Strengthened capacity

The plan requires that the state increases its control over society-critical infrastructure and that privatized society-critical activities are taken back, and that public ownership is strong in key sectors such as communications. Strengthening the ability to prevent and meet cyber-attacks in all parts of society, both public and private, follows from this. The plan does not, however, express itself on cyber-security strategies as such.

• state control over infrastructuredecisive»Staten måste öka sin kontroll över infrastruktur och resurser som behövs för att genomföra klimatomställningen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The state must increase its control over infrastructure and resources needed to implement the climate transition.”
• take back society-critical activities»Det är hög tid att agera och ta tillbaka den samhällsviktiga verksamhet och infrastruktur som har privatiserats.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“It is high time to act and take back the society-critical activities and infrastructure that have been privatized.”
• public control over key sectors»transportsystem, kommunikationer och övrig infrastruktur, finansiell sektor, bostadsproduktion, energiförsörjning, strategiska naturtillgångar och så vidare. Samhällsägda företag ska vara föredömen« (party programme ↗)“transport systems, communications and other infrastructure, financial sector, housing production, energy supply, strategic natural resources and so on. Public companies should be the models”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan explicitly states that work to resist cyberattacks and disinformation shall be strengthened and that Sweden must be able to defend itself against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyberattacks. The counter-proposal's requirement for strengthened capacity throughout society, both public and private sector, is precisely this commitment. The plan's rearming of civil defence points in the same direction.

• strengthened cyber capacitydecisive»Arbetet för att stärka förmågan att stå emot cyberattacker och desinformation ska stärkas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Work to strengthen the capacity to resist cyberattacks and disinformation shall be strengthened.”
• defence against hybrid threats»Vi måste kunna försvara oss militärt, men också mot hybridattacker, spionage och cyberangrepp.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We must be able to defend ourselves militarily, but also against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyberattacks.”
• rearmed civil defence»Arbetet att förstärka det civila försvaret och krisberedskapen måste fortsätta« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Work to strengthen civil defence and crisis preparedness must continue”
• protection of critical infrastructure»störningar av kritisk infrastruktur som el,« (party programme ↗)“disruptions of critical infrastructure such as electricity,”

The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.

The plan counts threats to IT and other communications systems as among the new threats and wants to increase allocations to crisis preparedness and make society less vulnerable to unforeseen disruptions. It also states that policy should stay ahead and prevent catastrophes from occurring. Strengthening the capacity to prevent and meet cyber attacks in both the public and private sectors follows from these commitments, even though the plan does not address the organization of cyber defence.

• vulnerable social infrastructuredecisive»Samhället förlitar sig i dag i alltför hög grad på en« (party programme ↗)“Society relies today too heavily on a”
• IT threats as security threats»energibrist, terrorism och hot mot IT- och andra« (party programme ↗)“energy shortages, terrorism and threats to IT and other”
• strengthened civil crisis preparedness»satsa en större andel av försvarets pengar på det civila försvaret, och öka anslagen till krisberedskap.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“allocate a larger share of defence spending to civil defence, and increase allocations to crisis preparedness.”
• preventive security policy»Politiken ska ligga steget före och förhindra att« (party programme ↗)“Policy should stay ahead and prevent”

The party programme establishes that threats no longer come only from states but also from other actors and that defence capacity must be adapted to new threats, which is precisely the counter-proposal's starting point. The election manifesto requires that civil defence and society's preparedness be strengthened and that the entire total defence be reinforced. Strengthening the capacity to meet cyber attacks in both public and private sectors thus follows from the plan. The plan does not assess whether the government's already taken measures are sufficient.

• adapt defence to new threatsdecisive»Därför måste vi också anpassa vår försvarsförmåga efter nya hot mot landet.« (party programme ↗)“Therefore we must also adapt our defence capacity to new threats against the country.”
• strengthen civil preparedness»Även det civila försvaret är livsviktigt. Vi måste rusta civilförsvaret och samhällets beredskap inför krig och kris.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Civil defence too is vital. We must strengthen civil defence and society's preparedness for war and crisis.”
• strengthen total defence»Vi behöver rusta Sveriges totalförsvar, stärka hela rättskedjan, satsa på förebyggande insatser och en likvärdig skola.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We need to strengthen Sweden's total defence, strengthen the entire chain of justice, invest in preventive measures and an equal school.”
• rule of law also digital»Samtidigt måste rättssamhället finnas även i den digitala sfären.« (party programme ↗)“At the same time there must be a rule of law society also in the digital sphere.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan establishes that Sweden's defence capacity must increase and that civil defence shall be strengthened at the same pace as military defence, noting that the threat to the security order is acute. The counter-proposal's demand for strengthened capacity to prevent and meet cyber attacks throughout society, public and private, follows from these commitments. The plan does not explicitly mention cyber capacity, which is why the conclusion is derived.

