2026-06-092025/26:UU10 · p.2UUForeign affairs
Foreign policy
The EU's stance on international law, human rights and defence cooperation
What's at stake: The decision affects how consistently the EU upholds international law and human rights relative to economic interests, for example in trade agreements and aid, and whether large-scale environmental damage should be prosecutable internationally. It also concerns Sweden's role in EU defence cooperation and its relationship with NATO.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is how far the EU's foreign policy should go on international law and human rights toward, among others, China, whether environmental destruction (ecocide) should become an international crime, and whether Sweden should withdraw from EU defence cooperation, or whether the current, more cautious line should stand.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee underscores the importance of the EU's fundamental values, international law and a rules-based world order, as well as accountability for breaches of international law, maintains that a stronger international framework against ecocide is needed but holds that an addition to the Rome Statute requires thorough analysis since the Statute rests on a hard-won compromise.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 5 (V)
The reservation (V) wants the EU's foreign policy, including toward China, to always put human rights before economic interests, wants ecocide made a crime under the Rome Statute prosecutable at the International Criminal Court, and wants Sweden to leave the Pesco permanent structured defence cooperation and the European Defence Agency.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 5 by V.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
The decision would have held
Explicit commitments that contradicted the vote: MPMiljöpartiet
Ja 189–23Ja 171–41
Counterfactual: the parties above are moved to the position their own documents explicitly point at, carrying their whole contingent present. Every other party keeps its real figures, including dissenters and absentees.
How the AI parties would have voted
For each party: what its own plan – election manifesto and party programme – argues for in this case, next to how the party actually voted. The AI can only answer Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| AI | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | No | No 0/20/0/1 | match | confidence: high | explicit |
| S | Yes | Abstain 0/0/106/0 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| MP | No | Yes 18/0/0/0 | differsagainst own programme | confidence: medium | explicit |
| C | Yes | Abstain 0/0/23/1 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| L | Yes | Yes 16/0/0/0 | match | confidence: high | explicit |
| KD | Yes | Yes 18/0/0/1 | match | confidence: medium | explicit |
| M | Yes | Yes 64/0/0/2 | match | confidence: high | derived |
| SD | Yes | Yes 68/0/0/2 | match | confidence: medium | not addressed |
Committee proposal
Parliament rejects the motions 2025/26:2369 by Håkan Svenneling et al. (V) demand 1, 2025/26:3570 by Anna Lasses et al. (C) demand 2, 2025/26:3623 by Morgan Johansson et al. (S) demands 30 and 33, 2025/26:3729 by Kerstin Lundgren et al. (C) demand 18 and 2025/26:3988 by Håkan Svenneling et al. (V) demands 2, 5 and 15.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2025/26:2369 av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V) yrkande 1, 2025/26:3570 av Anna Lasses m.fl. (C) yrkande 2, 2025/26:3623 av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S) yrkandena 30 och 33, 2025/26:3729 av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C) yrkande 18 och 2025/26:3988 av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V) yrkandena 2, 5 och 15.
Riksdag decision: The government has submitted a document on EU activities during 2025. The document addresses decisions and events in the Union and presents the breadth of Union issues based on the work in the various Council configurations. In the document, the government describes how European security has been challenged by an unstable neighborhood, hybrid threats, and a global context in which the rules-based international order is being questioned. Parliament believes, as it has before, that it is central to Sweden's security and world stability that the rules-based international order is maintained. During the year, Sweden has been a driving force behind the EU imposing additional sanctions against Russia and Belarus due to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Parliament welcomes that the government is working to increase pressure on Russia. The enlargement process in the Union has also made progress during 2025. Parliament believes an enlargement is important for peace, stability, and prosperity in Europe. But enlargement is only possible if the process is perceived as legitimate and has broad support in the member states. Furthermore, Parliament believes that respect for the EU's common fundamental values – democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and international law – is one of the Union's greatest assets that must be guaranteed. Parliament filed the document, that is, closed the matter.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants EU to adopt a feminist budget and criminalize tax evasion. (V) — Reservation 5
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The plan is explicitly opposed to Sweden's deepened military cooperation within the EU, which directly carries the requirement to leave the permanent structured defence cooperation and the defence bureau.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan is explicitly opposed to Sweden's deepened military cooperation within the EU, which directly carries the requirement to leave the permanent structured defence cooperation and the defence bureau. The plan also establishes that international law shall be defended and that human rights shall be a steady starting point in foreign policy, which supports the requirement that rights come before economic interests. That ecocide is criminalized is in line with the plan's requirement for ambitious environmental goals with sharp legislation. The committee's reasons about international law and accountability are thereby affected by the plan.
