2025-06-102024/25:UU19 · p.3UUForeign affairs
Center for Democratic Resilience
A NATO centre for democratic resilience
What's at stake: The question concerns how NATO should address democratic backsliding among member and partner countries, and whether Sweden should take an active role in pushing through a proposal blocked by another member state. The outcome affects Sweden's profile in NATO's parliamentary work.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
Parliament decides whether Sweden should push for the establishment of a NATO centre for democratic resilience, or whether the matter does not warrant a specific parliamentary statement.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The motion has been handled through simplified motion processing. The committee finds that the request cannot lead to a parliamentary statement and rejects it without individual justification, together with other motions in this category.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 3 (V)
The Left Party wants Sweden to push for the establishment of a NATO centre for democratic resilience — a proposal that has been blocked by Hungary for several years — pointing out that democratic backsliding in several NATO countries, including Turkey and now the United States, shows that the image of NATO as an alliance of democratic states does not hold true.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 3 by V.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
What each plan points to — and how the party voted
For each party: the vote its own election manifesto and party programme point to in this case, next to how the party actually voted. A plan can only point to Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| Plan | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | No | No 0/21/0/3 | follows the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
| S | No | Yes 93/0/0/13 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| MP | No | Yes 14/0/0/4 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
| C | No | Yes 17/0/0/7 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| L | No | Yes 14/0/0/2 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| KD | No | Yes 15/0/0/4 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
| M | Yes | Yes 60/0/0/8 | follows the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
| SD | No | Yes 60/0/0/12 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
Committee proposal
The Riksdag rejects motion 2024/25:3360 by Håkan Svenneling et al. (V) demand 6.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motion 2024/25:3360 av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V) yrkande 6.
Riksdag decision: Since March 7, 2024, Sweden participates fully in NATO's decision-making and thereby contributes to influencing the alliance's direction. The Riksdag has considered a memorandum in which the government reports on NATO activities in 2024. Furthermore, the Riksdag has considered a report from the Swedish delegation to NATO's parliamentary assembly on their activities in 2024. The Riksdag emphasizes how important it is for the Riksdag to have insight into and influence over the government's actions on NATO matters. The Riksdag and the government believe that Sweden should be a credible, reliable, and solidary ally that contributes to strengthening security and stability in our neighborhood and in the Euro-Atlantic area. It is positive that the government in 2024 prioritized strengthening NATO's collective deterrence and defense capability, including by integrating Sweden into NATO's plans and structures and through concrete contributions to NATO activities. The Riksdag again emphasizes that support for Ukraine should continue to be a central part of Swedish security and defense policy and that Sweden should support Ukraine's struggle as long as it is needed. All of NATO's 32 member states are part of the parliamentary assembly. The purpose of the assembly is to discuss and influence decisions on common security, create understanding for the security policy challenges that transatlantic cooperation faces, and support national parliaments' insight into defense and security matters. The Riksdag emphasizes the importance of the Swedish delegation for the Riksdag to gain insight into NATO's activities. The Riksdag filed the memorandum and report, i.e., closed the case.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants Sweden's defense policy decision-making to be preserved and synchronized with NATO, and for Sweden to focus on defending its near area together with neighboring countries. (V) — Reservation 3
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The plan states that Sweden should be a steady voice in the world for human rights, peace and national self-determination, and it shares the counter-proposal's view that NATO is not a guarantee for democracy.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan states that Sweden should be a steady voice in the world for human rights, peace and national self-determination, and it shares the counter-proposal's view that NATO is not a guarantee for democracy. A centre for democratic resilience is civil democratic strengthening work that lies close to that principle. At the same time, the plan is fundamentally critical of NATO and aims for exit, which is why the support must be inferred and becomes uncertain.
Original (Swedish)
Planen säger att Sverige ska vara en stadig röst i världen för mänskliga rättigheter, fred och nationellt självbestämmande, och den delar motförslagets bild av att Nato inte är någon garant för demokrati. Ett centrum för demokratisk resiliens är ett civilt demokratistärkande arbete som ligger nära den principen. Samtidigt är planen grundläggande kritisk till Nato och siktar på utträde, varför stödet får härledas och blir osäkert.
