2025-05-142024/25:UU7 · p.3UUForeign affairs
Relations with China
Sweden's China policy and the case for a new China strategy
What's at stake: The decision affects how Sweden handles risks linked to China, such as espionage, cyber intrusions and foreign investment, and how closely it cooperates with other democracies in the region such as Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. It also affects how clearly Sweden acts on China's human-rights violations, including in Xinjiang and Tibet.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is whether parliament should call on the government to develop a new, updated China strategy in light of China's support for Russia and threats against Taiwan, or whether the current approach to China, anchored in a common EU line, is sufficient.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee considers the current approach to China to be adequate and points to Sweden's interests towards China being best served through a common European approach and transatlantic coordination, and to the government working for a common, forceful and clear EU China policy. It stresses that it remains essential to be clear about China's human-rights violations, including in Xinjiang and Tibet, and to take part in cooperation against the security challenges posed by China's growing power ambitions. The committee therefore rejects the motion for a new China strategy.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 8 (SD)
The reservation (SD) calls for the government to develop a new China strategy, given that China has chosen to directly or indirectly support Russia's invasion of Ukraine and has threatened military force against Taiwan. The strategy should, among other things, strengthen protection against espionage and cyber intrusions, make trade policy more strategic and guard against foreign investment, and increase cooperation with democratic states in the region threatened by China, such as Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 8 by SD.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
The decision would have held
Explicit commitments that contradicted the vote: LLiberalerna
Ja 220–63Ja 206–77
Counterfactual: the parties above are moved to the position their own documents explicitly point at, carrying their whole contingent present. Every other party keeps its real figures, including dissenters and absentees.
How the AI parties would have voted
For each party: what its own plan – election manifesto and party programme – argues for in this case, next to how the party actually voted. The AI can only answer Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| AI | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | Yes | Yes 21/0/0/3 | match | confidence: medium | derived |
| S | No | Yes 93/0/0/13 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| MP | No | Yes 15/0/0/3 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| C | No | Abstain 0/0/20/4 | differs | confidence: low | derived |
| L | No | Yes 14/0/0/2 | differsagainst own programme | confidence: high | explicit |
| KD | No | Yes 16/0/0/3 | differs | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| M | No | Yes 60/0/0/8 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| SD | No | No 0/63/0/9 | match | confidence: medium | derived |
Committee proposal
The Riksdag rejects the motions 2024/25:1431 by Markus Wiechel et al. (SD) requests 3 and 13–15, 2024/25:1440 by Aron Emilsson et al. (SD) requests 1–4 and 2024/25:3162 by Kerstin Lundgren et al. (C) requests 35–37.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2024/25:1431 av Markus Wiechel m.fl. (SD) yrkandena 3 och 13-15, 2024/25:1440 av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD) yrkandena 1-4 och 2024/25:3162 av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C) yrkandena 35-37.
Riksdag decision: The Riksdag rejected approximately 130 proposals in motions on international relations. The motions were submitted during the ordinary motion period 2024 and concern, among other things, international cooperation, equality and women, peace and security, relations with China and consular matters.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants Sweden to establish a UN village and increase the number of Swedish representatives in the UN system. (SD) — Reservation 8
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The plan stipulates that Sweden shall be able to act independently from great powers such as the USA, China and Russia in order not to be drawn into geopolitical conflicts, and opposes militarization and arms race.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan stipulates that Sweden shall be able to act independently from great powers such as the USA, China and Russia in order not to be drawn into geopolitical conflicts, and opposes militarization and arms race. The counter-proposal's strategy is instead built on deepened bloc alignment and security policy cooperation directed against China. The plan defends human rights and international law, but points to that path rather than bloc formation, and therefore speaks against the requirement.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår fast att Sverige ska kunna agera självständigt från stormakter som USA, Kina och Ryssland för att inte dras in i geopolitiska konflikter, och vänder sig emot militarisering och kapprustning. Motförslagets strategi bygger tvärtom på fördjupad blockanpassning och säkerhetspolitisk samverkan riktad mot Kina. Planen försvarar mänskliga rättigheter och folkrätt, men anvisar den vägen snarare än blockbildning, och talar därför emot kravet.
