2025-05-072024/25:UU17 · p.3UUForeign affairs
Implementation of national sanctions
National sanctions against corruption and money laundering
What's at stake: The issue determines whether Sweden can sanction corruption and money laundering not covered by EU rules, for instance against foreign officials. It affects Sweden's freedom of action in foreign policy and its relationship to international sanctions regimes.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
Whether Sweden should adopt its own national sanctions regime, for example against corruption and money laundering, or continue to only implement sanctions decided by the UN or EU.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee holds that Sweden should not introduce national sanctions but should continue to only implement sanctions decided by the UN Security Council or the EU, citing reasons of effectiveness, international law, EU law, and security policy.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 3 (SD)
Sweden should adopt national Magnitskij-style legislation that also covers corruption and systemic money laundering, since the EU's equivalent legislation does not, and there is a clear link between corruption and human rights violations.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 3 by SD.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
What each plan points to — and how the party voted
For each party: the vote its own election manifesto and party programme point to in this case, next to how the party actually voted. A plan can only point to Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| Plan | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | No | Yes 21/0/0/3 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
| S | No | Yes 93/0/0/13 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | derived |
| MP | No | Yes 16/0/0/2 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
| C | No | Abstain 0/0/21/3 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | derived |
| L | No | Yes 14/0/0/2 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
| KD | No | Yes 17/0/0/2 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | derived |
| M | No | Yes 60/0/0/8 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | derived |
| SD | No | No 0/63/0/9 | follows the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
Committee proposal
Parliament rejects the motions 2024/25:1438 by Markus Wiechel et al. (SD) motion 26, 2024/25:3162 by Kerstin Lundgren et al. (C) motion 20 and 2024/25:3354 by Kerstin Lundgren et al. (C).
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2024/25:1438 av Markus Wiechel m.fl. (SD) yrkande 26, 2024/25:3162 av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C) yrkande 20 och 2024/25:3354 av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C).
Riksdag decision: Rules on international sanctions are to be tightened through a new law. Parliament approved the Government's proposal, which aims to implement the EU's sanctions directive into Swedish law. International sanctions mean that one or more countries restrict the freedom of action for, for example, a person, an organization or another country's government. The purpose is to peacefully attempt to influence the subject of the restrictions through economic and political measures. This can be done, among other things, by introducing restrictions on exports and imports, imposing entry bans or freezing assets. The purpose of the EU's sanctions directive – and of the new law – is to criminalize and establish penalties if the sanctions are not complied with. The law entails that penalties for violations of international sanctions are tightened even violations of lesser severity (minor cases) are to be criminalized new criminal offense designations in the form of sanctions violation, sanctions offense, gross sanctions offense and repeated sanctions offense are to be introduced attempts and complicity in certain sanctions offenses are to be criminalized certain government agencies are obligated to report if there is suspicion of a crime under the new law. Parliament decided that the law enters into force on 10 June 2025 instead of 20 May 2025 as the Government proposed.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants Sweden to introduce a national Magnitsky legislation that covers corruption and money laundering. (SD) — Reservation 3
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The plan wants Sweden to have high ambitions in international work for human rights and pursues its own firm demands against regimes that violate them, for example through bans on arms exports to dictatorships.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan wants Sweden to have high ambitions in international work for human rights and pursues its own firm demands against regimes that violate them, for example through bans on arms exports to dictatorships. A national Magnitsky-like legislation that also covers corruption and money laundering is such an independent tool. The plan moreover builds international cooperation on national self-determination and wants to challenge the limitations of EU law.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vill att Sverige har höga ambitioner i det internationella arbetet för mänskliga rättigheter och driver egna hårda krav mot regimer som kränker dem, till exempel genom förbud mot vapenexport till diktaturer. En nationell Magnitskijliknande lagstiftning som även täcker korruption och penningtvätt är ett sådant eget verktyg. Planen bygger dessutom internationellt samarbete på nationell självbestämmanderätt och vill utmana EU-rättens begränsningar.
- own demands against human rights-violating regimesdecisive»förbjuda vapenexport till diktaturer, stater som för angreppskrig och« (party programme ↗)“ban arms exports to dictatorships, states that wage wars of aggression, and”
- high ambitions for human rights»vara ett land med höga ambitioner i det internationella arbetet för en« (party programme ↗)“be a country with high ambitions in international work for a”
- national self-determination»nationella självbestämmanderätten som grund.« (party programme ↗)“national self-determination as a foundation.”