- voice for human rightsdecisive»en stadig röst i världen som talar för mänskliga rättigheter, fred och« (party programme ↗)“a steady voice in the world that speaks for human rights, peace and”
- fundamental NATO criticism»problem med Natos uppbyggnad. Vi arbetar för att Sverige ska vara en« (party programme ↗)“problems with NATO's structure. We work for Sweden to be a”
- defended international law»Folkrätten behöver försvaras och« (party programme ↗)“International law needs to be defended and”
flags: planens Nato-kritik drar delvis åt motsatt håll
The plan wants to see a Sweden that is among the most active in work for collective security within the UN, EU and NATO, and meets the emergence of authoritarian rule with resolute defence of democracy.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan wants to see a Sweden that is among the most active in work for collective security within the UN, EU and NATO, and meets the emergence of authoritarian rule with resolute defence of democracy. That Sweden drives for a NATO centre for democratic resilience is a direct application of both commitments. The plan does not mention the centre, therefore derived coverage.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vill se ett Sverige som hör till de mest aktiva i arbetet för gemensam säkerhet inom FN, EU och Nato, och möter framväxten av auktoritära styren med ett resolut försvar av folkstyret. Att Sverige driver på för ett Natocentrum för demokratisk resiliens är en direkt tillämpning av båda åtagandena. Planen nämner inte centrumet, därför härledd täckning.
- active role in NATO and EUdecisive»ett Sverige som hör till de mest aktiva i arbetet för gemensam säkerhet« (party programme ↗)“a Sweden that is among the most active in work for collective security”
- resolute defence of democracy»Framväxten av auktoritära styren runt om i världen ska mötas med ett resolut försvar av folkstyret« (party programme ↗)“The emergence of authoritarian rule around the world shall be met with resolute defence of democracy”
- democracy and rules-based order»Vi kommer att fortsätta arbetet för att öka respekten för de mänskliga rättigheterna, demokratin och en regelbaserad världsordning och global säkerhet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We will continue work to increase respect for human rights, democracy and a rules-based world order and global security.”
- resilience against hybrid threats»Beredskap mot hybridattacker.« (party programme ↗)“Readiness against hybrid attacks.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan demands that Sweden does not adapt its foreign policy to authoritarian states' demands in the Nato context and that Sweden works for human rights internationally.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan demands that Sweden does not adapt its foreign policy to authoritarian states' demands in the Nato context and that Sweden works for human rights internationally. A centre for democratic resilience, blocked by a member state with democratic backsliding, is in line with that commitment and with the plan's support for democracy-building. The plan says nothing about just such an institution however, so the conclusion is derived.
Original (Swedish)
Planen kräver att Sverige inte anpassar sin utrikespolitik efter auktoritära staters krav i Natosammanhanget och att Sverige arbetar för mänskliga rättigheter internationellt. Ett centrum för demokratisk resiliens, blockerat av ett medlemsland med demokratisk tillbakagång, ligger i linje med det åtagandet och med planens stöd till demokratibyggande. Planen säger dock inget om just en sådan institution, varför slutsatsen är härledd.
- no concessions to authoritarian statesdecisive»inte att Sverige ska anpassa sin utrikespolitik efter auktoritära staters krav för kunna att bli medlem i Nato och Sverige ska inte börja sälja vapen till Turkiet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“that Sweden shall not adapt its foreign policy to authoritarian states' demands in order to become a member of Nato and Sweden shall not begin selling weapons to Turkey.”
- human rights work internationally»Sverige ska arbeta för mänskliga rättigheter nationellt och internationellt.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall work for human rights nationally and internationally.”
- build democratic societies»att utvecklingssamarbetet ska bidra till att bekämpa fattigdom, förebygga och hantera klimatförändringarna, bevara och skapa fred, förebygga konflikter, bygga upp demokratiska samhällen och motverka korruption.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“that development cooperation shall contribute to combating poverty, preventing and managing climate change, preserving and creating peace, preventing conflicts, building democratic societies and combating corruption.”
- support for democracy work»Organisationer som arbetar för demokrati, mänskliga rättigheter, jämställdhet och hållbar utveckling bör ges stöd genom svenskt utvecklingssamarbete.« (party programme ↗)“Organizations that work for democracy, human rights, gender equality and sustainable development should be given support through Swedish development cooperation.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The election manifesto makes defending liberal democracy its own main priority and describes the struggle against authoritarian forces as something Sweden must win.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto makes defending liberal democracy its own main priority and describes the struggle against authoritarian forces as something Sweden must win. A NATO centre for democratic resilience is an instrument for exactly that, and the plan commits itself to completing NATO membership. The plan does not mention the centre, so the position is derived from these commitments.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet gör försvaret av den liberala demokratin till en egen huvudprioritering och beskriver kampen mot auktoritära krafter som något Sverige måste vinna. Ett Natocentrum för demokratisk resiliens är ett instrument för just det, och planen bekänner sig samtidigt till att fullfölja Natomedlemskapet. Planen nämner inte centrumet, varför ställningstagandet är härlett ur dessa åtaganden.
