2024-12-112024/25:UFöU1 · p.3UFöUDefence
Sweden's membership in NATO
Terms of Sweden's Nato membership – permanent bases and nuclear weapons
What's at stake: A formal position would set clear limits on what membership may involve in practice, which matters for Swedish public opinion and for how other countries perceive Sweden's stance, while it could also limit room for manoeuvre in future discussions within the alliance.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is whether the Riksdag should state, through a formal declaration, that Sweden's Nato membership should not include permanent Nato bases on Swedish territory or nuclear weapons on Swedish soil, or whether this should continue to be handled within the government's general approach to membership.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee agrees with the government's assessments and stresses that the collective defence commitment within Nato is central to Swedish security and defence policy, and that Sweden should be a credible, reliable and loyal ally contributing to the alliance's 360-degree approach. It sees no reason to specifically regulate questions of bases and nuclear weapons through a formal statement and rejects the motions.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 6 (S)
The reservation backs Nato membership and wants Sweden to take an active part in the alliance's decision-making, but argues that it should be made clear that membership is about defence cooperation: it sees no need for permanent Nato bases on Swedish territory, and firmly rejects nuclear weapons on Swedish soil so as not to contribute to increased nuclear proliferation.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 6 by S.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
What each plan points to — and how the party voted
For each party: the vote its own election manifesto and party programme point to in this case, next to how the party actually voted. A plan can only point to Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| Plan | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | No | Abstain 0/0/21/3 | departs from the plan | confidence: high | explicit |
| S | No | No 0/90/0/16 | follows the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| MP | No | Abstain 0/0/16/2 | departs from the plan | confidence: high | explicit |
| C | Yes | Yes 21/0/0/3 | follows the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
| L | Yes | Yes 14/0/0/2 | follows the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
| KD | No | Yes 16/0/0/3 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | derived |
| M | Yes | Yes 59/0/0/9 | follows the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
| SD | Yes | Yes 63/0/0/9 | follows the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
Committee proposal
The Riksdag rejects motions 2024/25:55 by Hanna Gunnarsson et al. (V) requests 2-7 and 9, 2024/25:3038 by Daniel Helldén et al. (MP) requests 101-103, 2024/25:3107 by Morgan Johansson et al. (S) request 14 and 2024/25:3247 by Hanna Gunnarsson et al. (V) requests 5 and 8.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2024/25:55 av Hanna Gunnarsson m.fl. (V) yrkandena 2-7 och 9, 2024/25:3038 av Daniel Helldén m.fl. (MP) yrkandena 101-103, 2024/25:3107 av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S) yrkande 14 och 2024/25:3247 av Hanna Gunnarsson m.fl. (V) yrkandena 5 och 8.
Riksdag decision: The Riksdag has addressed the prerequisites and direction of security policy for the next six years. The direction is part of the government's proposition Total defence 2025–2030. The Riksdag supports the government's stated direction for the current period. Among other things, both the government and the Riksdag emphasize that Sweden's support for Ukraine should be sustainable and long-term Sweden should be a credible and reliable member of NATO and pursue a solidarity-based alliance policy to strengthen security and stability in our neighbouring region and throughout the Euro-Atlantic area political dialogue and diplomacy are important tools to strengthen Sweden's security and promote Swedish interests climate change is a threat in itself and increases international tensions and instability and deepens existing conflicts. At the same time, the Riksdag decided to say no to the proposals on security policy that came in motions, of which about forty are from the general petition period 2024. The Riksdag refers to the government's assessments and positions in the proposition.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants to provide more extensive and long-term support to Ukraine. (S) — Reservation 6
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The party programme explicitly demands a ban on nuclear weapons on Swedish territory and that Sweden is free from foreign military bases on its own territory.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme explicitly demands a ban on nuclear weapons on Swedish territory and that Sweden is free from foreign military bases on its own territory. The counter-proposal's demand that no permanent NATO bases are needed and that nuclear weapons on Swedish territory are rejected thus aligns in substance with the plan. That the plan also wants to leave NATO does not change that it supports precisely these demands.
