2026-06-092025/26:UU18 · p.2UUForeign affairs
Sweden's accession to the export control agreement
Sweden's accession to the agreement on export control in the defence area
What's at stake: The agreement concerns long-term cooperation with a number of traditional partner countries on the export and import of military equipment. The decision affects how much national room for manoeuvre Sweden retains in export control, and whether other countries' weaker regulatory frameworks could affect Swedish assessments, such as the so-called democracy criterion.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is whether parliament should approve Sweden's accession to an international agreement on export control in the defence area, or whether accession should be rejected in favour of Sweden retaining full national control over military-equipment exports.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee welcomes Sweden's accession to the agreement and considers it to be in Sweden's security-policy interest to safeguard long-term cooperation on materiel matters with traditional partner countries. The committee notes that the agreement is premised on each party conducting its national export control under its own legislation and principles, and therefore rejects the motions opposing accession.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 3 (V, MP)
The reservation (V, MP) wants to reject accession to the agreement. The reasoning is that the UN Arms Trade Treaty requires Sweden to maintain national control over military-equipment exports, and that several of the other treaty parties have weaker export controls, risking a loophole that undermines the democracy criterion in Swedish legislation. The reservation's authors welcome joint procurement with closely aligned countries but hold that this must not come at the expense of the integrity of Swedish export control.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: approving what the committee proposes and rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 3 by V, MP.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
The decision would have held
Explicit commitments that contradicted the vote: KDKristdemokraterna
Ja 299–42Ja 281–60
Counterfactual: the parties above are moved to the position their own documents explicitly point at, carrying their whole contingent present. Every other party keeps its real figures, including dissenters and absentees.
How the AI parties would have voted
For each party: what its own plan – election manifesto and party programme – argues for in this case, next to how the party actually voted. The AI can only answer Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| AI | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | No | No 0/20/0/1 | match | confidence: high | derived |
| S | Yes | Yes 106/0/0/0 | match | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| MP | No | No 0/18/0/0 | match | confidence: medium | derived |
| C | No | Yes 23/0/0/1 | differs | confidence: low | not addressed |
| L | No | Yes 16/0/0/0 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| KD | No | Yes 18/0/0/1 | differsagainst own programme | confidence: medium | explicit |
| M | Yes | Yes 64/0/0/2 | match | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| SD | Yes | Yes 68/0/0/2 | match | confidence: low | derived |
Committee proposal
The Riksdag approves Sweden's accession to the export control agreement in the defense sphere. Thereby the Riksdag accepts government Bill 2025/26:228 point 4 and rejects the motions 2025/26:4091 by Håkan Svenneling et al. (V) motion 2 and 2025/26:4096 by Jacob Risberg et al. (MP) motion 6.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen godkänner Sveriges anslutning till avtalet om exportkontroll på försvarsområdet. Därmed bifaller riksdagen proposition 2025/26:228 punkt 4 och avslår motionerna 2025/26:4091 av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V) yrkande 2 och 2025/26:4096 av Jacob Risberg m.fl. (MP) yrkande 6.
Riksdag decision: The Riksdag approved the government's proposal for a modern and adapted regulatory framework for defense matériel and approved Sweden's accession to the export control agreement in the defense sphere. The proposal aims to adapt the rules to the fact that Sweden is now a member of NATO and to make the rules for export of defense matériel more effective. Among other things, it is proposed that the rules for export of defense matériel and cooperation with other countries in this area should be adapted to NATO membership. It will also be required to obtain a permit under the Weapons Act to manufacture firearms and similar items. Furthermore, it is proposed that certain information within the export control framework should be covered by secrecy. The legislative amendments enter into force on 1 August 2026.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants to reject the government's proposal to allow exemptions from licensing requirements for the manufacture of weapons material parts. (V, MP) — Reservation 3
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The plan requires a ban on arms exports to dictatorships, states that wage wars of aggression, and regimes that violate human rights, which supports the objection to an agreement that risks opening loopholes past the democracy criterion.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan requires a ban on arms exports to dictatorships, states that wage wars of aggression, and regimes that violate human rights, which supports the objection to an agreement that risks opening loopholes past the democracy criterion. The plan also wants Sweden to act independently and retain national control rather than commit to supranational obligations. The committee's reasoning - that each party retains its national export control - is precisely what the plan means must be guaranteed in practice.