- protect liberal democracydecisive»Den liberala demokratin får aldrig tas för given. Den ska vårdas, värnas och vidareutvecklas — idag och för kommande generationer.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Liberal democracy must never be taken for granted. It shall be cared for, protected and developed—today and for future generations.”
- resistance to authoritarian forces»Runtom i världen pågår en kamp mellan anhängare av den liberala demokratin och auktoritära krafter. Den måste vi vinna.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Around the world there is a struggle between supporters of liberal democracy and authoritarian forces. We must win that struggle.”
- complete NATO membership»Centerpartiet vill rusta försvaret, stärka Sveriges civila beredskap och fullfölja inträdet i Nato.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“the Centre Party wants to strengthen defence, strengthen Sweden's civil preparedness and complete entry into NATO.”
- shared responsibility for democracy»Fred, skyddet av mänskliga rättigheter och hållbar utveckling är hela världens ansvar.« (party programme ↗)“Peace, protection of human rights and sustainable development are the whole world's responsibility.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan makes defence of democracy the foundation of foreign policy and wishes Sweden to do more, both alone and in international cooperation, for freedom and rights.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan makes defence of democracy the foundation of foreign policy and wishes Sweden to do more, both alone and in international cooperation, for freedom and rights. It moreover wishes the defence alliance to strengthen its work beyond purely military and that the rule of law be scrutinised rigorously even among allies. The counter-proposal's requirement that Sweden pushes for a NATO centre for democratic resilience thus follows from the plan's principles, even if such a centre is not mentioned.
Original (Swedish)
Planen gör försvaret av demokratin till grunden för utrikespolitiken och vill att Sverige gör mer, både enskilt och i internationella samarbeten, för fri- och rättigheter. Den vill dessutom att försvarsalliansen stärker sitt arbete bortom det rent militära och att rättsstatens ställning granskas hårt även bland allierade. Motförslagets krav på att Sverige driver på för ett Natocentrum för demokratisk resiliens följer därför av planens principer, även om ett sådant centrum inte nämns.
- value-driven foreign policydecisive»Målet med vår utrikespolitik är en friare värld för alla.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The goal of our foreign policy is a freer world for all.”
- widened NATO work»Globalt behöver försvarsalliansen vidare stärka sitt arbete mot hotet från Kina.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Globally the defence alliance needs to further strengthen its work beyond the purely military”
- support to pro-democracy forces»Sverige ska vara en röst för global frihet och ge stöd åt de modiga människor som verkar för« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall be a voice for global freedom and give support to brave people who work for”
- rule of law even among allies»Rättsstaten och respekten för de mänskliga rättigheterna behöver stärkas inom EU-länderna« (party programme ↗)“The rule of law and respect for human rights need to be strengthened in EU countries”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan makes work for human rights a main goal of foreign policy and sees democracy and human rights as the value foundation on which cooperation shall rest.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan makes work for human rights a main goal of foreign policy and sees democracy and human rights as the value foundation on which cooperation shall rest. A NATO centre for democratic resilience is a positive instrument of the kind the plan primarily advocates. The documents do not mention such a centre, so the position is derived from the democracy commitment.
Original (Swedish)
Planen gör arbetet för mänskliga fri- och rättigheter till ett huvudmål för utrikespolitiken och ser demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter som den värdegrund samarbeten ska vila på. Ett Natocentrum för demokratisk resiliens är ett positivt verkningsmedel av det slag planen förordar i första hand. Dokumenten nämner inte ett sådant centrum, så ställningstagandet härleds ur demokratiåtagandet.
- HR as main goal in foreign policydecisive»Människovärdet ska stå i fokus och arbetet för att skydda och värna mänskliga fri- och rättigheter ska vara ett« (party programme ↗)“Human dignity shall be in focus and work to protect and uphold human rights and freedoms shall be a”
- positive instruments first»hand positiva verkningsmedel användas, som till exempel finansiellt stöd, samarbetsprojekt, samtal och dialoger för att främja mänskliga rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“hand positive instruments are used, such as for example financial support, cooperation projects, dialogue and conversations to promote human rights.”