Original (Swedish)
Partiprogrammet kräver uttryckligen ett förbud mot kärnvapen på svensk mark och att Sverige är fritt från främmande militärbaser på eget territorium. Motförslagets krav på att inga permanenta Natobaser behövs och att kärnvapen på svensk mark avvisas sammanfaller därmed i sak med planen. Att planen dessutom vill lämna Nato ändrar inte att den stöder just dessa krav.
- nuclear-free Swedish territorydecisive»Vi vill se ett förbud mot kärnvapen på svensk mark och arbetar för en« (party programme ↗)“We want to see a ban on nuclear weapons on Swedish territory and work for a”
- no foreign bases»militärbaser på eget territorium.« (party programme ↗)“military bases on its own territory.”
- criticism of NATO»med sikte på att lämna Nato.« (party programme ↗)“with a view to leaving NATO.”
- military non-alignment»Därför är Vänsterpartiet motståndare till Sveriges allt djupare militära samarbete med NATO och EU, och vi är det enda riksdagspartiet som konsekvent värnar och vill återupprätta svensk alliansfrihet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Therefore the Left Party is an opponent of Sweden's ever-deepening military cooperation with NATO and EU, and we are the only parliamentary party that consistently safeguards and wants to restore Swedish military non-alignment.”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The election manifesto affirms Nato membership but simultaneously states that the party condemns all threat of nuclear-weapons use and works for a nuclear-weapons-free world; the party programme wants to see a convention prohibiting nuclear weapons.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto affirms Nato membership but simultaneously states that the party condemns all threat of nuclear-weapons use and works for a nuclear-weapons-free world; the party programme wants to see a convention prohibiting nuclear weapons. The counter-proposal requires precisely that membership be limited to defence cooperation without nuclear weapons on Swedish soil and without permanent bases. The plan's nuclear-weapons line and the demand for its own say over how defence is shaped speak for the counter-proposal.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet bejakar Natomedlemskapet men slår samtidigt fast att partiet fördömer allt hot om kärnvapenanvändning och verkar för en värld fri från kärnvapen; partiprogrammet vill se en konvention som förbjuder kärnvapen. Motförslaget kräver just att medlemskapet begränsas till försvarssamarbete utan kärnvapen på svensk mark och utan permanenta baser. Planens kärnvapenlinje och kravet på egen bestämmanderätt över försvarets utformning talar för motförslaget.
- world free from nuclear weaponsdecisive»Vi fördömer allt hot om användning av kärnvapen och fortsätter verka för det enda rimliga slutmålet: en värld fri från kärnvapen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We condemn all threats to use nuclear weapons and continue to work for the only reasonable end goal: a world free from nuclear weapons.”
- convention against nuclear weapons»vill vi verka för en konvention som förbjuder« (party programme ↗)“we want to work for a convention that prohibits”
- own control over defence»Den ger oss rätten att utforma storlek och inriktning på vårt försvar,« (party programme ↗)“It gives us the right to shape the size and direction of our defence,”
- Swedish Nato membership»Sverige ska gå med i Nato« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall join Nato”
The plan explicitly requires a law prohibiting nuclear weapons on Swedish soil and the termination of leasing Swedish territory to NATO and other foreign military forces.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan explicitly requires a law prohibiting nuclear weapons on Swedish soil and the termination of leasing Swedish territory to NATO and other foreign military forces. The counter-proposal's demands — no permanent NATO bases in Sweden and a clear rejection of nuclear weapons on Swedish soil — align with these commitments. The plan therefore supports the counter-proposal.
Original (Swedish)
Planen kräver uttryckligen en lag som förbjuder kärnvapen på svensk mark och att uthyrning av svensk mark till NATO och andra utländska militärstyrkor ska upphöra. Motförslagets krav — inga permanenta Natobaser i Sverige och ett bestämt avvisande av kärnvapen på svensk mark — sammanfaller med dessa åtaganden. Planen stöder därför motförslaget.