Original (Swedish)
Planen är uttryckligen motståndare till Sveriges fördjupade militära samarbete inom EU, vilket direkt bär kravet på att lämna det permanenta strukturerade försvarssamarbetet och försvarsbyrån. Planen slår också fast att folkrätten ska försvaras och att mänskliga rättigheter ska vara en stadig utgångspunkt i utrikespolitiken, vilket stöder kravet att rättigheter går före ekonomiska intressen. Att ekocid kriminaliseras ligger i linje med planens krav på ambitiösa miljömål med skarp lagstiftning. Utskottets skäl om folkrätt och ansvarsutkrävande berörs därmed av planen.
- against the EU's defence cooperationdecisive»Därför är Vänsterpartiet motståndare till Sveriges allt djupare militära samarbete med NATO och EU, och vi är det enda riksdagspartiet som konsekvent värnar och vill återupprätta svensk alliansfrihet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Therefore the Left Party is opposed to Sweden's ever-deepening military cooperation with NATO and the EU, and we are the only parliamentary party that consistently values and wants to restore Swedish military non-alignment.”
- international law and human rights»Folkrätten behöver försvaras och« (party programme ↗)“International law needs to be defended and”
- sharp environmental legislation»miljömål som följs upp med skarp lagstiftning och praktiskt arbete.« (party programme ↗)“environmental goals that are followed up with sharp legislation and practical work.”
- peace and justice before interests»Vänsterpartiet anser att Sverige ska vara en röst för fred och rättvisa, inte för ökad militarisering.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Left Party believes that Sweden should be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarization.”
The counter-proposal's combined requirements mean that Sweden leaves the permanent structured defence cooperation and the European Defence Agency.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The counter-proposal's combined requirements mean that Sweden leaves the permanent structured defence cooperation and the European Defence Agency. The plan, by contrast, requires stronger European defence cooperation and a more forceful common foreign and security policy for the EU. Although the plan shares the demands for international law and accountability, the decisive explicit commitment to deepened European defence cooperation weighs heavier.
Original (Swedish)
Motförslagets samlade krav innebär att Sverige lämnar det permanenta strukturerade försvarssamarbetet och den europeiska försvarsbyrån. Planen kräver tvärtom ett starkare europeiskt försvarssamarbete och en mer kraftfull gemensam utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik för EU. Även om planen delar kraven på folkrätt och ansvarsutkrävande väger det avgörande åtagandet om fördjupat europeiskt försvarssamarbete tyngre.
- strengthened European defence cooperationdecisive»Starkare europeiskt försvarssamarbete.« (party programme ↗)“Stronger European defence cooperation.”
- common EU security policy»Mer kraftfull gemensam utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik för EU för att bidra till ökad« (party programme ↗)“More forceful common foreign and security policy for the EU to contribute to increased”
- European security responsibility»Ett starkt och enat Europa som tar ett större ansvar för sin egen säkerhet.« (party programme ↗)“A strong and united Europe that takes greater responsibility for its own security.”
- accountability for international law violations»Ingen straffrihet för folkmord, krigsförbrytelser och brott mot mänskligheten.« (party programme ↗)“No impunity for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan explicitly requires that Sweden works for ecocide legislation and that large-scale environmental crimes are classified as an international crime, which is the core of the counter-proposal's requirements on the Rome Statute.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan explicitly requires that Sweden works for ecocide legislation and that large-scale environmental crimes are classified as an international crime, which is the core of the counter-proposal's requirements on the Rome Statute. The plan also establishes that trade and foreign policy shall be a tool for human rights and democratization. The counter-proposal's requirement to leave the European defense cooperation is however not supported by the plan, which views cooperation with democracies positively.
