2025-06-102024/25:UU9 · p.3UUForeign affairs
Application of the regulations
Applying export control in individual cases, including the stance toward Israel
What's at stake: The decision affects whether a specific recipient country can receive more favourable treatment in the licensing process for principled, political reasons, or whether all cases should be assessed by the same criteria regardless of security-policy cooperation interests.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is whether Sweden should take a more positive stance toward war-materiel exports and defence cooperation with Israel specifically, or whether the current case-by-case overall assessment — which weighs the recipient country's democratic status and human-rights record in every individual case — should apply without exception.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee rejects the motions, stressing that Sweden's licensing process rests on a case-by-case overall assessment based on government guidelines, the EU Common Position, and the UN Arms Trade Treaty, in which respect for human rights and the recipient country's democratic status are central conditions in every individual case — and does not want to make an exception for a single country.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 4 (SD)
The Sweden Democrats' reservation wants Sweden to send a clear political signal of being positively disposed toward deepened defence cooperation and war-materiel exports to Israel, citing the country's advanced defence industry in missile defence, sensor technology, and cyber-defence, and Sweden's existing imports from Israel. The party wanted the motion's call for a positive presumption toward Israel to be approved, arguing this would not harm Sweden's ability to hold a critical dialogue about the situation in Gaza, and links the issue to a broader need for deterrence against Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 4 by SD.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
What each plan points to — and how the party voted
For each party: the vote its own election manifesto and party programme point to in this case, next to how the party actually voted. A plan can only point to Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| Plan | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | Yes | Abstain 0/0/21/3 | departs from the plan | confidence: high | explicit |
| S | Yes | Yes 93/0/0/13 | follows the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
| MP | Yes | Abstain 0/0/14/4 | departs from the plan | confidence: high | explicit |
| C | Yes | Yes 17/0/0/7 | follows the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
| L | No | Yes 14/0/0/2 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | derived |
| KD | Yes | Yes 15/0/0/4 | follows the plan | confidence: high | explicit |
| M | No | Yes 60/0/0/8 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | derived |
| SD | No | No 0/59/1/12 | follows the plan | confidence: high | explicit |
Broke with the party line
| SDJimmie Åkesson (SD, Jönköpings län) | Abstain — party line: No |
MPs whose vote differs from their party's majority position in this division. Marked with a dark ring in the chamber view.
Committee proposal
Parliament rejects the motions 2024/25:3405 by Håkan Svenneling et al. (V) motions 8, 10 and 13-16, 2024/25:3406 by Rasmus Giertz et al. (SD) motions 1 and 2, and 2024/25:3408 by Jacob Risberg et al. (MP) motion 3.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2024/25:3405 av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V) yrkandena 8, 10 och 13-16, 2024/25:3406 av Rasmus Giertz m.fl. (SD) yrkandena 1 och 2 samt 2024/25:3408 av Jacob Risberg m.fl. (MP) yrkande 3.
Riksdag decision: Every year since 1985, the Government has reported to Parliament on Sweden's export of war material. The report highlights Swedish export control policy regarding war material and dual-use products. The report contains an accounting of the export of war material that occurred in 2024. Furthermore, the Government describes cooperation within the EU and in other international forums concerning strategic export control of war material and dual-use products. The Government also reports on Sweden's donations of war material to Ukraine and the consequences for export control of Sweden's application for NATO membership. Parliament filed the report away, that is, concluded the matter. Parliament also said no to proposals in motions on export control of war material and dual-use products from the general motion period of 2024 and from follow-up motions. The motions deal, for example, with reviewing the current legislation and with the application of the legislation becoming either more restrictive or in some cases more generous. Parliament referred, among other things, to ongoing investigation work and current regulations.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants to enable deepened defense cooperation and strategic export with Israel and Taiwan. (SD) — Reservation 4
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The party programme explicitly works to ban arms exports to warring states and regimes that commit human rights violations.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme explicitly works to ban arms exports to warring states and regimes that commit human rights violations. The counter-proposal instead demands a positive presumption for arms exports to Israel and deepened military cooperation. That directly contradicts the plan's export line and its stance that Sweden shall be a voice for peace, not for increased militarization.
Original (Swedish)
Partiprogrammet arbetar uttryckligen för att förbjuda vapenexport till krigförande stater och regimer som begår brott mot de mänskliga rättigheterna. Motförslaget kräver tvärtom en positiv presumtion för krigsmaterielexport till Israel och fördjupat försvarssamarbete. Det står i direkt strid med planens exportlinje och med dess hållning att Sverige ska vara en röst för fred, inte för ökad militarisering.
