2024-04-112023/24:FöU4 · p.6FöUDefence
The Armed Forces' cooperation with other authorities
The Armed Forces' cooperation with civilian agencies in total defence
What's at stake: The outcome affects how quickly and effectively the Armed Forces can assist the police during a large-scale crisis or terrorist attack, and how well resources such as specialist centres for protection, signals security, and ammunition and mine clearance can be used across the whole of total defence.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is whether cooperation between the Armed Forces and civilian agencies - including support to the police during extraordinary events and coordination with the civil contingencies agency - should be reviewed and strengthened now through dedicated parliamentary initiatives, or whether it is sufficient to handle these issues within ongoing work and the upcoming total-defence decision.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee sees no reason to change its earlier assessment on support to the police during a large-scale terrorist attack and again opposes that claim; on coordination between civilian agencies and the Armed Forces, the committee welcomes the ongoing work on coherent total-defence planning and, citing the upcoming total-defence decision, opposes a dedicated inquiry initiative.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 10 (V)
The reservation (V) wants the government to commission an inquiry into how better cooperation can be created between civilian agencies such as the civil contingencies agency and the Armed Forces' specialist centres - the protection centre, the signals security school, and the ammunition and mine-clearance centre - so that the whole of total defence can benefit from the synergies.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 10 by V.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
What each plan points to — and how the party voted
For each party: the vote its own election manifesto and party programme point to in this case, next to how the party actually voted. A plan can only point to Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| Plan | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | Yes | No 0/20/0/4 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
| S | No | Yes 92/0/0/14 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| MP | No | Yes 13/0/0/5 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
| C | No | Yes 19/0/0/5 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
| L | No | Yes 13/0/0/3 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
| KD | No | Yes 14/0/0/5 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| M | No | Yes 59/0/0/9 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| SD | No | Yes 61/0/0/11 | departs from the plan | confidence: high | derived |
Committee proposal
The Riksdag rejects the motions 2023/24:66 by Nooshi Dadgostar et al. (V) proposal 5 and 2023/24:482 by Aron Emilsson et al. (SD) proposal 13.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2023/24:66 av Nooshi Dadgostar m.fl. (V) yrkande 5 och 2023/24:482 av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD) yrkande 13.
Riksdag decision: The Riksdag said no to approximately 40 proposals in motions on military issues from the general motion period of 2023. The motions deal with, among other things, the Armed Forces' organization and capacity and the Armed Forces' cooperation with other authorities. The Riksdag refers, among other things, to ongoing work.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants the government to appoint a committee to examine better collaboration between civil authorities and defense centers. (V) — Reservation 10
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The plan does not address the internal coordination of total defence.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan does not address the internal coordination of total defence. The nearest lying principles are that Sweden should not push for increased militarization and that the military system shall be subject to democratic control, which speaks against building in military specialist functions more broadly in the civil government world. Based on these principles the plan rejects the counter-proposal's requirements, but the basis is weak.
Original (Swedish)
Planen behandlar inte totalförsvarets inre samordning. Närmast liggande principer är att Sverige inte ska driva på för ökad militarisering och att det militära systemet ska underställas demokratisk kontroll, vilket talar emot att militära specialistfunktioner byggs in bredare i den civila myndighetsvärlden. Utifrån dessa principer avvisar planen närmast motförslagets krav, men underlaget är svagt.
- no to increased militarizationdecisive»Vänsterpartiet anser att Sverige ska vara en röst för fred och rättvisa, inte för ökad militarisering.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Left Party believes that Sweden should be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarization.”
- democratic control over the military»Det är av yttersta vikt att det militära systemet underställs en demokratisk kontroll.« (party programme ↗)“It is of the utmost importance that the military system is subject to democratic control.”
- scrutiny of force-exercising authorities»oberoende system för att granska de yrkesgrupper, till exempel polisen« (party programme ↗)“independent system to scrutinize professional groups, for example the police”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The election manifesto commits to strengthening civil defence and that work on crisis preparedness must continue, developing cyber defence and intelligence capacity, and removing secrecy barriers between government agencies so everyone can do their job.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto commits to strengthening civil defence and that work on crisis preparedness must continue, developing cyber defence and intelligence capacity, and removing secrecy barriers between government agencies so everyone can do their job. The counter-proposal's demand for an investigation into better cooperation between civil government agencies and the military defence's specialist centres aligns with this total defence approach. The plan therefore supports the demand.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet åtar sig att rusta upp det civila försvaret och att arbetet med krisberedskapen måste fortsätta, att utveckla cyberförsvaret och underrättelseförmågan, och att riva sekretesshinder mellan myndigheter så att alla kan göra sitt jobb. Motförslagets krav på en utredning om bättre samverkan mellan civila myndigheter och det militära försvarets specialistcentrum ligger i linje med denna totalförsvarsansats. Planen stöder därför kravet.
