity for genocide and war crimes.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan makes the defence of international law and a rules-based international order a guiding principle and demands that there is no impunity for genocide and war crimes. Strengthening international courts, investigating suspected participation in genocide and coordinating a European response to attacks on the criminal court fulfil that commitment. The plan therefore speaks in favour of the counter-proposal's requirement.
Original (Swedish)
Planen gör försvaret av folkrätten och en regelbaserad världsordning till en bärande princip och kräver att det inte finns någon straffrihet för folkmord och krigsförbrytelser. Att stärka de internationella domstolarna, utreda misstänkt medverkan till folkmord och samordna ett europeiskt svar på angrepp mot brottmålsdomstolen fullföljer det åtagandet. Planen talar därför för motförslagets krav.
- no impunity for serious crimesdecisive»Ingen straffrihet för folkmord, krigsförbrytelser och brott mot mänskligheten.« (party programme ↗)“No impunity for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
- international law is defended»Försvar för folkrätten och en regelbaserad världsordning.« (party programme ↗)“Defence of international law and a rules-based international order.”
- international law as basis of foreign policy»Vi har en lång historia av att stå upp för folkrätten, solidaritet, nedrustning, demokrati och jämställdhet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We have a long history of standing up for international law, solidarity, disarmament, democracy and equality.”
- coordinated European action»Ett starkt och enat Europa som tar ett större ansvar för sin egen säkerhet.« (party programme ↗)“A strong and united Europe that takes greater responsibility for its own security.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan asserts that Sweden should not export weapons to countries where serious human rights violations occur, and particularly points out Israel's genocide in Gaza.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan asserts that Sweden should not export weapons to countries where serious human rights violations occur, and particularly points out Israel's genocide in Gaza. It also requires that Sweden supports the international courts and pushes for increased accountability for violations of international law, which is exactly what the counter-proposal requests regarding resources, investigations and protection for the criminal court. The obligations of the Genocide Convention are explicitly highlighted.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår fast att Sverige inte ska exportera vapen till länder där allvarliga kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter förekommer, och pekar särskilt ut Israels folkmord i Gaza. Den kräver också att Sverige stödjer de internationella domstolarna och driver på ökat ansvarsutkrävande för brott mot folkrätten, vilket är just vad motförslaget begär i fråga om resurser, utredningar och skydd för brottmålsdomstolen. Folkmordskonventionens förpliktelser lyfts uttryckligen fram.
- restrictive arms exportsdecisive»Sverige ska inte exportera vapen till diktaturer eller länder där allvarliga kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter förekommer.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall not export weapons to dictatorships or countries where serious human rights violations occur.”
- support for international courts»Sveriges ska stödja de internationella domstolarna och verka för att öka ansvarsutkrävandet för brott mot folkrätten.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall support the international courts and work to increase accountability for violations of international law.”
- act against genocide»Omvärldens oförmåga att ingripa mot Israels folkmord i Gaza har allvarligt skadat förtroendet för arbetet för mänskliga rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“The world's inability to intervene against Israel's genocide in Gaza has seriously damaged confidence in the work for human rights.”
- Genocide Convention obligations»Sverige ska följa den folkmordskonvention som Sverige ratificerat samt skydda befolkningar som i sina länder utsätts för folkmord, krigsbrott, etnisk rensning och brott mot mänskligheten.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall comply with the Genocide Convention that Sweden has ratified and protect populations that in their countries are subjected to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The party programme makes the protection of universal human freedom and rights the ultimate purpose of foreign policy and requires that citizens in democracies do not compromise their ideals.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme makes the protection of universal human freedom and rights the ultimate purpose of foreign policy and requires that citizens in democracies do not compromise their ideals. A firmer rule of law line, strengthened international courts and defence of the criminal court against sanctions follow from this. The plan moreover protects courts' independence as a democratic cornerstone.
Original (Swedish)
Partiprogrammet gör värnandet av universella mänskliga fri- och rättigheter till utrikespolitikens yttersta syfte och kräver att medborgare i demokratier inte kompromissar med sina ideal. En fastare folkrättslig linje, stärkta internationella domstolar och försvar av brottmålsdomstolen mot sanktioner följer av detta. Planen värnar också domstolars oberoende som demokratisk grundbult.
- human rights as foreign policy goaldecisive»Utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken syftar ytterst till att värna universella mänskliga fri- och rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“Foreign and security policy ultimately aim to protect universal human freedom and rights.”
- global responsibility for the law of nations»Fred, skyddet av mänskliga rättigheter och hållbar utveckling är hela världens ansvar.« (party programme ↗)“Peace, protection of human rights and sustainable development are the responsibility of the whole world.”