- export ban for human rights violationsdecisive»regimer som begår brott mot de mänskliga rättigheterna.« (party programme ↗)“regimes that commit human rights violations.”
- ban on export to warring states»förbjuda vapenexport till diktaturer, stater som för angreppskrig och« (party programme ↗)“ban arms exports to dictatorships, states that wage wars of aggression and”
- voice for peace, not militarization»Vänsterpartiet anser att Sverige ska vara en röst för fred och rättvisa, inte för ökad militarisering.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Left Party believes that Sweden should be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarization.”
- against militarization and arms races»och deeskalering. Vi vänder oss emot militarisering och kapprustning.« (party programme ↗)“and de-escalation. We oppose militarization and arms races.”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The plan's core foreign policy commitment is defence of international law and a rules-based world order and increased respect for human rights.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan's core foreign policy commitment is defence of international law and a rules-based world order and increased respect for human rights. A positive presumption for arms exports to a single country would sidestep that assessment. The party programme further requires that there be no impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity, which argues against the kind of general political signal the counter-proposal seeks to give.
Original (Swedish)
Planens bärande utrikespolitiska åtagande är försvar för folkrätten och en regelbaserad världsordning samt ökad respekt för de mänskliga rättigheterna. En positiv presumtion för krigsmaterielexport till ett enskilt land skulle sätta den prövningen ur spel. Partiprogrammet kräver dessutom att det inte råder straffrihet för krigsförbrytelser och brott mot mänskligheten, vilket talar emot en generell politisk signal av det slag motförslaget vill ge.
- international law is defendeddecisive»Försvar för folkrätten och en regelbaserad världsordning.« (party programme ↗)“Defence of international law and a rules-based world order.”
- accountability for war crimes»Ingen straffrihet för folkmord, krigsförbrytelser och brott mot mänskligheten.« (party programme ↗)“No impunity for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
- human rights in foreign policy»Vi kommer att fortsätta arbetet för att öka respekten för de mänskliga rättigheterna, demokratin och en regelbaserad världsordning och global säkerhet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We shall continue working to increase respect for human rights, democracy and a rules-based world order and global security.”
- the UN Charter's prohibition of force»Våldsförbudet i FN-stadgan respekteras i världspolitiken.« (party programme ↗)“The prohibition of force in the UN Charter is respected in world politics.”
The party programme requires that export of war materiel to countries in armed conflict or with severe human rights violations is abolished, and the goal is a dismantled weapons export.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme requires that export of war materiel to countries in armed conflict or with severe human rights violations is abolished, and the goal is a dismantled weapons export. A positive presumption for war materiel export to Israel is the direct opposite of that commitment. The plan also wants to limit, not deepen, military cooperation of this kind.
Original (Swedish)
Partiprogrammet kräver att export av krigsmateriel till länder i väpnad konflikt eller med grova kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter avskaffas, och målet är en avvecklad vapenexport. En positiv presumtion för krigsmaterielexport till Israel är raka motsatsen till det åtagandet. Planen vill dessutom begränsa, inte fördjupa, militära samarbeten av detta slag.
- export ban in armed conflictdecisive»Export av vapen och annan krigsmateriel till diktaturer, länder som befinner sig i väpnad konflikt eller där grova och omfattande kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter förekommer ska avskaffas.« (party programme ↗)“Export of weapons and other war materiel to dictatorships, countries that are in armed conflict or where severe and extensive human rights violations occur shall be abolished.”
- dismantled weapons export»Miljöpartiet de grönas mål är därför en avvecklad vapenexport.« (party programme ↗)“The Green Party's goal is therefore a dismantled weapons export.”
- international law at the centre»Miljöpartiet de gröna sätter folkrätten och de mänskliga rättigheterna i centrum.« (party programme ↗)“The Green Party puts international law and human rights at the centre.”
- restrictive military cooperation»Uthyrningen av svensk mark till NATO och andra utländska militärstyrkor för krigsövningar ska också upphöra.« (party programme ↗)“The leasing of Swedish territory to NATO and other foreign military forces for military exercises shall also cease.”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The party programme establishes that foreign and security policy ultimately aims to safeguard universal human freedoms and rights and that trade must take ethical considerations.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme establishes that foreign and security policy ultimately aims to safeguard universal human freedoms and rights and that trade must take ethical considerations. A general positive presumption for arms exports to a single country would put that assessment out of play, and the election manifesto instead wants to set harder demands on rights in trade relations. The plan says nothing about Israel, so the position is inferred from these principles.
