2024-04-032023/24:UU15 · p.1UUForeign affairs
General topics regarding the Middle East and North Africa
Sweden's general approach to the Middle East and North Africa
What's at stake: The decision concerns Sweden's long-term approach to a region marked by instability and conflict, and whether a broader political initiative is needed to strengthen women's rights, labour rights and Sweden's image in the region, or whether the current work through bilateral contacts, the EU and the UN is sufficient.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is whether parliament should call on the government to take new, comprehensive initiatives for the Middle East and North Africa - such as increased support to the women's movement and a new Swedish strategy for the region - or whether the government's ongoing, broad engagement on issues including gender equality and labour rights should be considered sufficient.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee notes that the Middle East and North Africa face long-term political, economic and social challenges that require broad engagement. The committee welcomes the fact that Sweden has for years strengthened civil society organisations' work for the rights of women and girls, and notes that the government's development cooperation reform agenda prioritises gender equality and women's participation in peace processes and politics. The committee therefore finds no grounds for a statement calling for increased Swedish support to the women's movement in the region. The committee further underlines the importance of labour rights, the rule of law, and the government working for states to ratify ILO conventions, and against this background rejects the relevant items in motions 2023/24:462 and 2023/24:2466.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 2 (C)
The reservation (C) argues that Swedish foreign policy needs a new comprehensive strategy for the Middle East to address the region's difficult challenges, including measures to counter disinformation spread about Swedish social services and police and to strengthen Sweden's image.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 2 by C.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
The decision would have held
Explicit commitments that contradicted the vote: SDSverigedemokraterna
Ja 246–21Ja 183–84
Counterfactual: the parties above are moved to the position their own documents explicitly point at, carrying their whole contingent present. Every other party keeps its real figures, including dissenters and absentees.
How the AI parties would have voted
For each party: what its own plan – election manifesto and party programme – argues for in this case, next to how the party actually voted. The AI can only answer Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| AI | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | Yes | Abstain 1/0/20/3 | differs | confidence: low | derived |
| S | No | Yes 92/0/0/14 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| MP | Yes | Abstain 0/0/14/4 | differs | confidence: low | derived |
| C | No | No 0/21/0/3 | match | confidence: low | derived |
| L | No | Yes 14/0/0/2 | differs | confidence: low | derived |
| KD | No | Yes 15/0/0/4 | differs | confidence: low | derived |
| M | No | Yes 60/0/0/8 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| SD | No | Yes 63/0/0/9 | differsagainst own programme | confidence: high | explicit |
Broke with the party line
| VCiczie Weidby (V, Jönköpings län) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
MPs whose vote differs from their party's majority position in this division. Marked with a dark ring in the chamber view.
Committee proposal
The Riksdagen rejects the motions 2023/24:462 by Håkan Svenneling et al. (V) demands 1-3 and 9 and 2023/24:2466 by Kerstin Lundgren et al. (C) demand 37.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2023/24:462 av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V) yrkandena 1-3 och 9 samt 2023/24:2466 av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C) yrkande 37.
Riksdag decision: The Riksdagen said no to approximately 80 proposals in motions regarding the Middle East and North Africa that were submitted during the general motion period 2023. The Riksdagen's assessments and positions are based on the current situation in the regions and on the information currently available.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants Sweden to develop a new comprehensive strategy for the Middle East and counter misinformation about Swedish institutions. (C) — Reservation 2
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The plan does not address a comprehensive Middle East strategy.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan does not address a comprehensive Middle East strategy. Closest principle is that foreign policy should be governed by international law, human rights, women's liberation and international solidarity, not by national image-keeping; nationalism is said to have no place in left politics. The counter-proposal's emphasis on handling disinformation and strengthening Sweden's image does not respond to these commitments, so the plan does not support the demand.
Original (Swedish)
Planen behandlar inte en samlad Mellanösternstrategi. Närmast liggande princip är att utrikespolitiken ska styras av folkrätt, mänskliga rättigheter, kvinnors frigörelse och internationell solidaritet, inte av nationell imagevård; nationalismen sägs sakna plats i vänsterpolitiken. Motförslagets tyngdpunkt på att hantera desinformation och stärka bilden av Sverige svarar inte mot dessa åtaganden, varför planen inte ger stöd för kravet.