Original (Swedish)
Planen kräver uttryckligen att Sverige verkar för en ekocidlagstiftning och att storskaliga miljöbrott klassas som ett internationellt brott, vilket är kärnan i motförslagets krav om Romstadgan. Planen slår också fast att handels- och utrikespolitiken ska vara ett verktyg för mänskliga rättigheter och demokratisering. Motförslagets krav på att lämna det europeiska försvarssamarbetet stöds däremot inte av planen, som ser positivt på samarbete med demokratier.
- ecocide legislationdecisive»att Sverige verkar för en ekocidlagstiftning.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“that Sweden works for ecocide legislation.”
- ecocide as international crime»Storskaliga miljöbrott, ekocid, klassas som ett internationellt brott.« (party programme ↗)“Large-scale environmental crimes, ecocide, are classified as an international crime.”
- human rights before economic interests»Sveriges och EU:s handelspolitik ska vara ett verktyg för fattigdomsbekämpning, främjande av mänskliga rättigheter, fredliga samarbeten, demokratisering och global klimatpolitik.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden's and the EU's trade policy shall be a tool for poverty alleviation, promotion of human rights, peaceful cooperation, democratization and global climate policy.”
- defense cooperation with democracies»Miljöpartiet ser positivt på ett försvarssamarbete med likasinnade demokratiska stater – särskilt våra grannländer i Norden och Baltikum.« (party programme ↗)“The Green Party views favorably a defense cooperation with like-minded democratic states – particularly our neighbors in the Nordic region and the Baltic.”
flags: motforslaget_innehaller_delkrav_planen_inte_stodjer
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The counter-proposal requires that Sweden leaves the permanent structured defence cooperation and the European Defence Agency.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The counter-proposal requires that Sweden leaves the permanent structured defence cooperation and the European Defence Agency. The plan goes in the opposite direction: defence must be strengthened quickly and powerfully, two per cent of GDP is allocated and NATO membership is completed, with security built in close cooperation with democracies in our region. The demand for human rights before economic interests is, however, close to the plan, but the whole is rejected.
Original (Swedish)
Motförslaget kräver att Sverige lämnar det permanenta strukturerade försvarssamarbetet och den europeiska försvarsbyrån. Planen går i rakt motsatt riktning: försvaret ska rustas snabbt och kraftfullt, två procent av BNP avsättas och Natomedlemskapet fullföljas, med säkerhet byggd i nära samarbete med demokratier i vår närhet. Kravet på mänskliga rättigheter före ekonomiska intressen ligger däremot nära planen, men helheten avvisas.
- strengthen defence and join NATOdecisive»Centerpartiet vill rusta försvaret, stärka Sveriges civila beredskap och fullfölja inträdet i Nato.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Centre Party wants to strengthen defence, strengthen Sweden's civil preparedness and complete NATO accession.”
- increased defence spending»Sverige behöver satsa två procent av BNP på försvaret så snart det är praktiskt möjligt och gå med i Nato.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden needs to invest two per cent of GDP in defence as soon as is practically possible and join NATO.”
- human rights in foreign policy»Utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken syftar ytterst till att värna universella mänskliga fri- och rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“Foreign and security policy ultimately aims to protect universal human freedoms and rights.”
- ethical demands in trade agreements»Ställ hårdare krav på arbetsvillkor, miljö och klimat i handelsavtal.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Make stricter demands on working conditions, environment and climate in trade agreements.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The counter-proposal requires, among other things, that Sweden leaves the permanent structured defense cooperation and the European Defense Agency.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The counter-proposal requires, among other things, that Sweden leaves the permanent structured defense cooperation and the European Defense Agency. The plan requires the exact opposite: more European cooperation and closer cooperation against internal and external threats, with the EU as the primary forum for Swedish foreign and security policy. That the plan otherwise wants to strengthen human rights and the International Criminal Court does not outweigh that part.
Original (Swedish)
Motförslaget kräver bland annat att Sverige lämnar det permanenta strukturerade försvarssamarbetet och den europeiska försvarsbyrån. Planen kräver raka motsatsen: mer europeiskt samarbete och tätare samverkan mot inre och yttre hot, med EU som det främsta forumet för svensk utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik. Att planen i övrigt vill stärka mänskliga rättigheter och Internationella brottmålsdomstolen väger inte upp den delen.