Original (Swedish)
Planen kräver förbud mot vapenexport till diktaturer, stater som för angreppskrig och regimer som kränker mänskliga rättigheter, vilket bär invändningen mot ett avtal som riskerar att öppna kryphål förbi demokratikriteriet. Planen vill också att Sverige agerar självständigt och behåller nationell kontroll snarare än binder sig i överstatliga åtaganden. Utskottets skäl - att varje part behåller sin nationella exportkontroll - är just det planen menar måste garanteras i praktiken.
- democracy criterion for arms exportsdecisive»förbjuda vapenexport till diktaturer, stater som för angreppskrig och« (party programme ↗)“ban arms exports to dictatorships, states that wage wars of aggression, and”
- national self-determination»Det är viktigt att Sverige kan agera självständigt från stormakter som« (party programme ↗)“It is important that Sweden can act independently from great powers like”
- against supranational bindings»Vi vill att Sverige utmanar EU:s överstatliga fördrag och lagar« (party programme ↗)“We want Sweden to challenge EU's supranational treaties and laws”
- voice for peace»Vänsterpartiet anser att Sverige ska vara en röst för fred och rättvisa, inte för ökad militarisering.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Left Party believes that Sweden should be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarization.”
The plan wants to see stronger European defence cooperation and a Europe that takes greater responsibility for its own security, and wants to continue international cooperation in the defence area.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan wants to see stronger European defence cooperation and a Europe that takes greater responsibility for its own security, and wants to continue international cooperation in the defence area. Long-term equipment cooperation with neighbouring partner countries therefore aligns with the plan. The demand on non-proliferation is a counterweight, but does not support the counter-proposal's demand to stand outside the agreement.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vill se ett starkare europeiskt försvarssamarbete och ett Europa som tar större ansvar för sin egen säkerhet, och vill fortsätta internationella samarbeten på försvarsområdet. Ett långsiktigt materielsamarbete med närstående partnerländer ligger därför i linje med planen. Kravet på icke-spridning är en motvikt, men bär inte motförslagets krav på att stå utanför avtalet.
- European defence cooperationdecisive»Starkare europeiskt försvarssamarbete.« (party programme ↗)“Stronger European defence cooperation.”
- European security responsibility»Ett starkt och enat Europa som tar ett större ansvar för sin egen säkerhet.« (party programme ↗)“A strong and united Europe that takes greater responsibility for its own security.”
- continuing international cooperation»Vi vill fortsätta internationella samarbeten och utveckla cyberförsvaret och underrättelseförmågan.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We want to continue international cooperation and develop cyber defence and intelligence capability.”
- non-proliferation»Pådrivande arbete för avspänning, icke-spridning och en ömsesidig internationell« (party programme ↗)“Driving work for détente, non-proliferation and a reciprocal international”
The plan requires that Sweden does not export weapons to dictatorships or countries with serious human rights violations and that Swedish foreign policy is not adapted to other states' demands.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan requires that Sweden does not export weapons to dictatorships or countries with serious human rights violations and that Swedish foreign policy is not adapted to other states' demands. An agreement that through parties with weaker regulations risks creating a loophole in national export control contradicts this, which the counter-proposal objects to. The plan also requires an independent security policy within NATO.
Original (Swedish)
Planen kräver att Sverige inte exporterar vapen till diktaturer eller länder med allvarliga kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter och att svensk utrikespolitik inte anpassas efter andra staters krav. Ett avtal som via parter med svagare regelverk riskerar att skapa ett kryphål i den nationella exportkontrollen står i strid med detta, vilket motförslaget invänder mot. Planen kräver också en självständig säkerhetspolitik inom Nato.
- no export to dictatorshipsdecisive»Sverige ska inte exportera vapen till diktaturer eller länder där allvarliga kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter förekommer.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall not export weapons to dictatorships or countries where serious human rights violations occur.”
- no adaptation of weapons exports»inte att Sverige ska anpassa sin utrikespolitik efter auktoritära staters krav för kunna att bli medlem i Nato och Sverige ska inte börja sälja vapen till Turkiet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“not that Sweden should adapt its foreign policy to authoritarian states' demands to be able to become a member of NATO and Sweden should not start selling weapons to Turkey.”
- the export must not undermine peace work»Den svenska vapenindustrin, importen och exporten av vapen, får aldrig urholka arbetet för fred, demokratisering och mänskliga rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“Swedish weapons industry, import and export of weapons, must never undermine work for peace, democratization and human rights.”
- independent security policy»Sveriges medlemskap i Nato måste förenas med en självständig utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden's NATO membership must be reconciled with an independent foreign and security policy.”