- HR-governed foreign policydecisive»Sverige ska föra en självständig utrikespolitik där demokrati, respekt för folkrätten och de mänskliga rättigheterna, hållbar utveckling,« (party programme ↗)“Sweden should conduct an independent foreign policy where democracy, respect for international law and human rights, sustainable development,”
- rejected nationalism»Nationalismen har ingen plats i en demokratisk« (party programme ↗)“Nationalism has no place in a democratic”
- women's rights prioritized»Kvinnors rätt till arbete, självbestämmande och sexuell« (party programme ↗)“Women's right to work, self-determination and sexual”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan states that the Swedish people are targets for influence campaigns and disinformation and demands that the ability to resist disinformation is strengthened.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan states that the Swedish people are targets for influence campaigns and disinformation and demands that the ability to resist disinformation is strengthened. The counter-proposal's demand for a coordinated regional strategy that also handles disinformation about Swedish social services and police is thus in line with the plan. The plan also wants Sweden to be a strong global voice and an active peacebuilder in the region's conflicts.
Original (Swedish)
Planen konstaterar att svenska folket är måltavla för påverkanskampanjer och desinformation och kräver att förmågan att stå emot desinformation stärks. Motförslagets krav på en samlad regionstrategi som bland annat hanterar desinformation om svensk socialtjänst och polis ligger därmed i planens linje. Planen vill också att Sverige är en stark global röst och en aktiv brobyggare i regionens konflikter.
- resist disinformationdecisive»Arbetet för att stärka förmågan att stå emot cyberattacker och desinformation ska stärkas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The work to strengthen the ability to resist cyber attacks and disinformation must be strengthened.”
- influence campaigns against Sweden»Svenska folket är måltavla för påverkanskampanjer och desinformation.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Swedish people are targets for influence campaigns and disinformation.”
- strong global voice»Sverige ska vara en stark global röst.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall be a strong global voice.”
- active role as peacebuilder»Sverige ska fortsätta att spela en aktiv roll som medlare, brobyggare och samtalspartner« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall continue to play an active role as a mediator, peacebuilder and dialogue partner”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan does not address any regional Middle East strategy.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan does not address any regional Middle East strategy. Its overriding commitment is that Swedish foreign and development policy should be guided by poverty reduction, international law and human rights and not conditioned against Sweden's domestic political interests. A strategy whose stated purpose is to strengthen Sweden's image goes in the opposite direction, so the plan speaks against the demand. The conclusion is derived.
Original (Swedish)
Planen behandlar inte någon regional Mellanösternstrategi. Dess bärande åtagande är att svensk utrikes- och biståndspolitik ska styras av fattigdomsbekämpning, folkrätt och mänskliga rättigheter och inte villkoras mot Sveriges inrikespolitiska intressen. En strategi vars uttalade syfte är att stärka bilden av Sverige går i motsatt riktning, varför planen talar emot kravet. Slutsatsen är härledd.
- foreign policy free from domestic interestsdecisive»att mer än 1 procent av Sveriges bruttonationalinkomst fortsatt ska gå till bistånd, att biståndet ska styras av principer om effektivitet och fattigdomsbekämpning och inte villkoras mot Sveriges inrikespolitiska intressen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“that more than 1 percent of Sweden's gross national income continues to go to development aid, that development aid should be guided by principles of effectiveness and poverty reduction and not conditioned against Sweden's domestic political interests.”
- global justice before self-interest»Målet om en rättvis och hållbar global utveckling måste gå före kortsiktiga ekonomiska intressen.« (party programme ↗)“The goal of a just and sustainable global development must take precedence over short-term economic interests.”
- international law and human rights at center»Miljöpartiet de gröna sätter folkrätten och de mänskliga rättigheterna i centrum.« (party programme ↗)“The Green Party places international law and human rights at the center.”
- feminist foreign policy»utveckla och förstärka Sveriges feministiska utrikes- och utvecklingspolitik.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“develop and strengthen Sweden's feminist foreign and development policy.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan says nothing about a comprehensive Middle East strategy, but binds foreign policy to universal rights and freedoms and requires that Sweden is strengthened against authoritarian powers' influence.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan says nothing about a comprehensive Middle East strategy, but binds foreign policy to universal rights and freedoms and requires that Sweden is strengthened against authoritarian powers' influence. A comprehensive strategy that also addresses disinformation about Swedish authorities is in line with that. The conclusion is based on general principles, however, so the confidence is low.
Original (Swedish)
Planen säger inget om en samlad Mellanösternstrategi, men binder utrikespolitiken vid universella fri- och rättigheter och kräver att Sverige rustas mot auktoritära krafters påverkan. En samlad strategi som också hanterar desinformation om svenska myndigheter ligger i den linjen. Slutsatsen vilar dock på allmänna principer, varför säkerheten är låg.
- rights-based foreign policydecisive»Utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken syftar ytterst till att värna universella mänskliga fri- och rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“Foreign and security policy ultimately aims to protect universal human rights and freedoms.”