- deepened European cooperationdecisive»Europa behöver mer – inte mindre – samarbete. Inte minst vill vi öka de europeiska klimatambitionerna samt se en tätare samverkan mot inre och yttre hot.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Europe needs more – not less – cooperation. Not least do we want to increase European climate ambitions and see closer cooperation against internal and external threats.”
- EU central to security policy»Europeiska unionen är det främsta forumet för svensk utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik.« (party programme ↗)“The European Union is the primary forum for Swedish foreign and security policy.”
- values-driven foreign policy»Därför vill vi att Sverige gör mycket mer, både som enskilt land och inom internationella samarbeten, för fri- och rättigheter, frihandel, fria val och samarbete i den fria världen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“That is why we want Sweden to do much more, both as a single country and within international cooperation, for freedom and rights, free trade, free choice, and cooperation in the free world.”
- strengthened criminal court»Internationella brottmålsdomstolens roll för att lagföra brott mot mänskliga rättigheter ska stärkas.« (party programme ↗)“The International Criminal Court's role in prosecuting crimes against humanity shall be strengthened.”
The counter-proposal requires that Sweden leaves the permanent structured defence cooperation and the defence bureau.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The counter-proposal requires that Sweden leaves the permanent structured defence cooperation and the defence bureau. The plan, by contrast, states that Sweden participates in and develops EU's security and defence policy cooperation and that this supports Swedish defence policy. That human rights shall weigh heavily in foreign policy is shared by the plan, but the decisive requirement to leave defence cooperation goes against the documents.
Original (Swedish)
Motförslaget kräver att Sverige lämnar det permanenta strukturerade försvarssamarbetet och försvarsbyrån. Planen säger tvärtom att Sverige ingår i och utvecklar EU:s säkerhets- och försvarspolitiska samarbete och att detta stöder svensk försvarspolitik. Att mänskliga rättigheter ska väga tungt i utrikespolitiken delar planen, men det avgörande kravet om utträde ur försvarssamarbetet strider mot dokumenten.
- European defence cooperationdecisive»försvarspolitiska samarbetet. Vi kan inte stå neutrala om våra grannländer anfalls.« (party programme ↗)“defence policy cooperation. We cannot remain neutral if our neighboring countries are attacked.”
- defence cooperation strengthens Sweden»Genom ett europeiskt försvarssamarbete stöds också den svenska« (party programme ↗)“Through European defence cooperation the Swedish”
- coordinated European crisis ability»gränsöverskridande samarbete och solidaritet. EU måste också ha en samordnad förmåga att« (party programme ↗)“cross-border cooperation and solidarity. The EU must also have a coordinated ability to”
- human rights in foreign policy»rättigheter ska vara ett huvudmål för utrikespolitiken.« (party programme ↗)“rights shall be a main goal of foreign policy.”
The plan binds Sweden to intensified military cooperation in Europe and sees the EU and NATO as the most important cooperations.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan binds Sweden to intensified military cooperation in Europe and sees the EU and NATO as the most important cooperations. Ending participation in the permanent structured defence cooperation and the defence agency runs directly counter to that commitment. The plan prioritizes democracy and human rights, but foreign policy shall safeguard Swedish interests and is not subordinated to any single principle. On the whole, the counter-proposal is rejected.
Original (Swedish)
Planen binder Sverige vid ett intensifierat militärt samarbete i Europa och ser EU och Nato som de allra viktigaste samarbetena. Att avsluta deltagandet i det permanenta strukturerade försvarssamarbetet och försvarsbyrån går rakt emot det åtagandet. Planen prioriterar demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter, men utrikespolitiken ska värna svenska intressen och underordnas inte en enda princip. Sammantaget avvisas motförslaget.
- deepened European defence cooperationdecisive»Sverige behöver intensifiera det militära samarbetet i Europa« (party programme ↗)“Sweden needs to intensify military cooperation in Europe”
- EU and NATO as core»EU är tillsammans med Nato vårt allra viktigaste internationella samarbete.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The EU, together with NATO, is our most important international cooperation.”