- do not compromise the ideals»inte kompromissar med våra ideal utan förenas i en strävan efter alla människors fri- och rättigheter« (party programme ↗)“does not compromise their ideals but unites in a pursuit of all people's freedom and rights”
- strong independent courts»Vi vill göra det svårare att ändra grundlagen, skydda oppositionens ställning i riksdagen och stärka domstolarnas oberoende.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We want to make it harder to change the constitution, protect the opposition's position in the Riksdag and strengthen courts' independence.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The party programme wants to strengthen the International Criminal Court's role for prosecuting crimes against human rights and states that Sweden shall not export weapons to dictatorships.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme wants to strengthen the International Criminal Court's role for prosecuting crimes against human rights and states that Sweden shall not export weapons to dictatorships. The election manifesto promises an explicitly values-driven foreign policy. The counter-proposal's demands for resources to the courts, investigation of suspected participation in genocide and a European counter-measure to protect the court follow from these commitments.
Original (Swedish)
Partiprogrammet vill stärka Internationella brottmålsdomstolens roll för att lagföra brott mot mänskliga rättigheter och slår fast att Sverige inte ska exportera vapen till diktaturer. Valmanifestet lovar en uttalat värderingsstyrd utrikespolitik. Motförslagets krav på resurser till domstolarna, utredning av misstänkt medverkan till folkmord och en europeisk motåtgärd till skydd för domstolen följer av dessa åtaganden.
- strengthened international criminal courtdecisive»Internationella brottmålsdomstolens roll för att lagföra brott mot mänskliga rättigheter ska stärkas.« (party programme ↗)“The International Criminal Court's role for prosecuting crimes against human rights shall be strengthened.”
- restrictive weapons export»Sverige ska inte exportera vapen till diktaturer.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall not export weapons to dictatorships.”
- values-driven foreign policy»Vi kallar det för vad det är: en ny värderingsstyrd utrikespolitik.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We call it what it is: a new values-driven foreign policy.”
- support for human rights»Sverige ska vara en stark röst för dessa värden och ge stöd åt de människor som utmanar förtrycket.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall be a strong voice for these values and provide support to the people who challenge oppression.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan explicitly forbids arms exports to countries engaged in offensive warfare and to states where systematic violations of human rights occur, which bears the counter-proposal's objection to continued arms trade.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan explicitly forbids arms exports to countries engaged in offensive warfare and to states where systematic violations of human rights occur, which bears the counter-proposal's objection to continued arms trade. It also requires that international courts and legal systems within the UN system be protected and strengthened, which covers the demands for resources and protection of the criminal court. Human rights are a main aim of foreign policy.
Original (Swedish)
Planen förbjuder uttryckligen vapenexport till offensivt krigförande länder och till stater där systematiska kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter förekommer, vilket bär motförslagets invändning mot fortsatt vapenhandel. Den kräver också att internationella domstolar och rättssystem inom FN-systemet skyddas och stärks, vilket täcker kraven på resurser och försvar av brottmålsdomstolen. Mänskliga rättigheter är ett huvudmål för utrikespolitiken.
- restrictive arms exportsdecisive»Export ska ej gå till offensivt krigförande länder« (party programme ↗)“Exports shall not go to countries engaged in offensive warfare”
- export ban on human rights violations»eller till stater där det förekommer systematiska kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter« (party programme ↗)“or to states where systematic violations of human rights occur”
- protect international courts»internationella domstolar och rättssystem inom FN-systemet« (party programme ↗)“international courts and legal systems within the UN system”
- human rights as a foreign policy aim»främja mänskliga rättigheter och demokrati« (party programme ↗)“promote human rights and democracy”
Worldstate weighed in: Israel and the USA launched an attack on Iran on 28 February 2026 — Tightens the application of the plan's ban on exports to countries engaged in offensive warfare
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The plan establishes that Swedish foreign policy shall protect Swedish interests and that Swedish defence industry shall benefit all of NATO, which argues against limiting arms trade as a form of international legal pressure.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan establishes that Swedish foreign policy shall protect Swedish interests and that Swedish defence industry shall benefit all of NATO, which argues against limiting arms trade as a form of international legal pressure. The plan is also explicitly restrictive toward channeling increasing resources through international bodies. The fact that the plan simultaneously prioritises democracy and human rights makes the assessment uncertain.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår fast att svensk utrikespolitik ska värna svenska intressen och att svensk försvarsindustri ska komma hela Nato till del, vilket talar emot att begränsa vapenhandeln som folkrättsligt påtryckningsmedel. Planen är också uttalat restriktiv mot att kanalisera ökande resurser genom internationella organ. Att planen samtidigt prioriterar demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter gör bedömningen osäker.