- resilience against influence»Sverige måste rustas även mot dessa hot.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden must also be strengthened against these threats.”
- women's rights globally»Det gäller oavsett om det sker i Sverige eller i andra länder, och inte minst när det används som vapen i krig och konflikter.« (party programme ↗)“This applies whether it happens in Sweden or in other countries, and especially when it is used as a weapon in war and conflicts.”
The plan demands a values-based foreign policy and that trade and promotion policy strengthens Sweden's image as an actor for a freer world, which speaks for a unified strategy for the Middle East and North Africa.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan demands a values-based foreign policy and that trade and promotion policy strengthens Sweden's image as an actor for a freer world, which speaks for a unified strategy for the Middle East and North Africa. The plan also wants to protect social workers against persecution, which lies close to the requirement to meet disinformation about Swedish social services. The support is inferred; the plan addresses no regional strategy as such.
Original (Swedish)
Planen kräver en värderingsstyrd utrikespolitik och att främjandepolitiken stärker bilden av Sverige som aktör för en friare värld, vilket talar för en samlad strategi för Mellanöstern och Nordafrika. Planen vill också skydda socialsekreterare mot förföljelse, vilket ligger nära kravet att möta desinformation om svensk socialtjänst. Stödet är dock härlett; planen behandlar ingen regional strategi som sådan.
- strengthened promotion policydecisive»Handels- och främjandepolitiken ska stärka Sverige som aktör för en friare värld« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Trade and promotion policy shall strengthen Sweden as an actor for a freer world”
- values-based foreign policy»Vi kallar det för vad det är: en ny värderingsstyrd utrikespolitik.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We call it what it is: a new values-based foreign policy.”
- protection for social workers»Socialsekreterare och andra offentliganställda ska skyddas mot förföljelse och utsatthet genom att ett nytt brott – tjänstemannaförföljelse – införs.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Social workers and other public employees shall be protected against persecution and victimisation through a new crime – persecution of a civil servant – being introduced.”
- equality in aid»jämställdhet och sexuell och reproduktiv hälsa och rättigheter« (party programme ↗)“gender equality and sexual and reproductive health and rights”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The party programme requires that aid is a component in a unified foreign policy and that work for global development is based on a holistic view, which lies close to the counter-proposal's demand for a combined regional strategy.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme requires that aid is a component in a unified foreign policy and that work for global development is based on a holistic view, which lies close to the counter-proposal's demand for a combined regional strategy. The plan's broadened security concept also encompasses threats directed at the image of Swedish authorities. The connection is however general, so confidence is low.
Original (Swedish)
Partiprogrammet kräver att biståndet är en komponent i en sammanhållen utrikespolitik och att arbetet för global utveckling bygger på helhetssyn, vilket ligger nära motförslagets krav på en samlad regionstrategi. Planens vidgade säkerhetsbegrepp rymmer också hot som riktas mot bilden av svenska myndigheter. Kopplingen är dock allmän, varför säkerheten är låg.
- unified foreign policydecisive»måste vara en komponent i en sammanhållen utrikespolitik till stöd för mänskliga rättigheter« (party programme ↗)“must be a component in a unified foreign policy in support of human rights”
- foreign policy goals»Svensk utrikespolitik ska främja fred, frihet, demokrati och utveckling samt mänskliga rättigheter, förståelse och försoning.« (party programme ↗)“Swedish foreign policy shall promote peace, freedom, democracy and development and human rights, understanding and reconciliation.”
- broadened security concept»möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet, terrorism, cyberkrigföring« (party programme ↗)“meet attacks from international crime, terrorism, cyber warfare”
- holistic view in foreign policy»Arbetet för global utveckling kräver en helhetssyn« (party programme ↗)“Work for global development requires a holistic view”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan establishes that there is reason to review Sweden's full range of foreign policy tools and that Swedish foreign policy should protect Swedish interests.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan establishes that there is reason to review Sweden's full range of foreign policy tools and that Swedish foreign policy should protect Swedish interests. It also promises an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats, which precisely affects disinformation about Swedish authorities. The counter-proposal's demand for a new comprehensive Middle East strategy with measures against disinformation and for Sweden's image follows from these commitments.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår fast att det finns skäl att se över Sveriges samlade utrikespolitiska verktygslåda och att svensk utrikespolitik ska värna svenska intressen. Den lovar dessutom en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot, vilket träffar just desinformation om svenska myndigheter. Motförslagets krav på en ny samlad Mellanösternstrategi med åtgärder mot desinformation och för bilden av Sverige följer av dessa åtaganden.