Original (Swedish)
Partiprogrammet slår fast att utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken ytterst syftar till att värna universella mänskliga fri- och rättigheter och att handeln måste ta etiska hänsyn. En generell positiv presumtion för krigsmaterielexport till ett enskilt land skulle sätta den prövningen ur spel, och valmanifestet vill tvärtom ställa hårdare krav på rättigheter i handelsrelationer. Planen säger inget om Israel, varför ställningstagandet är härlett ur dessa principer.
- rights guide foreign policydecisive»Utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken syftar ytterst till att värna universella mänskliga fri- och rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“Foreign and security policy ultimately aims to safeguard universal human freedoms and rights.”
- ethical considerations in trade»Hänsyn måste tas till etiska och miljömässiga perspektiv.« (party programme ↗)“Consideration must be taken to ethical and environmental perspectives.”
- conditional trade»Ställ hårdare krav på arbetsvillkor, miljö och klimat i handelsavtal.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Set harder demands on working conditions, environment and climate in trade agreements.”
- human rights as foundation»Respekten för de mänskliga rättigheterna är grunden för ett demokratiskt samhälle.« (party programme ↗)“Respect for human rights is the foundation for a democratic society.”
The plan's only categorical bar on arms exports applies to dictatorships, and Israel does not fall under that.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan's only categorical bar on arms exports applies to dictatorships, and Israel does not fall under that. At the same time, the plan bases security policy on deepened cooperation with other democracies and requires a considerably stronger Swedish defence, which speaks for deepened defence industrial cooperation. However, the conclusion is uncertain: the plan also requires a values-based foreign policy and does not state positive presumptions for individual countries.
Original (Swedish)
Planens enda kategoriska spärr för krigsmaterielexport gäller diktaturer, och Israel faller inte under den. Samtidigt bygger planen säkerhetspolitiken på fördjupat samarbete med andra demokratier och kräver ett betydligt starkare svenskt försvar, vilket talar för fördjupat försvarsindustriellt samarbete. Slutsatsen är dock osäker: planen kräver också en värderingsstyrd utrikespolitik och uttalar sig inte om positiva presumtioner för enskilda länder.
- cooperation with democraciesdecisive»Grunden för Sveriges säkerhetspolitik ska vara samarbete med andra demokratier.« (party programme ↗)“The basis for Sweden's security policy shall be cooperation with other democracies.”
- export ban only against dictatorships»Sverige ska inte exportera vapen till diktaturer.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall not export weapons to dictatorships.”
- significantly strengthened defence»Sverige behöver ett betydligt starkare militärt försvar än i dag.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden needs a considerably stronger military defence than today.”
- values-based foreign policy»Vi kallar det för vad det är: en ny värderingsstyrd utrikespolitik.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We call it what it is: a new values-based foreign policy.”
flags: osaker_avvagning
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The party programme sets conditions that a general positive presumption for a single country cannot be reconciled with: exports should not go to countries engaged in offensive warfare or to states with systematic human rights violations, and exports should be limited to democratic states under strict control.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme sets conditions that a general positive presumption for a single country cannot be reconciled with: exports should not go to countries engaged in offensive warfare or to states with systematic human rights violations, and exports should be limited to democratic states under strict control. The counter-proposal wants instead to give a political signal that anticipates review in the individual case. The plan's interest in domestic defence material expertise does not outweigh the explicit export conditions.
Original (Swedish)
Principprogrammet ställer upp villkor som en generell positiv presumtion för ett enskilt land inte kan förenas med: export ska inte gå till offensivt krigförande länder eller till stater med systematiska kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter, och exporten ska begränsas till demokratiska stater under noggrann kontroll. Motförslaget vill i stället ge en politisk signal som föregriper prövningen i det enskilda ärendet. Planens intresse av inhemsk försvarsmateriell kompetens uppväger inte de uttryckliga exportvillkoren.
- no export to warring statesdecisive»Export ska ej gå till offensivt krigförande länder« (party programme ↗)“Export shall not go to countries engaged in offensive warfare”
- export ban for HR violations»eller till stater där det förekommer systematiska kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“or to states where there are systematic violations of human rights.”