- independence from great powersdecisive»Det är viktigt att Sverige kan agera självständigt från stormakter som« (party programme ↗)“It is important that Sweden can act independently from great powers such as”
- avoid geopolitical conflicts»USA, Kina och Ryssland för att inte dras in i geopolitiska konflikter« (party programme ↗)“the USA, China and Russia in order not to be drawn into geopolitical conflicts”
- de-escalation rather than arms buildup»och deeskalering. Vi vänder oss emot militarisering och kapprustning.« (party programme ↗)“and de-escalation. We oppose militarization and arms races.”
- international law as main tool»kan ofta göra störst skillnad genom att konsekvent försvara internatio« (party programme ↗)“can often make the greatest difference through consistently defending internatio”
The election manifesto establishes that Sweden must be able to defend itself against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyberattacks and wants to develop cyber defence and intelligence capability, which supports the counter-proposal's demands for strengthened protection against espionage and foreign investment.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto establishes that Sweden must be able to defend itself against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyberattacks and wants to develop cyber defence and intelligence capability, which supports the counter-proposal's demands for strengthened protection against espionage and foreign investment. The manifesto also commits the party to in all cases stand up against the Russian invasion war and to a rules-based world order and human rights, which motivates an updated stance towards a state that supports Russia.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet slår fast att Sverige måste kunna försvara sig mot hybridattacker, spionage och cyberangrepp och vill utveckla cyberförsvaret och underrättelseförmågan, vilket bär motförslagets krav på stärkt skydd mot spionage och utländska investeringar. Manifestet binder också partiet vid att i alla lägen stå upp mot det ryska invasionskriget och vid en regelbaserad världsordning och mänskliga rättigheter, vilket motiverar en uppdaterad hållning mot en stat som stöder Ryssland.
- protection against espionage and cyberattacksdecisive»Vi måste kunna försvara oss militärt, men också mot hybridattacker, spionage och cyberangrepp.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We must be able to defend ourselves militarily, but also against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyberattacks.”
- support for Ukraine»Sverige måste i alla lägen stå upp för Ukraina och mot det ryska invasionskriget.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden must in all cases stand up for Ukraine and against the Russian invasion war.”
- strengthened cyber defence»Vi vill fortsätta internationella samarbeten och utveckla cyberförsvaret och underrättelseförmågan.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We want to continue international cooperation and develop cyber defence and intelligence capability.”
- rules-based world order»Vi kommer att fortsätta arbetet för att öka respekten för de mänskliga rättigheterna, demokratin och en regelbaserad världsordning och global säkerhet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We will continue the work to increase respect for human rights, democracy and a rules-based world order and global security.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan states that Sweden should not adapt its foreign policy to demands from authoritarian states and puts international law and human rights at the centre.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan states that Sweden should not adapt its foreign policy to demands from authoritarian states and puts international law and human rights at the centre. A new China strategy that strengthens protection against espionage, makes trade policy more strategic and deepens cooperation with democracies in the region is in line with that stance. The plan does not specifically address China, so the position is derived from these principles.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår fast att Sverige inte ska anpassa sin utrikespolitik efter auktoritära staters krav och sätter folkrätten och de mänskliga rättigheterna i centrum. En ny Kinastrategi som stärker skyddet mot spionage, gör handelspolitiken mer strategisk och fördjupar samverkan med demokratier i regionen ligger i linje med den hållningen. Planen behandlar inte Kina särskilt, varför ställningstagandet härleds ur dessa principer.
- no adaptation to authoritarian statesdecisive»inte att Sverige ska anpassa sin utrikespolitik efter auktoritära staters krav för kunna att bli medlem i Nato och Sverige ska inte börja sälja vapen till Turkiet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“that Sweden should not adapt its foreign policy to demands from authoritarian states in order to become a NATO member and Sweden should not start selling weapons to Turkey.”