- strengthened civil defencedecisive»Rusta upp det civila försvaret. Arbetet att förstärka det civila försvaret och krisberedskapen måste fortsätta« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen civil defence. The work to strengthen civil defence and crisis preparedness must continue”
- developed specialist capacity»Vi vill fortsätta internationella samarbeten och utveckla cyberförsvaret och underrättelseförmågan.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We want to continue international cooperation and develop cyber defence and intelligence capacity.”
- remove barriers for government cooperation»Sekretesshinder mellan myndigheter ska rivas så att polisen och andra yrkesgrupper kan göra sitt jobb.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Secrecy barriers between government agencies shall be removed so that police and other professional groups can do their jobs.”
- strengthened protective capacity»Arbetet för att stärka förmågan att stå emot cyberattacker och desinformation ska stärkas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The work to strengthen the ability to resist cyber attacks and disinformation shall be strengthened.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The election manifesto wants to allocate a larger share of defence spending to civil defence and increase allocations for crisis preparedness, and the party programme demands home-based preparedness for the threats security policy identifies.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto wants to allocate a larger share of defence spending to civil defence and increase allocations for crisis preparedness, and the party programme demands home-based preparedness for the threats security policy identifies. Investigating how civil authorities can benefit from military specialist resources for protection and clearance strengthens precisely that civil capacity without new military expansion. The plan also calls for more alternative solutions for a more robust society.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet vill lägga en större andel av försvarets pengar på det civila försvaret och öka anslagen till krisberedskap, och partiprogrammet kräver beredskap hemma för de hot säkerhetspolitiken identifierar. Att utreda hur civila myndigheter kan dra nytta av militära specialistresurser för skydd och röjning stärker just den civila förmågan utan ny militär utbyggnad. Planen efterlyser också fler alternativa lösningar för ett robustare samhälle.
- strengthened civil defencedecisive»satsa en större andel av försvarets pengar på det civila försvaret, och öka anslagen till krisberedskap.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“allocate a larger share of defence spending to civil defence, and increase allocations for crisis preparedness.”
- home-based preparedness»Vi ska också själva ha en beredskap på hemmaplan för att kunna möta de olika slags hot som säkerhetspolitiken identifierar.« (party programme ↗)“We should also ourselves have preparedness on the home front to be able to meet the different kinds of threats that security policy identifies.”
- robust society»Därför förordar vi att fler alternativa och lokala lösningar skapas som komplement för ett mer robust samhälle.« (party programme ↗)“Therefore we advocate that more alternative and local solutions are created as complement for a more robust society.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan requires that Sweden's total defence is strengthened and that civil defence and society's preparedness are strengthened, which presupposes that civil authorities and military defence can benefit from each other's capabilities.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan requires that Sweden's total defence is strengthened and that civil defence and society's preparedness are strengthened, which presupposes that civil authorities and military defence can benefit from each other's capabilities. It also establishes that state authorities must cooperate. An investigation into better cooperation around defence specialist centres thus accords with the plan, even if that specific issue is not addressed.
Original (Swedish)
Planen kräver att Sveriges totalförsvar rustas och att civilförsvaret och samhällets beredskap stärks, vilket förutsätter att civila myndigheter och det militära försvaret kan dra nytta av varandras förmågor. Den slår också fast att statliga myndigheter måste samverka. En utredning om bättre samarbete kring försvarets specialistcentrum ligger därför i linje med planen, även om just den frågan inte behandlas.
- strengthen total defencedecisive»Vi behöver rusta Sveriges totalförsvar, stärka hela rättskedjan, satsa på förebyggande insatser och en likvärdig skola.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We need to strengthen Sweden's total defence, strengthen the entire chain of accountability, invest in preventive measures and an equal school.”
- strengthened civil defence»Även det civila försvaret är livsviktigt. Vi måste rusta civilförsvaret och samhällets beredskap inför krig och kris.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Civil defence too is vital. We must strengthen civil defence and society's preparedness for war and crisis.”
- cooperation between authorities»Statliga myndigheter måste samverka och arbeta marksnålt när man tar ny mark i anspråk för väg, tåg, el, etc.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“State authorities must cooperate and work in a coordinated way when taking new land for road, rail, electricity, etc.”
- comprehensive defence and preparedness rearmament»Centerpartiet vill rusta försvaret, stärka Sveriges civila beredskap och fullfölja inträdet i Nato.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Centre Party wants to strengthen defence, strengthen Sweden's civil preparedness and complete NATO membership.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan requires that civil defence is strengthened at the same pace as the military and that national defence capability increases, which presupposes that civil authorities can benefit from military defence's specialist competence.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan requires that civil defence is strengthened at the same pace as the military and that national defence capability increases, which presupposes that civil authorities can benefit from military defence's specialist competence. The plan also establishes that authorities must effectively be able to share information with each other. An investigation of such synergies lies in line with these commitments.