- challenge EU's supranationality»Vi vill att Sverige utmanar EU:s överstatliga fördrag och lagar« (party programme ↗)“We want Sweden to challenge EU's supranational treaties and laws”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The party programme refuses to accept that those in power violate human rights for political or economic interests, and the election manifesto promises continued work for human rights and a rules-based world order and strengthened international work against crime.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme refuses to accept that those in power violate human rights for political or economic interests, and the election manifesto promises continued work for human rights and a rules-based world order and strengthened international work against crime. National Magnitsky-like legislation against corruption and money-laundering serves these commitments. The plan prioritizes, however, EU-common solutions, which makes the conclusion uncertain.
Original (Swedish)
Partiprogrammet vägrar acceptera att makthavare kränker de mänskliga rättigheterna av politiska eller ekonomiska intressen, och valmanifestet lovar fortsatt arbete för mänskliga rättigheter och en regelbaserad världsordning samt förstärkt internationellt arbete mot brottslighet. En nationell Magnitskijliknande lagstiftning mot korruption och penningtvätt tjänar dessa åtaganden. Planen prioriterar dock EU-gemensamma lösningar, vilket gör slutsatsen osäker.
- uncompromising HR defencedecisive»Socialdemokratin vägrar acceptera att någon makt på grund av politiska eller ekonomiska« (party programme ↗)“Social democracy refuses to accept that any power on grounds of political or economic”
- rules-based world order»Vi kommer att fortsätta arbetet för att öka respekten för de mänskliga rättigheterna, demokratin och en regelbaserad världsordning och global säkerhet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We will continue working to increase respect for human rights, democracy and a rules-based world order and global security.”
- against transnational crime»Vi behöver förstärka det internationella arbetet mot brottsligheten.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We need to strengthen international work against crime.”
- EU cooperation first»Vi är övertygade om att EU-samarbetet är grunden för att lösa många av vår tids svåraste problem.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We are convinced that EU cooperation is the foundation for solving many of this era's most difficult problems.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan places international law and human rights at the centre of foreign policy, requires that all forms of corruption are countered and that corporate tax evasion is stopped.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan places international law and human rights at the centre of foreign policy, requires that all forms of corruption are countered and that corporate tax evasion is stopped. It also asserts that member states shall have the right to go ahead with stricter legislation when the EU does not suffice. A national Magnitsky-like law covering corruption and money laundering follows from these commitments.
Original (Swedish)
Planen sätter folkrätten och de mänskliga rättigheterna i centrum för utrikespolitiken, kräver att alla former av korruption motarbetas och att företags skatteflykt stoppas. Den slår också fast att medlemsländer ska ha rätt att gå före med hårdare lagstiftning när EU inte räcker till. En nationell Magnitskijliknande lagstiftning som täcker korruption och penningtvätt följer av dessa åtaganden.
- international law and human rights at the centredecisive»Miljöpartiet de gröna sätter folkrätten och de« (party programme ↗)“The Green Party places international law and”
- corruption must be countered»kunna granska makten. Alla former av korruption« (party programme ↗)“be able to scrutinise power. All forms of corruption”
- right to go ahead nationally»Medlemsländerna måste få rätt att gå före med« (party programme ↗)“Member states must have the right to go ahead with”
- stop illegal money flows»Företags skatteflykt ska stoppas.« (party programme ↗)“Corporate tax evasion shall be stopped.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The party programme states that foreign policy ultimately aims to uphold universal human freedoms and rights and that citizens of democracies should not compromise with those ideals, which supports Magnitsky-like legislation against gross violations and the corruption that feeds them.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme states that foreign policy ultimately aims to uphold universal human freedoms and rights and that citizens of democracies should not compromise with those ideals, which supports Magnitsky-like legislation against gross violations and the corruption that feeds them. The manifesto's demand for stricter anti-corruption rules points the same way. That the plan simultaneously emphasizes international cooperation means the conclusion is drawn with low confidence.
Original (Swedish)
Partiprogrammet slår fast att utrikespolitiken ytterst syftar till att värna universella mänskliga fri- och rättigheter och att demokratiernas medborgare inte ska kompromissa med de idealen, vilket bär en Magnitskijliknande lagstiftning mot grova kränkningar och den korruption som göder dem. Manifestets krav på skärpta regler mot korruption pekar åt samma håll. Att planen samtidigt betonar internationellt samarbete gör att slutsatsen dras med låg säkerhet.
- human rights as goaldecisive»Utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken syftar ytterst till att värna universella mänskliga fri- och rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“Foreign and security policy ultimately aims to uphold universal human freedoms and rights.”