- strong Swedish defence industrydecisive»Verka för att Sveriges teknologiska kunnande och kompetenta försvarsindustri kommer hela Nato till del« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Work to ensure that Sweden's technological knowledge and competent defence industry benefit all of NATO”
- restrictive toward international bodies»Dina skattepengar ska inte försvinna i korruption eller hamna i fickorna på odemokratiska ledare, och inte heller okritiskt kanaliseras i ökande volymer genom oreformerade FN-organ som brister i transparens och uppföljning.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Your tax money must not disappear in corruption or end up in the pockets of undemocratic leaders, nor shall it uncritically be channeled in increasing volumes through unreformed UN bodies that lack transparency and follow-up.”
- Swedish interests guide foreign policyweak support»Svensk utrikespolitik ska värna svenska intressen.« (party programme ↗)“Swedish foreign policy shall protect Swedish interests.”
- democracy and human rights»Prioritera insatser som stödjer arbetet för demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Prioritise initiatives that support work for democracy and human rights”
flags: citat_svagt
The plan states that the relationship with Israel, as the region's only democracy, should be restored and maintained, which speaks against the counter-proposal's demand for a stop to arms trade and investigations directed at a state accused of genocide.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan states that the relationship with Israel, as the region's only democracy, should be restored and maintained, which speaks against the counter-proposal's demand for a stop to arms trade and investigations directed at a state accused of genocide. According to the plan, foreign policy should be independent and primarily protect Swedish interests, not be driven through coordinated European countermeasures. The sanctions line in the plan is directed against Turkey, Belarus and Russia.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår fast att relationen till Israel som regionens enda demokrati ska återupprättas och vårdas, vilket talar emot motförslagets krav på stopp för vapenhandel och utredningar riktade mot en stat som anklagas för folkmord. Utrikespolitiken ska enligt planen vara självständig och primärt värna svenska intressen, inte drivas genom samordnade europeiska motåtgärder. Sanktionslinjen i planen riktas mot Turkiet, Belarus och Ryssland.
- maintain the relationship with Israeldecisive»Relationen till Israel, som den enda demokratin i sin region, bör återupprättas och vårdas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The relationship with Israel, as the only democracy in its region, should be restored and maintained.”
- Swedish interests first»Värna svenska intressen i internationella sammanhang« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Protect Swedish interests in international contexts”
- independent foreign policy»Den svenska utrikespolitiken skall vara självständig« (party programme ↗)“Swedish foreign policy shall be independent”
- national self-determination»Stärka det nationella självbestämmandet« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen national self-determination”
Share and embed
Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2025/26:UU14)
- Committee report full text (HD01UU14)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2024/25:1323 — Värnande av folkrätten av Jacob Risberg m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2024/25:1431 — Vissa Asienfrågor av Markus Wiechel m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:1435 — Stöd till utsatta grupper av Rasmus Giertz m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:1438 — Internationella relationer och mänskliga rättigheter av Markus Wiechel m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:1441 — Ekocid som krigsbrott av Yasmine Eriksson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:1471 — Europarådet av Markus Wiechel m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:167 — Skydd för kristna i världen av Magnus Jacobsson (KD)
- Motion 2024/25:169 — Stopp för hädelselagar och dödsstraff för konvertiter av Magnus Jacobsson (KD)
- Motion 2024/25:1729 — Situationen för religiösa minoriteter i Indien av Roland Utbult (KD)
- Motion 2024/25:1788 — Initiativ från Sverige till ekocidlagstiftning av Magnus Manhammar m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2024/25:2181 — Frigivning av Dawit Isaak och försvar av det fria ordet av Helén Pettersson och Fredrik Lundh Sammeli (båda S)
- Motion 2024/25:2520 — Stöd för Tibets folk av Maria Stockhaus m.fl. (M)
- Motion 2024/25:2625 — En grön feministisk utvecklings- och biståndspolitik av Janine Alm Ericson m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2024/25:2954 — En folkrörelse för klimatet av Muharrem Demirok m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2024/25:301 — Erkännande av holodomor som folkmord av Gudrun Brunegård (KD)
- Motion 2024/25:3020 — Israels ockupation av Palestina av Nooshi Dadgostar m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2024/25:3061 — Inkludering av ekocid i Romstadgan av Rebecka Le Moine m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2024/25:3106 — Utgiftsområde 7 Internationellt bistånd av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2024/25:3107 — Internationell samverkan av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2024/25:3162 — Internationellt samarbete i en utmanande tid av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C)
Source: The Swedish Parliament