- international law and human rights»Miljöpartiet de gröna sätter folkrätten och de« (party programme ↗)“the Greens puts international law and”
- conditional trade policy»tillverkade med hänsyn till miljö, mänskliga rättigheter och arbetsförhållanden« (party programme ↗)“manufactured with consideration for the environment, human rights and working conditions”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan states that the struggle between liberal democracy and authoritarian forces must be won and that defence capacity must be adapted to new threats to the country, which supports the counter-proposal's demands for protection against espionage and cyber attacks and cooperation with democracies in China's neighbourhood.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan states that the struggle between liberal democracy and authoritarian forces must be won and that defence capacity must be adapted to new threats to the country, which supports the counter-proposal's demands for protection against espionage and cyber attacks and cooperation with democracies in China's neighbourhood. The plan is at the same time strongly pro-free trade, which pulls in the other direction regarding investment screening. Overall, the plan leans towards support, but the evidence specifically about China is thin.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår fast att kampen mellan den liberala demokratin och auktoritära krafter måste vinnas och att försvarsförmågan ska anpassas efter nya hot mot landet, vilket bär motförslagets krav på skydd mot spionage och cyberintrång och på samverkan med demokratier i Kinas närområde. Planen är samtidigt starkt frihandelsvänlig, vilket drar åt andra hållet i fråga om investeringsgranskning. Sammantaget lutar planen åt stöd, men underlaget om just Kina är tunt.
- defend liberal democracydecisive»Runtom i världen pågår en kamp mellan anhängare av den liberala demokratin och auktoritära krafter. Den måste vi vinna.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Around the world, there is a struggle between supporters of liberal democracy and authoritarian forces. We must win that struggle.”
- adapt defence to new threats»Därför måste vi också anpassa vår försvarsförmåga efter nya hot mot landet.« (party programme ↗)“Therefore, we must also adapt our defence capacity to new threats to the country.”
- strategic trade policy towards China»Vi ska använda handelspolitiken för att kapa fossila subventioner runtom i världen och pressa stora utsläppare som Kina att stänga ner sina kolkraftverk.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We should use trade policy to cut fossil subsidies around the world and press major polluters like China to shut down their coal-fired power plants.”
- free trade rather than protectionism»Sverige behöver mer frihandel och internationellt samarbete, inte protektionism och stängda gränser.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden needs more free trade and international cooperation, not protectionism and closed borders.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan's decisive commitment is that trade and promotion policy shall be conducted without the naivety toward Chinese power politics that has been shown for too long, and that work against the threat from China shall be strengthened.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan's decisive commitment is that trade and promotion policy shall be conducted without the naivety toward Chinese power politics that has been shown for too long, and that work against the threat from China shall be strengthened. The counter-proposal's requirement for a new China strategy with strategic trade policy, investment screening and protection against espionage is the implementation of precisely that. The plan also sees undemocratic states' acquisition of strategic assets as a security matter and wants Sweden to do more together with the free world.
Original (Swedish)
Planens avgörande åtagande är att handels- och främjandepolitiken ska bedrivas utan den naivitet som alltför länge visats kinesisk maktpolitik, och att arbetet mot hotet från Kina ska stärkas. Motförslagets krav på en ny Kinastrategi med strategisk handelspolitik, investeringsgranskning och skydd mot spionage är genomförandet av just det. Planen ser dessutom odemokratiska staters förvärv av strategiska tillgångar som en säkerhetsfråga och vill att Sverige gör mer tillsammans med den fria världen.
- end naivety toward Chinadecisive»Handels- och främjandepolitiken ska stärka Sverige som aktör för en friare värld och dra nytta av frihandelns fördelar utan den naivitet som alltför länge uppvisats för kinesisk och rysk maktpolitik.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Trade and promotion policy shall strengthen Sweden as an actor for a freer world and take advantage of free trade's benefits without the naivety that has for too long been shown toward Chinese and Russian power politics.”
- meet the threat from China»Globalt behöver försvarsalliansen vidare stärka sitt arbete mot hotet från Kina.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Globally, the defence alliance needs to further strengthen its work against the threat from China.”