- strict control of exports»till demokratiska stater och omgärdas av noggrann« (party programme ↗)“to democratic states and surrounded by strict”
- domestic defence industry is needed»en inhemsk försvarsindustri« (party programme ↗)“a domestic defence industry”
The plan does not mention Israel and does not take a position on presumptions in licensing review.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan does not mention Israel and does not take a position on presumptions in licensing review. The closest principle is that Sweden shall build military cooperation with like-minded nations, strengthen its own capacity and equipment and let Swedish defence technology know-how benefit others, which speaks for a positive attitude towards deepened defence cooperation with a high-technology partner. The conclusion therefore rests on general principles and is uncertain.
Original (Swedish)
Planen nämner inte Israel och tar inte ställning till presumtioner i tillståndsprövningen. Närmast liggande princip är att Sverige ska bygga militära samarbeten med likasinnade nationer, stärka den egna förmågan och materielen och låta svenskt försvarstekniskt kunnande komma till nytta, vilket talar för en positiv hållning till fördjupat försvarssamarbete med en högteknologisk partner. Slutsatsen vilar därför på allmänna principer och är osäker.
- cooperation with like-mindeddecisive»Sverige ska fortsätta att tillsammans med likasinnade nationer« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall continue to together with like-minded nations”
- strengthened capacity and equipment(2022 manifesto)
- defence technology exchange»Verka för att Sveriges teknologiska kunnande och kompetenta försvarsindustri kommer hela Nato till del« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Act to ensure that Sweden's technological know-how and competent defence industry benefits all of NATO”
flags: citat_ej_verifierat
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan explicitly establishes that the relationship with Israel, as the only democracy in its region, should be re-established and nurtured.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan explicitly establishes that the relationship with Israel, as the only democracy in its region, should be re-established and nurtured. The counter-proposal's demand for a positive stance on deepened defense cooperation and military equipment export with Israel follows directly from that commitment. The plan also wants to strengthen Swedish defense industry and arm Sweden against a worsened security situation, which speaks for cooperation with high-tech partners.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår uttryckligen fast att relationen till Israel, som den enda demokratin i sin region, bör återupprättas och vårdas. Motförslagets krav på en positiv hållning till fördjupat försvarssamarbete och krigsmaterielexport med Israel följer direkt av det åtagandet. Planen vill dessutom stärka svensk försvarsindustri och rusta Sverige mot ett försämrat säkerhetsläge, vilket talar för samarbete med högteknologiska partner.
- re-established Israel relationshipdecisive»Relationen till Israel, som den enda demokratin i sin region, bör återupprättas och vårdas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The relationship with Israel, as the only democracy in its region, should be re-established and nurtured.”
- strengthened defense industry»Svensk försvarsindustri ska också stärkas genom att fortsatt satsa på inhemsk försvarsteknologi och att tydligare värdera det strategiska intresset av svenska leverantörer vid inköp av försvarsmateriel.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Swedish defense industry should also be strengthened by continuing to invest in domestic defense technology and by more clearly valuing the strategic interest of Swedish suppliers in defense equipment procurement.”
- deterrence and rearmament»Rusta Sverige inför en ny säkerhetspolitisk situation i vårt närområde« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Arm Sweden for a new security policy situation in our surrounding region”
- combat Islamism»Bekämpa internationell terrorism och islamism« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Combat international terrorism and Islamism”
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2024/25:UU9)
- Committee report full text (HC01UU9)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2024/25:1464 — En tillväxtorienterad politik för industrilandet Sverige av Tobias Andersson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:3038 — Stärkt beredskap och ett robustare samhälle av Daniel Helldén m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2024/25:3088 — Militära relationer med Taiwan av Markus Wiechel (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:3405 — med anledning av skr. 2024/25:114 Strategisk exportkontroll 2024 - krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2024/25:3406 — med anledning av skr. 2024/25:114 Strategisk exportkontroll 2024 - krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden av Rasmus Giertz m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:3408 — med anledning av skr. 2024/25:114 Strategisk exportkontroll 2024 - krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden av Jacob Risberg m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2024/25:955 — Vapenexport till Saudiarabien av Martin Ådahl (C)
- Regeringens skrivelse 2024/25:114 — Strategisk exportkontroll 2024 - krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden
Source: The Swedish Parliament