Original (Swedish)
Planen kräver att det civila försvaret stärks i samma takt som det militära och att den nationella försvarsförmågan ökar, vilket förutsätter att civila myndigheter kan dra nytta av det militära försvarets specialistkompetens. Planen slår också fast att myndigheter effektivt måste kunna dela information med varandra. En utredning av sådana synergier ligger i linje med dessa åtaganden.
- civil defence in pace with militarydecisive»Antalet anställda och värnpliktiga i krigsorganisationen ska öka, ny materiel tillföras och det civila försvaret stärkas i samma takt som det militära.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The number of employees and conscripts in the war organization shall increase, new equipment be provided, and civil defence strengthened at the same pace as the military.”
- increased defence capability»Sveriges nationella försvarsförmåga måste öka.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden's national defence capability must increase.”
- cooperation between authorities»myndigheter effektivt kan dela information med varandra.« (party programme ↗)“authorities effectively can share information with each other.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The party programme requires that the total defence system has the preparedness to participate in managing disasters and serious strains on society, and that crises are met with all the preventive possibilities of policy.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme requires that the total defence system has the preparedness to participate in managing disasters and serious strains on society, and that crises are met with all the preventive possibilities of policy. The programme also emphasizes well-functioning cooperation across agency boundaries, and the election manifesto wants to review the secrecy rules so that agencies can share information. To investigate how civilian agencies can better utilize the military defence's specialist centres follows from this.
Original (Swedish)
Principprogrammet kräver att totalförsvaret har beredskap att delta i hanteringen av katastrofer och svåra påfrestningar i samhället, och att kriser möts med politikens alla preventiva möjligheter. Programmet framhåller också väl fungerande samarbete över myndighetsgränser, och valmanifestet vill se över sekretessreglerna så att myndigheter kan dela uppgifter. Att utreda hur civila myndigheter bättre kan nyttja det militära försvarets specialistcentrum följer av detta.
- the total defence system's support in crisesdecisive»förmår upprätthålla beredskap för att kunna delta i hanteringen av katastrofer och andra svåra påfrestningar i samhället samt att delta i förebyggande åtgärder för att begränsa riskerna för sådana.« (party programme ↗)“can maintain readiness to be able to participate in managing disasters and other serious strains on society and to participate in preventive measures to limit the risks of such.”
- cooperation across agency boundaries»För att möta den internationella brottsutvecklingen krävs ett väl fungerande samarbete över myndighetsgränser« (party programme ↗)“To meet international crime development requires well-functioning cooperation across agency boundaries”
- preventive crisis management»Kriser måste mötas med politikens alla preventiva möjligheter.« (party programme ↗)“Crises must be met with all the preventive possibilities of policy.”
- agencies shall be able to cooperate»Total översyn av sekretessreglerna, så att myndigheter kan dela uppgifter mellan sig för att förebygga och klara upp brott.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Complete review of the secrecy rules, so that agencies can share information between them to prevent and solve crimes.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan establishes that investments in military and civil defence must move in step to create a functioning total defence, and that military defence cannot perform its tasks if civil defence does not function.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan establishes that investments in military and civil defence must move in step to create a functioning total defence, and that military defence cannot perform its tasks if civil defence does not function. It also wants to establish a national security council and an action plan against hybrid threats, that is, to strengthen coordination between civil and military capabilities. Investigating how civil agencies can benefit from defence's specialist centres follows from this.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår fast att satsningarna på det militära och civila försvaret måste gå i takt för att skapa ett fungerande totalförsvar, och att det militära försvaret inte kan lösa sina uppgifter om det civila inte fungerar. Den vill dessutom inrätta ett nationellt säkerhetsråd och en handlingsplan mot hybridhot, det vill säga stärka samordningen mellan civila och militära förmågor. Att utreda hur civila myndigheter kan dra nytta av försvarets specialistcentrum följer av detta.
- coordinated total defencedecisive»Sammantaget krävs kraftfulla satsningar på såväl det militära som det civila försvaret och att dessa satsningar går i takt för att skapa ett fungerande totalförsvar som stärker Sveriges säkerhet på bred front.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Overall, powerful investments are required in both military and civil defence and that these investments move in step to create a functioning total defence that strengthens Sweden's security on a broad front.”
- civil and military are linked»Fungerar inte det civila försvaret så kan inte heller det militära försvaret lösa sina uppgifter.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“If civil defence does not function, neither can military defence perform its tasks.”