- protect strategic assets»Det finns en tydlig risk för att dessa utnyttjas för politisk utpressning.« (party programme ↗)“There is a clear risk these could be exploited for political extortion.”
- cooperation in the free world»Därför vill vi att Sverige gör mycket mer, både som enskilt land och inom internationella samarbeten, för fri- och rättigheter, frihandel, fria val och samarbete i den fria världen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Therefore we want Sweden to do much more, both as a single country and within international cooperations, for freedom and rights, free trade, free choice and cooperation in the free world.”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The plan makes protection of human rights and freedoms the main goal of foreign policy and states that aggression can never be rewarded.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan makes protection of human rights and freedoms the main goal of foreign policy and states that aggression can never be rewarded. It also requires the ability to meet attacks in the form of cyber warfare and other transnational threats. A new China strategy with strengthened protection against espionage and cyber intrusions, strategic trade policy, and deepened cooperation with democracies in the region follow from these commitments.
Original (Swedish)
Planen gör skyddet av mänskliga fri- och rättigheter till huvudmål för utrikespolitiken och slår fast att aggression aldrig får löna sig. Den kräver också förmåga att möta angrepp i form av cyberkrigföring och annan gränsöverskridande hotbild. En ny Kinastrategi med stärkt skydd mot spionage och cyberintrång, strategisk handelspolitik och fördjupad samverkan med demokratier i regionen följer av dessa åtaganden.
- human rights as main goal in foreign policydecisive»Människovärdet ska stå i fokus och arbetet för att skydda och värna mänskliga fri- och rättigheter ska vara ett huvudmål för utrikespolitiken.« (party programme ↗)“Human dignity shall be in focus and work to protect and value human rights and freedoms shall be a main goal of foreign policy.”
- aggression must not pay off»Aggression får aldrig löna sig« (party programme ↗)“Aggression can never be rewarded”
- preparedness against cyber threats»Sverige måste kunna möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet, terrorism, cyberkrigföring« (party programme ↗)“Sweden must be able to meet attacks from international crime, terrorism, cyber warfare”
- peace-building also globally»Målet är att fördjupa fredsuppbyggnaden i vårt närområde, i Europa samt i övriga världen.« (party programme ↗)“The aim is to deepen peace-building in our nearby area, in Europe and in the rest of the world.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan commits to strengthening protection against espionage and cyberattacks from foreign powers, to developing cyber defense and to Sweden being able to resist authoritarian states' use of power together with like-minded democracies.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan commits to strengthening protection against espionage and cyberattacks from foreign powers, to developing cyber defense and to Sweden being able to resist authoritarian states' use of power together with like-minded democracies. The counter-proposal's demand for a new China strategy with espionage and investment protection, strategic trade policy and closer cooperation with democracies in the region is the same substance. The plan therefore supports the demand.
Original (Swedish)
Planen åtar sig att stärka skyddet mot spionage och cyberattacker från främmande makt, att utveckla cyberförsvaret och att Sverige ska kunna stå emot auktoritära staters maktspråk tillsammans med likasinnade demokratier. Motförslagets krav på en ny Kinastrategi med spionage- och investeringsskydd, strategisk handelspolitik och närmare samverkan med demokratier i regionen är samma sakinnehåll. Planen stöder därför kravet.
- protection against espionagedecisive»Ge företag som är engagerade i säkerhetskänslig verksamhet bättre stöd från staten att kunna möta cyberattacker, spionage och stöldförsök från främmande makt« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Give companies engaged in security-sensitive operations better support from the state to meet cyberattacks, espionage and theft attempts from foreign powers”
- resistance to authoritarian states»Stora auktoritära länder ska inte kunna spela ut enskilda små västerländska demokratier mot varandra.« (party programme ↗)“Large authoritarian countries should not be able to pit individual small Western democracies against each other.”