- do not compromise on ideals»Därför är det särskilt viktigt att vi, medborgare i de demokratiska länderna, inte kompromissar med våra ideal utan förenas i en strävan efter alla människors fri- och rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“Therefore, it is particularly important that we, citizens of democratic countries, do not compromise with our ideals but unite in a pursuit of all people's freedoms and rights.”
- stricter anti-corruption rules»Vi vill inrätta en antikorruptionsmyndighet, skärpa regler mot korruption och införa ett lobbyregister.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We want to establish an anti-corruption agency, tighten rules against corruption and introduce a lobbying register.”
- international cooperation first»kan bara lösas genom internationellt samarbete« (party programme ↗)“can only be solved through international cooperation”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan makes values-driven foreign policy a goal and wants Sweden to be driving for as comprehensive sanctions regime as possible, which bears the counter-proposal's demand for national Magnitsky-like legislation where EU law is insufficient.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan makes values-driven foreign policy a goal and wants Sweden to be driving for as comprehensive sanctions regime as possible, which bears the counter-proposal's demand for national Magnitsky-like legislation where EU law is insufficient. The plan also requires that human rights violations can be met with sanctions and that corruption prevention is prioritized. The link between corruption and human rights violations thus lies in the plan's own logic.
Original (Swedish)
Planen gör en värderingsstyrd utrikespolitik till mål och vill att Sverige är pådrivande för en så heltäckande sanktionsregim som möjligt, vilket bär motförslagets krav på en nationell Magnitskijliknande lagstiftning där EU-rätten inte räcker. Planen kräver också att kränkningar av rättigheter ska kunna mötas med sanktioner och att korruptionsbekämpning prioriteras. Sambandet mellan korruption och rättighetskränkningar ligger därmed i planens egen logik.
- comprehensive sanctions regimedecisive»Sverige ska vara pådrivande för att så breda globala koalitioner som möjligt bygger ut en så heltäckande sanktionsregim mot Ryssland som möjligt.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall be driving for as broad global coalitions as possible to build as comprehensive sanctions regime against Russia as possible.”
- values-driven foreign policy»Vi kallar det för vad det är: en ny värderingsstyrd utrikespolitik.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We call it what it is: a new values-driven foreign policy.”
- sanctions for human rights violations»Systematiska kränkningar av medborgarnas rättigheter eller diskriminering av minoriteter ska kunna leda till sanktioner i form av indragna EU-stöd efter beslut av EU-domstolen, eller i särskilt allvarliga fall suspenderad rösträtt i rådet.« (party programme ↗)“Systematic violations of citizens' rights or discrimination of minorities shall be able to lead to sanctions in the form of withdrawn EU support following decision by the EU Court of Justice, or in particularly serious cases suspended voting rights in the Council.”
- corruption prevention is prioritized»Därför ska bistånd till demokratiserande krafter, institutionsbyggande, korruptionsbekämpning och rättsstatliga strukturer samt jämställdhet och sexuell och reproduktiv hälsa och rättigheter samt hbtqi-personers rättigheter prioriteras.« (party programme ↗)“Therefore aid to democratization efforts, institution-building, corruption prevention and rule-of-law structures as well as equality and sexual and reproductive health and rights and LGBTQI people's rights shall be prioritized.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan makes work for human rights and freedoms a main goal of foreign policy and explicitly keeps open for boycotts and sanctions to be used as a last resort.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan makes work for human rights and freedoms a main goal of foreign policy and explicitly keeps open for boycotts and sanctions to be used as a last resort. National legislation that also addresses corruption and systematic money laundering, where EU law is not sufficient, is in line with this and with the plan's requirement to counteract serious transnational crime. The plan at the same time emphasizes international commitments and the position of the UN, which pulls in the other direction.
Original (Swedish)
Planen gör arbetet för mänskliga fri- och rättigheter till ett huvudmål för utrikespolitiken och håller uttryckligen öppet för att bojkott och sanktioner används som en sista utväg. En nationell lagstiftning som träffar även korruption och systematisk penningtvätt, där EU-rätten inte räcker till, ligger i linje med detta och med planens krav på att motverka allvarlig gränsöverskridande brottslighet. Planen betonar samtidigt internationella förpliktelser och FN:s ställning, vilket drar åt andra hållet.
- human rights as main goaldecisive»Människovärdet ska stå i fokus och arbetet för att skydda och värna mänskliga fri- och rättigheter ska vara ett« (party programme ↗)“Human worth shall be in focus and work to protect and promote human rights and freedoms shall be a”
- sanctions as a last resort»utväg kan bojkott och sanktioner bli aktuella.« (party programme ↗)“as a last resort, boycotts and sanctions may become relevant.”