- coordination at the highest level»Inrätta ett nationellt säkerhetsråd på Statsrådsberedningen« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Establish a national security council at the Prime Minister's Office”
- action plan against hybrid threats»Införa en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och cyberattacker« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Implement an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyberattacks”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan explicitly wants to increase defence capacity and authority to assist the police and adapt the defence force to support civilian tasks in peacetime, while crisis management capacity throughout society must be strengthened.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan explicitly wants to increase defence capacity and authority to assist the police and adapt the defence force to support civilian tasks in peacetime, while crisis management capacity throughout society must be strengthened. The counter-proposal's demand for investigation of better cooperation between civilian authorities and the military's specialist centres follows from this commitment. The plan therefore supports the demand.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vill uttryckligen öka försvarets kapacitet och behörighet att bistå polisen och anpassa försvaret för att stödja civila uppgifter i fredstid, samtidigt som krisledningsförmågan i hela samhället ska stärkas. Motförslagets krav på en utredning om bättre samarbete mellan civila myndigheter och militärens specialistcentrum följer av detta åtagande. Planen stöder därför kravet.
- defence force assists civilian authoritiesdecisive»Öka kapaciteten och behörigheten för försvaret att bistå polisen i insatser, bevakning och ordningsuppdrag« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Increase the defence force's capacity and authority to assist police in operations, surveillance and order missions”
- military support in peacetime»Men försvaret behöver också anpassas för att i högre grad kunna användas för att stödja och biträda i det polisiära uppdraget i fredstid i en situation där den inhemska säkerhetssituationen kräver mer resurser än vad polisen disponerar.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“But the defence force also needs to be adapted to a greater extent to be able to be used to support and assist the police in its mission in peacetime in a situation where the domestic security situation requires more resources than the police have available.”
- strengthened crisis management capacity»Sverigedemokraterna vill stärka samhällets beredskap för alla typer av kriser som kan uppstå. Den operativa krisledningsförmågan behöver stärkas på Regeringskansliet och vid landets myndigheter, regioner och kommuner.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden-democrats want to strengthen society's preparedness for all types of crises that may occur. Operational crisis management capacity must be strengthened at the Prime Minister's Office and at the country's authorities, regions and municipalities.”
- coherent total defence»Återupprätta ett totalförsvar som är rustat för krig« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Reestablish a total defence that is armed for war”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2023/24:FöU4)
- Committee report full text (HB01FöU4)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2023/24:1105 — Hemvärnets möjlighet till övning och utbildning i Kalmar län av Marie Nicholson (M)
- Motion 2023/24:1110 — Sydsvenskt försvar av Boriana Åberg m.fl. (M)
- Motion 2023/24:1132 — Stärkt försvar av Göteborg och västkusten av David Josefsson och Marie-Louise Hänel Sandström (båda M)
- Motion 2023/24:1269 — Klassning av skjutbanor som kritisk infrastruktur av Kjell-Arne Ottosson (KD)
- Motion 2023/24:1527 — Ett miljövänligt, robust och konkurrenskraftigt energisystem av Linus Lakso m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2023/24:1569 — Stärkt försvar i Halland av Aida Birinxhiku m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2023/24:1872 — Åtgärder för att hindra spridning av afrikansk svinpest och andra sjukdomar av Emma Nohrén och Jacob Risberg (båda MP)
- Motion 2023/24:1941 — Strängnäs som försvarsort och frågan om regemente av Fredrik Olovsson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2023/24:2028 — Samarbete och säkerhet i Norrbotten av Fredrik Lundh Sammeli m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2023/24:204 — Översyn av infrastrukturen i Västsverige utifrån ett säkerhetspolitiskt perspektiv av Magnus Jacobsson (KD)
- Motion 2023/24:2109 — Gotlands försvar av Jesper Skalberg Karlsson (M)
- Motion 2023/24:2129 — Regemente i Gävleborg av Mattias Eriksson Falk och Roger Hedlund (båda SD)
- Motion 2023/24:2214 — Stärkt försvarsförmåga med ett ökat samarbete mellan jägare, sportskyttar och försvaret av Sten Bergheden och Johanna Rantsi (båda M)
- Motion 2023/24:2450 — En förstärkning av det civila försvaret och krisberedskapen av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2023/24:2453 — Ledarskap för klimat och grön omställning av Rickard Nordin m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2023/24:2456 — Krisberedskap och utveckling av militärt och civilt försvar av Mikael Larsson m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2023/24:2458 — En folkrörelse för klimatet av Muharrem Demirok m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2023/24:2564 — Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2023/24:378 — Livsmedel av Staffan Eklöf m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2023/24:482 — Säkerhetspolitik av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD)
Source: The Swedish Parliament