- action plan against hybrid threats»Införa en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och cyberattacker« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Introduce an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyberattacks”
- strong cyber defense»Utveckla cyberförsvaret« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Develop cyber defense”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan explicitly requires a clear policy that prevents Chinese advance and embraces Swedish economic interests, and that foreign policy to a greater extent shall protect Swedish interests.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan explicitly requires a clear policy that prevents Chinese advance and embraces Swedish economic interests, and that foreign policy to a greater extent shall protect Swedish interests. The party programme states that foreign policy shall be independent. A Swedish strategy for China with heightened protection against espionage, strategic trade policy and cooperation with democracies in the region follows from these commitments.
Original (Swedish)
Planen kräver uttryckligen en tydlig politik som hindrar kinesiska framflyttningar och bejakar svenska ekonomiska intressen, och att utrikespolitiken i högre grad ska värna svenskarnas intressen. Partiprogrammet slår fast att utrikespolitiken ska vara självständig. En egen svensk Kinastrategi med skärpt skydd mot spionage, strategisk handelspolitik och samverkan med demokratier i regionen följer av dessa åtaganden.
- counter Chinese advancedecisive»En tydlig Arktispolitik ska tas fram som hindrar ryska och kinesiska framflyttningar och bejakar svenska ekonomiska intressen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“A clear Arctic policy shall be drawn up that prevents Russian and Chinese advance and embraces Swedish economic interests.”
- Swedish interests in foreign policy»Sverigedemokraterna vill att inriktningen av utrikespolitiken i högre utsträckning än idag ska värna svenskarnas intressen på det globala planet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Sweden Democrats wish the direction of foreign policy to a greater extent than today shall protect Swedish interests on the global stage.”
- independent foreign policy»Den svenska utrikespolitiken skall vara självständig« (party programme ↗)“Swedish foreign policy shall be independent”
- voice for the democratic model»Vara en tydlig röst för den västerländska demokratimodellen och mänskliga fri- och rättigheter« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Be a clear voice for the Western democratic model and human rights and freedoms”
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2024/25:UU7)
- Committee report full text (HC01UU7)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2024/25:1042 — Kinas felaktiga tolkning av resolution 2758 och Taiwans representation i FN-systemet av Magnus Berntsson (KD)
- Motion 2024/25:1166 — Estonias last under förlisningsnatten av Mikael Oscarsson (KD)
- Motion 2024/25:1192 — Kinas ökande makt av Anne-Li Sjölund och Niels Paarup-Petersen (båda C)
- Motion 2024/25:1274 — Om behovet av en ny politik gentemot Taiwan av Mathias Tegnér m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2024/25:1323 — Värnande av folkrätten av Jacob Risberg m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2024/25:1430 — Vissa frågor i Mellanöstern och Afrika av Markus Wiechel m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:1431 — Vissa Asienfrågor av Markus Wiechel m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:1433 — Säkerhetspolitik av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:1438 — Internationella relationer och mänskliga rättigheter av Markus Wiechel m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:1439 — Ett ökat svenskt internationellt inflytande av Markus Wiechel m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:1440 — En ny och skärpt Kinapolitik av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:1637 — Frigivande av Dawit Isaak av Lawen Redar (S)
- Motion 2024/25:1638 — Frigivande av Gui Minhai av Lawen Redar (S)
- Motion 2024/25:1712 — Solidaritet av Jamal El-Haj (-)
- Motion 2024/25:1723 — Ett land i förändring av Jamal El-Haj (-)
- Motion 2024/25:1730 — Utredning avseende Raoul Wallenbergs försvinnande av Magnus Oscarsson och Mikael Oscarsson (båda KD)
- Motion 2024/25:1732 — Ny utredning om Raoul Wallenbergs öde av Mikael Oscarsson (KD)
- Motion 2024/25:1738 — Frisläppande av Dawit Isaak av Magnus Oscarsson (KD)
- Motion 2024/25:1739 — Nya fynd kring Dag Hammarskjölds död av Gudrun Brunegård (KD)
- Motion 2024/25:1802 — Enprocentsmålet i biståndet av Annika Strandhäll (S)
Source: The Swedish Parliament