- prohibition of nuclear weapons on Swedish soildecisive»• införa en lag som förbjuder kärnvapen på svensk mark.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“• introduce a law prohibiting nuclear weapons on Swedish soil.”
- no foreign military on Swedish soil»Uthyrningen av svensk mark till NATO och andra utländska militärstyrkor för krigsövningar ska också upphöra.« (party programme ↗)“The leasing of Swedish territory to NATO and other foreign military forces for military exercises must also cease.”
- ratify the nuclear weapons convention»• ratificera konventionen om kärnvapenförbud och arbeta för ett totalförbud mot att använda autonoma vapensystem.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“• ratify the nuclear weapons convention and work for a total ban on the use of autonomous weapons systems.”
- dismantling of nuclear weapons»Vi vill se en avveckling av kärnvapen och andra massförstörelsevapen.« (party programme ↗)“We wish to see the dismantling of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The election manifesto binds the party to complete NATO entry, invest two percent of GDP in defence and equip the military quickly and powerfully, and the party programme warns against presuming de-escalation and demilitarization.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto binds the party to complete NATO entry, invest two percent of GDP in defence and equip the military quickly and powerfully, and the party programme warns against presuming de-escalation and demilitarization. Setting advance prohibitions on permanent bases and nuclear weapons on Swedish soil limits the defence cooperation the plan seeks. The plan therefore rejects the counter-proposal's demands.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet binder partiet till att fullfölja inträdet i Nato, satsa två procent av BNP på försvaret och rusta försvaret snabbt och kraftfullt, och partiprogrammet varnar för att förutsätta avspänning och demilitarisering. Att på förhand slå fast förbud mot permanenta baser och mot kärnvapen på svensk mark begränsar det försvarssamarbete planen efterfrågar. Planen avvisar därför motförslagets krav.
- full NATO membershipdecisive»Sverige behöver satsa två procent av BNP på försvaret så snart det är praktiskt möjligt och gå med i Nato.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden needs to invest two percent of GDP in defence as soon as it is practically possible and join NATO.”
- complete NATO entry»Centerpartiet vill rusta försvaret, stärka Sveriges civila beredskap och fullfölja inträdet i Nato.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Centre Party wants to equip the military, strengthen Sweden's civil preparedness and complete NATO entry.”
- no naive demilitarization»Vi kan inte förutsätta att avspänning och demilitarisering ska prägla vår värld.« (party programme ↗)“We cannot presume that de-escalation and demilitarization shall characterize our world.”
- rapid rearmament»Sverige måste rustas snabbt och fokuserat; ingen ska kunna ta vårt demokratiska samhälle ifrån oss.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden must be equipped quickly and in focus; no one shall be able to take our democratic society from us.”
The plan explicitly commits that Sweden within NATO shall contribute the infrastructure needed for the defence of Finland and the Baltic, which is difficult to reconcile with an advance ruling that excludes permanent bases.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan explicitly commits that Sweden within NATO shall contribute the infrastructure needed for the defence of Finland and the Baltic, which is difficult to reconcile with an advance ruling that excludes permanent bases. The plan's entire line is that security is created in alliances and that Sweden shall be a full, solidarity member without self-imposed reservations. The demand for national exceptions is therefore rejected.
Original (Swedish)
Planen åtar sig uttryckligen att Sverige inom Nato ska bidra med den infrastruktur som behövs för försvaret av Finland och Baltikum, vilket är svårt att förena med ett förhandsbesked som utesluter permanenta baser. Planens hela linje är att trygghet skapas i allianser och att Sverige ska vara en fullvärdig, solidarisk medlem utan självpåtagna förbehåll. Kravet på nationella undantag avvisas därmed.