The party programme establishes that foreign and security policy ultimately aims to protect universal human freedoms and rights and that ethical considerations must be taken in trade, and the election manifesto demands tougher requirements in trade agreements.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme establishes that foreign and security policy ultimately aims to protect universal human freedoms and rights and that ethical considerations must be taken in trade, and the election manifesto demands tougher requirements in trade agreements. This speaks to the national export control's democracy criterion not being hollowed out by an agreement. The plan's strong support for free trade and cooperation points the other way at the same time.
Original (Swedish)
Partiprogrammet slår fast att utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken ytterst syftar till att värna universella mänskliga fri- och rättigheter och att etiska hänsyn måste tas i handeln, och valmanifestet kräver hårdare krav i handelsavtal. Det talar för att den nationella exportkontrollens demokratikriterium inte får urholkas av ett avtal. Planens starka stöd för frihandel och samarbete drar samtidigt åt andra hållet.
- tougher requirements in trade agreementsdecisive»Ställ hårdare krav på arbetsvillkor, miljö och klimat i handelsavtal.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Set tougher requirements on working conditions, environment and climate in trade agreements.”
- rights drive foreign policy»Utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken syftar ytterst till att värna universella mänskliga fri- och rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“Foreign and security policy ultimately aims to protect universal human freedoms and rights.”
- ethical considerations in trade»Hänsyn måste tas till etiska och miljömässiga perspektiv.« (party programme ↗)“Ethical and environmental perspectives must be considered.”
- free trade and cooperation»Sverige klarar sig inte utan frihandel.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden cannot manage without free trade.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan explicitly establishes that Sweden shall not export weapons to dictatorships and that criteria for business relations with undemocratic regimes shall exist.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan explicitly establishes that Sweden shall not export weapons to dictatorships and that criteria for business relations with undemocratic regimes shall exist. The counter-proposal's demand that an international agreement must not become a loophole that undermines the democracy criterion thus rests on a commitment in the plan. The plan admittedly wants close cooperation with other democracies, but explicitly without naivety.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår uttryckligen fast att Sverige inte ska exportera vapen till diktaturer och att kriterier för affärsrelationer med odemokratiska regimer ska finnas. Motförslagets krav på att ett internationellt avtal inte får bli ett kryphål som underminerar demokratikriteriet vilar därmed på ett åtagande i planen. Planen vill visserligen ha nära samarbete med andra demokratier, men uttryckligen utan naivitet.
- no weapons to dictatorshipsdecisive»Sverige ska inte exportera vapen till diktaturer.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall not export weapons to dictatorships.”
- democracy criteria in business»I företag som helt eller delvis ägs av den svenska staten ska det finnas kriterier gällande affärsrelationer med odemokratiska regimer.« (party programme ↗)“In companies that are wholly or partly owned by the Swedish state, there shall be criteria regarding business relations with undemocratic regimes.”
- trade without naivety»Handels- och främjandepolitiken ska stärka Sverige som aktör för en friare värld och dra nytta av frihandelns fördelar utan den naivitet som alltför länge uppvisats för kinesisk och rysk maktpolitik.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Trade and promotion policy shall strengthen Sweden as an actor for a freer world and take advantage of free trade's benefits without the naivety that has been shown too long towards Chinese and Russian power politics.”
- cooperation with democracies»Grunden för Sveriges säkerhetspolitik ska vara samarbete med andra demokratier.« (party programme ↗)“The foundation for Sweden's security policy shall be cooperation with other democracies.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The party programme binds arms exports to democratic states under careful control and explicitly forbids export to offensively warring states and states with systematic violations of human rights.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme binds arms exports to democratic states under careful control and explicitly forbids export to offensively warring states and states with systematic violations of human rights. An agreement that risks circumventing the democracy criterion through parties with weaker regulations undermines that commitment. The plan also requires that Swedish decisions are made independently, although European defence cooperation in itself is welcomed.
Original (Swedish)
Partiprogrammet binder vapenexporten till demokratiska stater under noggrann kontroll och förbjuder uttryckligen export till offensivt krigförande stater och stater med systematiska kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter. Ett avtal som riskerar att kringgå demokratikriteriet via parter med svagare regelverk urholkar det åtagandet. Planen kräver också att svenska beslut fattas självständigt, även om europeiskt försvarssamarbete i sig välkomnas.
- the democracy criteriondecisive»Vapenexporten ska begränsas till demokratiska stater och omgärdas av noggrann kontroll.« (party programme ↗)“Arms exports shall be limited to democratic states and surrounded by careful control.”
- export ban for human rights violations»Export ska ej gå till offensivt krigförande länder eller till stater där det förekommer systematiska kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter.« (party programme ↗)“Export shall not go to offensively warring countries or to states where systematic violations of human rights occur.”