• civil defence in pace with military defencedecisive»det civila försvaret stärkas i samma takt som det militära« (2022 manifesto ↗)“civil defence is strengthened at the same pace as military defence”
• increased defence capacity»Sveriges nationella försvarsförmåga måste öka.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden's national defence capacity must increase.”
• acute threat to the security order»Med det ryska anfallskriget mot Ukraina – detta angrepp mot hela Europa – är hotet mot vår säkerhetsordning akut.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“With the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine – this attack on all of Europe – the threat to our security order is acute.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan is based on a broadened concept of security where Sweden must be able to meet cyberwarfare and attacks resulting from the vulnerability of modern society, and where crises must be met with all preventive possibilities of policy. The counter-proposal's requirement for strengthened ability to prevent and meet cyberattacks in both the public and private sectors follows directly from this commitment.

• capability against cyberattacksdecisive»möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet, terrorism, cyberkrigföring« (party programme ↗)“meet attacks from international crime, terrorism, cyberwarfare”
• broadened concept of security»Nya typer av konflikter och hot leder till ett vidgat« (party programme ↗)“New types of conflicts and threats lead to a broadened”
• preventive crisis management»Kriser måste mötas med politikens alla preventiva« (party programme ↗)“Crises must be met with all preventive”
• preparedness throughout society»delta i hanteringen av katastrofer och andra svåra påfrestningar i samhället« (party programme ↗)“participate in the management of disasters and other severe hardships in society”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan commits to introducing an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyberattacks and to developing cyber defence. It explicitly also covers the private sector through better government support to companies in security-sensitive operations. The counter-proposal's demand for strengthened capacity in all parts of society thus aligns with the plan's commitments.

• action plan against cyberattacksdecisive»Införa en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och cyberattacker« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Introduce an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyberattacks”
• protection also in private sector»Ge företag som är engagerade i säkerhetskänslig verksamhet bättre stöd från staten att kunna möta cyberattacker, spionage och stöldförsök från främmande makt« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Give companies engaged in security-sensitive operations better support from the state to meet cyberattacks, espionage and theft attempts by foreign powers”
• developed cyber defence»Utveckla cyberförsvaret« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Develop cyber defence”
• strong civil defence»Tryggheten i Sverige förutsätter också ett starkt civilförsvar« (party programme ↗)“Security in Sweden also requires strong civil defence”

The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.

The plan wants to strengthen society's preparedness for all types of crises and particularly points out that an increasingly digital society's vulnerability must be evaluated better. It also wants to strengthen the operational crisis management capability of agencies, regions and municipalities and European cooperation against hybrid threats. The counter-proposal's demand for strengthened capacity against cyber attacks in both the public and private sector follows from these commitments.

• preparedness for all crisesdecisive»Sverigedemokraterna vill stärka samhällets beredskap för alla typer av kriser som kan uppstå.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden Democrats want to strengthen society's preparedness for all types of crises that can occur.”
• digital vulnerability»Samhällets sårbarhet behöver bättre utvärderas, inkluderat hur ett allt mer elektrifierat och digitalt samhälle påverkar utsattheten vid en kris eller störning.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Society's vulnerability needs to be better evaluated, including how an increasingly electrified and digital society affects vulnerability in a crisis or outage.”
• strengthened crisis management capability»Den operativa krisledningsförmågan behöver stärkas på Regeringskansliet och vid landets myndigheter, regioner och kommuner.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Operational crisis management capability needs to be strengthened at the Government Offices and at the country's agencies, regions and municipalities.”
• resistance to hybrid threats»Förstärka det europeiska samarbetet mot islamistiska organisationer, hybridhot och terrorism« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen European cooperation against Islamist organizations, hybrid threats and terrorism”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.