- action plan against hybrid threatsdecisive»Införa en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och cyberattacker« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Introduce an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyberattacks”
- review of foreign policy»I en föränderlig omvärld finns skäl att se över Sveriges samlade utrikespolitiska verktygslåda.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“In a changing world, there is reason to review Sweden's full range of foreign policy tools.”
- foreign policy for Swedish interestsweak support»Svensk utrikespolitik ska värna svenska intressen.« (party programme ↗)“Swedish foreign policy should protect Swedish interests.”
- democracy and human rights prioritised»Prioritera insatser som stödjer arbetet för demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Prioritise efforts that support work for democracy and human rights”
flags: citat_svagt
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The election manifesto explicitly establishes that foreign policy shall protect Sweden's interests and reputation and that the worsened image of Sweden in the world is something the party wants to change.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto explicitly establishes that foreign policy shall protect Sweden's interests and reputation and that the worsened image of Sweden in the world is something the party wants to change. The counter-proposal's requirement for a coordinated Middle East strategy that addresses disinformation about Swedish social services and police and strengthens the image of Sweden is precisely this. The plan also wants to prioritize the foreign policy issues that have the greatest impact on Swedish society.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet slår uttryckligen fast att utrikespolitiken ska värna Sveriges intressen och renommé och att den försämrade bilden av Sverige i världen är något partiet vill ändra på. Motförslagets krav på en samlad Mellanösternstrategi som bemöter desinformation om svensk socialtjänst och polis och stärker bilden av Sverige är just detta. Planen vill också prioritera de utrikespolitiska frågor som får störst påverkan på det svenska samhället.
- protect Sweden's reputationdecisive»Sveriges utrikespolitik ska utformas för att värna Sveriges intressen och renommé.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden's foreign policy shall be designed to protect Sweden's interests and reputation.”
- improve the image of Sweden»Bilden av Sverige i världen har under den gångna mandatperioden försämrats delvis på grund av inkonsekvens och misslyckanden i utrikespolitiken. Det vill vi ändra på.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The image of Sweden in the world has worsened during the past term partly due to inconsistency and failures in foreign policy. We want to change that.”
- prioritize what affects Sweden»En grundläggande utmaning i ett allt mer instabilt närområde är att prioritera frågor som kan få stor påverkan för det svenska samhället.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“A fundamental challenge in an increasingly unstable immediate region is to prioritize issues that can have major impact for Swedish society.”
- Swedish interests internationally»Värna svenska intressen i internationella sammanhang« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Protect Swedish interests in international contexts”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2023/24:UU15)
- Committee report full text (HB01UU15)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2022/23:1783 — Vissa internationella militära insatser av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2023/24:1195 — Folkmord på yazidierna av Serkan Köse och Ola Möller (båda S)
- Motion 2023/24:1266 — Flytt av Sveriges ambassad i Israel av Roland Utbult (KD)
- Motion 2023/24:1327 — Al-nakba av Jamal El-Haj (S)
- Motion 2023/24:1595 — Uppdatering av Iranpolitiken av Azadeh Rojhan (S)
- Motion 2023/24:196 — Flytt av Sveriges ambassad till Jerusalem av Magnus Jacobsson (KD)
- Motion 2023/24:1984 — Sveriges roll i arbetet för ett fritt Västsahara av Magnus Manhammar (S)
- Motion 2023/24:2398 — Återuppbyggnad av Irak och Syrien av Hans Eklind (KD)
- Motion 2023/24:2466 — Utrikes- och biståndspolitik av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2023/24:2561 — Sveriges ambassad till Jerusalem av Dennis Dioukarev m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2023/24:2562 — Internationell samverkan av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2023/24:2659 — Hävande av ockupationen av Palestina av Jamal El-Haj m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2023/24:305 — Religiösa minoriteters överlevnad i Mellanöstern av Robert Hannah (L)
- Motion 2023/24:321 — Iraks etniska och religiösa minoriteters överlevnad av Robert Hannah (L)
- Motion 2023/24:341 — Erkännande av Jerusalem som Israels huvudstad av Magnus Oscarsson och Dan Hovskär (båda KD)
- Motion 2023/24:462 — Nordafrika och Mellanöstern av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2023/24:477 — Israel och Palestina av Rasmus Giertz m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2023/24:481 — Sverigedemokraternas biståndspolitik av Yasmine Eriksson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2023/24:485 — Vissa frågor rörande Mellanöstern och Afrika av Markus Wiechel m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2023/24:489 — Erkännande av Jerusalem som Israels huvudstad av Hans Eklind (KD)
Source: The Swedish Parliament