- national self-determination»Svenska militära insatser ska genomföras först efter självständiga svenska beslut.« (party programme ↗)“Swedish military operations shall be carried out only after independent Swedish decisions.”
- European defence cooperation»Genom ett europeiskt försvarssamarbete stöds också den svenska försvarspolitiken som syftar till fred och frihet.« (party programme ↗)“Through European defence cooperation, Swedish defence policy which aims for peace and freedom is also supported.”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The plan wants Swedish defence industry and Swedish technological expertise to be shared with all of NATO and for military cooperation in Europe and across the Atlantic to be intensified.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan wants Swedish defence industry and Swedish technological expertise to be shared with all of NATO and for military cooperation in Europe and across the Atlantic to be intensified. The counter-proposal wants to refrain from a material cooperation agreement with selected partner countries. The plan's line of building security together with like-minded nations therefore speaks against the counter-proposal's demand.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vill att svensk försvarsindustri och svenskt teknologiskt kunnande kommer hela Nato till del och att det militära samarbetet i Europa och över Atlanten intensifieras. Motförslaget vill avstå från ett materielsamarbetsavtal med utvalda partnerländer. Planens linje att bygga säkerhet tillsammans med likasinnade talar därför emot motförslagets krav.
- defence industrial cooperationdecisive»Verka för att Sveriges teknologiska kunnande och kompetenta försvarsindustri kommer hela Nato till del« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Work to ensure that Sweden's technological expertise and competent defence industry are shared with all of NATO”
- deepened military cooperation»Sverige behöver intensifiera det militära samarbetet i Europa« (party programme ↗)“Sweden needs to intensify military cooperation in Europe”
- cooperation with like-minded»Sverige ska fortsätta att tillsammans med likasinnade nationer« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall continue together with like-minded nations”
- deepened regional cooperation»Verka för ett fördjupat samarbete i norra Europa« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Work for deepened cooperation in northern Europe”
The plan sees interstate agreements and cooperation as fully sufficient and desirable, and requires that Swedish defence industry be strengthened and Sweden's position in international trade be improved.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan sees interstate agreements and cooperation as fully sufficient and desirable, and requires that Swedish defence industry be strengthened and Sweden's position in international trade be improved. The agreement is interstate and leaves national export control untouched, so the objection that sovereignty is eroded does not hit the plan's principles. The plan thus speaks against the counter-proposal's demand, albeit without addressing the matter directly.
Original (Swedish)
Planen ser mellanstatliga avtal och samarbeten som fullt tillräckliga och önskvärda, och kräver att den svenska försvarsindustrin stärks och Sveriges ställning i internationell handel förbättras. Avtalet är mellanstatligt och lämnar den nationella exportkontrollen orörd, varför invändningen om att suveräniteten urholkas inte träffar planens principer. Planen talar därför emot motförslagets krav, om än utan att behandla frågan direkt.
- strengthened defence industrydecisive»Svensk försvarsindustri ska också stärkas genom att fortsatt satsa på inhemsk försvarsteknologi och att tydligare värdera det strategiska intresset av svenska leverantörer vid inköp av försvarsmateriel.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Swedish defence industry shall also be strengthened by continuing to invest in domestic defence technology and by more clearly valuing the strategic interest of Swedish suppliers in procurement of defence material.”
- interstate cooperation suffices»nationalstater, är fullt tillräckligt. Vi ser med stark skepsis på samarbeten som tar sig« (party programme ↗)“nation states, is fully sufficient. We view with strong scepticism cooperation that takes the form of”
- Swedish exports and trade»Förbättra Sveriges ställning på den internationella marknaden och i handel« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Improve Sweden's position on the international market and in trade”
- deepened defence cooperation»Fördjupa det nordiska försvars- och säkerhetssamarbetet« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Deepen Nordic defence and security cooperation”
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2025/26:UU18)
- Committee report full text (HD01UU18)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2025/26:3407 — Exportkontroll, försvarsindustrins förutsättningar och reglering av autonoma vapen av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2025/26:4091 — med anledning av prop. 2025/26:228 Ett modernt och anpassat regelverk för krigsmateriel av Håkan Svenneling m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2025/26:4096 — med anledning av prop. 2025/26:228 Ett modernt och anpassat regelverk för krigsmateriel av Jacob Risberg m.fl. (MP)
- Proposition 2025/26:228 — Ett modernt och anpassat regelverk för krigsmateriel
Source: The Swedish Parliament