- Swedish infrastructure for NATO defencedecisive»Sverige ska inom Nato särskilt kunna bidra med den infrastruktur som behövs för att skapa ett nödvändigt och strategiskt djup för försvaret av Finland och Baltikum.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall within NATO particularly be able to contribute the infrastructure needed to create a necessary and strategic depth for the defence of Finland and the Baltic.”
- security through alliance»I dag skapas trygghet i allianser, inte i allianslöshet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Today security is created in alliances, not in non-alignment.”
- full NATO membership»Vi har arbetat för ett svenskt Natomedlemskap i årtionden och tänker inte låta rödgröna Natomotståndare stoppa ett svenskt medlemskap.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We have worked for Swedish NATO membership for decades and do not intend to let red-green NATO opponents stop Swedish membership.”
- cooperation with democracies»Grunden för Sveriges säkerhetspolitik ska vara samarbete med andra demokratier.« (party programme ↗)“The foundation of Sweden's security policy shall be cooperation with other democracies.”
The party programme states that each member state shall independently take a stance on participation in a possible common territorial defence and that Swedish military operations shall take place after independent Swedish decisions.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme states that each member state shall independently take a stance on participation in a possible common territorial defence and that Swedish military operations shall take place after independent Swedish decisions. It provides support for Sweden itself establishing conditions such as that permanent bases are not needed and that nuclear weapons on Swedish soil are rejected. At the same time the plan advocates close NATO cooperation and says nothing about nuclear weapons placement, which is why the conclusion is uncertain.
Original (Swedish)
Partiprogrammet slår fast att varje medlemsstat självständigt ska ta ställning till deltagande i ett eventuellt gemensamt territorialförsvar och att svenska militära insatser sker efter självständiga svenska beslut. Det ger stöd för att Sverige själv fastställer villkor som att permanenta baser inte behövs och att kärnvapen på svensk mark avvisas. Samtidigt förordar planen ett nära NATO-samarbete och säger inget om kärnvapenplacering, varför slutsatsen är osäker.
- national self-determination in defencedecisive»Varje medlemsstat måste självständigt få ta ställning till deltagande i ett eventuellt gemensamt territorialförsvar.« (party programme ↗)“Each member state must independently be able to take a stance on participation in a possible common territorial defence.”
- independent Swedish decisions»insatser ska genomföras först efter självständiga svenska beslut« (party programme ↗)“operations shall be conducted only after independent Swedish decisions”
- peace-building in the region»Målet är att fördjupa fredsuppbyggnaden i vårt närområde« (party programme ↗)“The goal is to deepen peace-building in our region”
- close NATO cooperation»Ett öppet och nära samarbete med NATO bör, givet nämnda kriterier, vara en naturlig del av svensk säkerhetspolitik.« (party programme ↗)“Close and open cooperation with NATO should, given the mentioned criteria, be a natural part of Swedish security policy.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan sets a high ambition level for membership: Sweden should be a full, active and highly respected NATO member and get the maximum possible benefit from membership, among other things through concrete contributions in the region.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan sets a high ambition level for membership: Sweden should be a full, active and highly respected NATO member and get the maximum possible benefit from membership, among other things through concrete contributions in the region. To pre-emptively lock in reservations about bases and nuclear weapons on Swedish territory goes against that line. The plan does not treat bases or nuclear weapons explicitly, so the conclusion is derived.
Original (Swedish)
Planen sätter en hög ambitionsnivå för medlemskapet: Sverige ska vara fullvärdig, aktiv och högt ansedd Natomedlem och få ut mesta möjliga effekt av medlemskapet, bland annat genom konkreta bidrag i närområdet. Att i förväg låsa fast förbehåll om baser och kärnvapen på svenskt territorium går emot den linjen. Planen behandlar inte baser eller kärnvapen uttryckligen, varför slutsatsen är härledd.