- democracy as condition for cooperation»unionen är öppen för varje europeiskt land som delar grundläggande värden om demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter« (party programme ↗)“the union is open to any European country that shares fundamental values of democracy and human rights”
- close NATO cooperation»med NATO bör, givet nämnda kriterier, vara en naturlig del av svensk säkerhetspolitik.« (party programme ↗)“with NATO should, given the aforementioned criteria, be a natural part of Swedish security policy.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan defines Sweden's NATO ambition in terms of being a security producer in the neighbourhood and contributing concrete military capability, not in establishing new alliance bodies to monitor allies' democratic development.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan defines Sweden's NATO ambition in terms of being a security producer in the neighbourhood and contributing concrete military capability, not in establishing new alliance bodies to monitor allies' democratic development. The counter-proposal's demand is moreover based on criticism of allies, while the plan emphasises mutual solidarity and maximum benefit from membership. However, the plan is clear that Sweden shall be a strong voice for democracy, so the assessment is uncertain.
Original (Swedish)
Planen definierar Sveriges Natoambition i termer av att vara säkerhetsproducent i närområdet och bidra med konkret militär förmåga, inte med nya alliansorgan för att granska allierades demokratiska utveckling. Motförslagets krav vilar dessutom på kritik mot allierade, medan planen betonar ömsesidig solidaritet och maximal effekt av medlemskapet. Planen är samtidigt tydlig med att Sverige ska vara en stark röst för demokrati, varför bedömningen är osäker.
- security producer in the neighbourhooddecisive»Sverige ska som medlem i Nato vara en säkerhetsproducent i vårt närområde och även få ut mesta möjliga effekt av medlemskapet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall as a NATO member be a security producer in our neighbourhood and also get the maximum possible benefit from membership.”
- military capability contribution»Vi kan bidra mer än de allra flesta exempelvis när det gäller stridsflyg och ubåtar, men även inom telekom och artificiell intelligens.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We can contribute more than most, for example when it comes to fighter jets and submarines, but also in telecommunications and artificial intelligence.”
- strong voice for democracy»Sverige ska vara en stark röst för frihet, demokrati och« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall be a strong voice for freedom, democracy and”
The plan does not address any NATO centre, but it requires Sweden to be a clear voice for the Western democracy model and that sanctions be directed at, among others, Turkey in the event of negative development.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan does not address any NATO centre, but it requires Sweden to be a clear voice for the Western democracy model and that sanctions be directed at, among others, Turkey in the event of negative development. An intergovernmental centre within NATO for democratic resilience lies within the defence cooperation the plan embraces. However, uncertainty is great because the plan does not take a position on new institutions.
Original (Swedish)
Planen behandlar inte något Natocentrum, men den kräver att Sverige ska vara en tydlig röst för den västerländska demokratimodellen och att sanktioner riktas mot bland annat Turkiet vid negativ utveckling. Ett mellanstatligt centrum inom Nato för demokratisk resiliens ligger inom det försvarssamarbete planen bejakar. Osäkerheten är dock stor eftersom planen inte tar ställning till nya institutioner.
- voice for Western democracydecisive»Vara en tydlig röst för den västerländska demokratimodellen och mänskliga fri- och rättigheter« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Be a clear voice for the Western democracy model and human rights and freedoms”
- marking against democratic backsliding»Sverige bör verka för tydliga sanktioner mot Turkiet, Belarus, Ryssland och andra länder med en negativ utveckling.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should work for clear sanctions against Turkey, Belarus, Russia and other countries with negative development.”
- NATO cooperation strengthens security»Genom bilaterala- och internationella avtal, samarbeten och försvarsallianser såsom Nato, stärker vi vår säkerhet och värnar Sveriges försvars- och säkerhetspolitiska intressen.« (party programme ↗)“Through bilateral and international agreements, cooperation and defence alliances such as NATO, we strengthen our security and protect Sweden's defence and security policy interests.”
- clearer democracy voice»Sverige ska bli en tydligare röst för demokrati, yttrandefrihet och grundläggande mänskliga fri och rättigheter i världspolitiken.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should become a clearer voice for democracy, freedom of speech and fundamental human rights and freedoms in world politics.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2024/25:UU19)
- Committee report full text (HC01UU19)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2024/25:3360 — med anledning av skr. 2024/25:112 Verksamheten inom Nato under helåret 2024 av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2024/25:3384 — med anledning av skr. 2024/25:112 Verksamheten inom Nato under helåret 2024 av Jacob Risberg m.fl. (MP)
- Framställning / redogörelse 2024/25:RS2 — Redogörelse för verksamheten i riksdagens delegation till Natos parlamentariska församling 2024
- Regeringens skrivelse 2024/25:112 — Verksamheten inom Nato under helåret 2024
Source: The Swedish Parliament