- against transnational crime»motverka allvarlig gränsöverskridande brottslighet« (party programme ↗)“counteract serious transnational crime”
- international legal obligations»efterlevandet av internationella förpliktelser garanteras.« (party programme ↗)“compliance with international commitments is guaranteed.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan states that Sweden shall be a strong voice for freedom, democracy and human rights and that tax money shall not end up in the pockets of corrupt and undemocratic leaders.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan states that Sweden shall be a strong voice for freedom, democracy and human rights and that tax money shall not end up in the pockets of corrupt and undemocratic leaders. A national Magnitsky legislation covering corruption and money laundering is a tool for precisely that, and the plan contains no commitment that excludes national measures. However, the fact that EU cooperation is the core of Sweden's international engagement suggests that the tool would preferably be joint.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår fast att Sverige ska vara en stark röst för frihet, demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter och att skattepengar inte ska hamna i fickorna på korrupta och odemokratiska ledare. En nationell Magnitskijlagstiftning som täcker korruption och penningtvätt är ett verktyg för just det, och planen innehåller inget åtagande som utesluter nationella åtgärder. Att EU-samarbetet är kärnan i Sveriges internationella engagemang drar dock åt att verktyget helst ska vara gemensamt.
- strong voice for human rightsdecisive»Sverige ska vara en stark röst för frihet, demokrati och« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall be a strong voice for freedom, democracy and”
- against corruption»Dina skattepengar ska inte försvinna i korruption eller hamna i fickorna på odemokratiska ledare« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Your tax money shall not disappear in corruption or end up in the pockets of undemocratic leaders”
- democracy and human rights prioritized»Prioritera insatser som stödjer arbetet för demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Prioritize measures that support work for democracy and human rights”
- EU as core of foreign policy»EU-samarbetet är kärnan i Sveriges ekonomiska och politiska internationella engagemang« (party programme ↗)“EU cooperation is the core of Sweden's economic and political international engagement”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan wants Sweden to work for clear sanctions against states with negative development and clearly mark against violations of fundamental freedoms and rights.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan wants Sweden to work for clear sanctions against states with negative development and clearly mark against violations of fundamental freedoms and rights. It also wants to strengthen Swedish democracy's independence, which speaks for a separate national sanctions order instead of only following EU and UN decisions. A Magnitsky legislation that also covers corruption thus aligns with the plan.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vill att Sverige verkar för tydliga sanktioner mot stater med negativ utveckling och tydligt markerar mot kränkningar av grundläggande fri- och rättigheter. Den vill dessutom stärka det svenska folkstyrets oberoende, vilket talar för en egen nationell sanktionsordning i stället för att enbart följa EU:s och FN:s beslut. En Magnitskijlagstiftning som även träffar korruption ligger därmed i linje med planen.
- active sanctions policydecisive»Sverige bör verka för tydliga sanktioner mot Turkiet, Belarus, Ryssland och andra länder med en negativ utveckling.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden should work for clear sanctions against Turkey, Belarus, Russia, and other countries with negative development.”
- mark against rights violations»Sverige ska tydligt markera mot kränkningar av grundläggande fri- och rättigheter och av suveräna staters territorium.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall clearly mark against violations of fundamental freedoms and rights and of sovereign states' territory.”
- national self-determination»Bejaka och stärka det svenska folkstyrets oberoende« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Embrace and strengthen Swedish democracy's independence”
- voice for human rights»Vara en tydlig röst för den västerländska demokratimodellen och mänskliga fri- och rättigheter« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Be a clear voice for the Western democratic model and human freedoms and rights”
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2024/25:UU17)
- Committee report full text (HC01UU17)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2024/25:1438 — Internationella relationer och mänskliga rättigheter av Markus Wiechel m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2024/25:2467 — En näringspolitik för tillväxt i hela landet av Elisabeth Thand Ringqvist m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2024/25:3107 — Internationell samverkan av Morgan Johansson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2024/25:3136 — Utgiftsområde 24 Näringsliv av Fredrik Olovsson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2024/25:3162 — Internationellt samarbete i en utmanande tid av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2024/25:3354 — med anledning av prop. 2024/25:126 Ny lag om internationella sanktioner av Kerstin Lundgren m.fl. (C)
- Proposition 2024/25:126 — Ny lag om internationella sanktioner
Source: The Swedish Parliament