- maximum benefit from membershipdecisive»Sverige ska som medlem i Nato vara en säkerhetsproducent i vårt närområde och även få ut mesta möjliga effekt av medlemskapet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should as a member of NATO be a security producer in our region and also get the maximum possible benefit from membership”
- active NATO member»En regering som leds av Moderaterna kommer att vara en garant för att Sverige också blir en aktiv och högt ansedd Natomedlem.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“A government led by the Moderates will be a guarantee that Sweden also becomes an active and highly respected NATO member”
- full membership»Vi ska vara en fullvärdig medlem i Nato« (party programme ↗)“We should be a full member of NATO”
- solidaristic defence contributions»Sverige bör bidra konkret till skyddet av våra vänner i de baltiska länderna, exempelvis genom att överväga att skicka bidrag till Natos stridsgrupper eller att delta med vårt stridsflyg i Natos incidentberedskap.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should contribute concretely to protecting our friends in the Baltic countries, for example by considering sending contributions to NATO battlegroups or participating with our fighter jets in NATO's incident preparedness”
The plan's goal is a war-deterrent defence capability and rapid rearmament against the worsened situation in our neighbourhood, with a clear hard line against Russia.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan's goal is a war-deterrent defence capability and rapid rearmament against the worsened situation in our neighbourhood, with a clear hard line against Russia. To pre-commit that Sweden rejects permanent bases and nuclear weapons on Swedish soil limits the deterrent capability the plan demands. The plan's emphasis on national self-determination pulls partly in the opposite direction, which makes the basis weak.
Original (Swedish)
Planens mål är en krigsavhållande försvarsförmåga och en snabb upprustning mot det försämrade läget i närområdet, med en tydlig hård linje mot Ryssland. Att i förväg låsa fast att Sverige avvisar permanenta baser och kärnvapen på svensk mark begränsar den avskräckande förmåga planen efterfrågar. Planens betoning av nationellt självbestämmande drar delvis i motsatt riktning, vilket gör underlaget svagt.
- war-deterrent defence capabilitydecisive»Målet är en krigsavhållande försvarsförmåga med kapacitet att möta främmande aggressioner, men som också kan bistå samhället i kris eller oro.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The goal is a war-deterrent defence capability with capacity to meet foreign aggression, but which can also assist society in crisis or unrest.”
- rearmament against new threat situation»Rusta Sverige inför en ny säkerhetspolitisk situation i vårt närområde« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Prepare Sweden for a new security situation in our neighbourhood”
- hard line against Russia»Sverige bör verka för tydliga sanktioner mot Turkiet, Belarus, Ryssland och andra länder med en negativ utveckling.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should work for clear sanctions against Turkey, Belarus, Russia and other countries with negative development.”
- national self-determination»Stärka det nationella självbestämmandet« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen national self-determination”
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2024/25:UFöU1)
- Committee report full text (HC01UFöU1)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2024/25:1406 — Militärt försvar av Lars Wistedt m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:1433 — Säkerhetspolitik av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:1434 — Sveriges Natopolitik av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:1436 — Rymdstrategi av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:2435 — Förbud mot införsel av kärnvapen av Laila Naraghi m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2024/25:3023 — Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2024/25:3038 — Stärkt beredskap och ett robustare samhälle av Daniel Helldén m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2024/25:3088 — Militära relationer med Taiwan av Markus Wiechel (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:3107 — Internationell samverkan av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2024/25:3160 — Krisberedskap och utveckling av militärt och civilt försvar av Mikael Larsson m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2024/25:3162 — Internationellt samarbete i en utmanande tid av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2024/25:3247 — med anledning av prop. 2024/25:34 Totalförsvaret 2025-2030 av Hanna Gunnarsson m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2024/25:3252 — med anledning av prop. 2024/25:34 Totalförsvaret 2025-2030 av Mikael Larsson och Kerstin Lundgren (båda C)
- Motion 2024/25:3257 — med anledning av prop. 2024/25:34 Totalförsvaret 2025-2030 av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2024/25:55 — Ett kärnvapenfritt Sverige av Hanna Gunnarsson m.fl. (V)
Source: The Swedish Parliament