- Swedish interests guide foreign policyweak support»Svensk utrikespolitik ska värna svenska intressen.« (party programme ↗)“Swedish foreign policy shall safeguard Swedish interests.”
- democracy and human rights prioritized»Prioritera insatser som stödjer arbetet för demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Prioritize efforts that support work for democracy and human rights”
flags: citat_svagt
The plan wants foreign policy to a greater degree protect Swedish interests and improve Sweden's position in trade, which speaks against economic interests being generally subordinated in the relationship with China.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan wants foreign policy to a greater degree protect Swedish interests and improve Sweden's position in trade, which speaks against economic interests being generally subordinated in the relationship with China. The plan also accepts defense cooperation that strengthens Sweden's security, while the counter-proposal wants to leave structured defense cooperation. The demand for ecocide in the Rome Statute lacks support in the plan's requirement for evidence-based and cost-effective environmental policy.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vill att utrikespolitiken i högre grad värnar svenska intressen och förbättrar Sveriges ställning i handeln, vilket talar emot att ekonomiska intressen generellt underordnas i relationen till Kina. Planen bejakar också försvarssamarbeten som stärker Sveriges säkerhet, medan motförslaget vill lämna det strukturerade försvarssamarbetet. Kravet på ekocid i Romstadgan saknar stöd i planens krav på evidensbaserad och kostnadseffektiv miljöpolitik.
- Swedish interests firstdecisive»Värna svenska intressen i internationella sammanhang« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Protect Swedish interests in international contexts”
- trade and export»Förbättra Sveriges ställning på den internationella marknaden och i handel« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Improve Sweden's position on the international market and in trade”
- defense cooperation strengthens security»Genom bilaterala- och internationella avtal, samarbeten och försvarsallianser såsom Nato, stärker vi vår säkerhet och värnar Sveriges försvars- och säkerhetspolitiska intressen.« (party programme ↗)“Through bilateral and international agreements, cooperation, and defense alliances such as NATO, we strengthen our security and protect Sweden's defense and security policy interests.”
- stop symbolic politics»Stoppa symbolpolitik som går ut över möjligheten att bedriva industri och näring« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Stop symbolic politics that goes beyond the possibility to conduct industry and business”
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2025/26:UU10)
- Committee report full text (HD01UU10)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2024/25:1431 — Vissa Asienfrågor av Markus Wiechel m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:388 — Uigurernas situation i Kina av Björn Söder och Markus Wiechel (båda SD)
- Motion 2025/26:2003 — Stöd till Moldaviens europeiska väg av Magnus Berntsson (KD)
- Motion 2025/26:2369 — Kina av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2025/26:2379 — Ett system för att synliggöra kringgående av internationella sanktioner av Markus Wiechel (SD)
- Motion 2025/26:2776 — Västafrika och Västsahara av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2025/26:2800 — Belarus av Markus Wiechel (SD)
- Motion 2025/26:2818 — En svensk utvecklings- och biståndspolitik för rättvisa, jämställdhet och hållbar utveckling av Nooshi Dadgostar m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2025/26:2831 — En näringspolitik för tillväxt i hela landet av Elisabeth Thand Ringqvist m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2025/26:292 — EU:s avtal med och finansiering av Kubas regim av Björn Söder och Markus Wiechel (båda SD)
- Motion 2025/26:3411 — Kina - mänskliga rättigheter, miljö och geopolitik av Jacob Risberg m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2025/26:3570 — Bistånd i en ny världsordning av Anna Lasses m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2025/26:3593 — Utgiftsområde 24 Näringsliv av Fredrik Olovsson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2025/26:3622 — Utgiftsområde 7 Internationellt bistånd av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2025/26:3623 — Internationell samverkan av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2025/26:3724 — Förbud mot kärnvapen och utträde ur NATO av Daniel Riazat (-)
- Motion 2025/26:3729 — Internationellt samarbete i en utmanande tid av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2025/26:3795 — Klassificering av Kuba som statlig sponsor av terrorism av Markus Wiechel (SD)
- Motion 2025/26:3988 — med anledning av skr. 2025/26:115 Verksamheten i Europeiska unionen under 2025 av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2025/26:404 — Konfliktmineraler och deras offer av Gudrun Brunegård (KD)
Source: The Swedish Parliament