Defence industry and government defence industry strategy

The plan explicitly opposes militarization and arms races and wants Sweden to be a voice for peace and disarmament rather than for increased rearmament. It admittedly wants to see state ownership in weapons production, but combines it with demands for limited arms exports. A package for more submarines, easier direct procurement and a special export support agency therefore goes against the plan's main line.

• against militarization and arms racesdecisive»Vi vänder oss emot militarisering och kapprustning.« (party programme ↗)“We oppose militarization and arms races.”
• Sweden as a peace voice»Vänsterpartiet anser att Sverige ska vara en röst för fred och rättvisa, inte för ökad militarisering.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Left Party believes that Sweden should be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarization.”
• disarmament»Världen behöver gå mot fred, nedrustning« (party programme ↗)“The world needs to move toward peace, disarmament”
• limited arms exports»förbjuda vapenexport till diktaturer, stater som för angreppskrig och« (party programme ↗)“ban arms exports to dictatorships, states that wage wars of aggression and”

The plan establishes that Sweden needs a strong Swedish defence industry and that defence spending shall increase to two per cent of GDP, translated into among other things modern equipment. It supports the counter-proposal's demand for submarine procurement, control over next generation fighter jets and measures that facilitate procurement from the domestic industry. The opening for state co-ownership is in line with the requirement that public interest shall weigh more heavily in the management of state-owned enterprises.

• strong domestic defence industrydecisive»Sverige behöver ett robust militärt och civilt folkförsvar, och en stark svensk försvarsindustri.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden needs a robust military and civil civil defence, and a strong Swedish defence industry.”
• increased defence spending»Anslagen till det militära försvaret ska öka till motsvarande två procent av BNP.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Defence spending shall increase to the equivalent of two per cent of GDP.”
• increased equipment procurement»Nu öppnar nya regementen, fler soldater utbildas och försvarsmateriel tillverkas och köps in.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Now new regiments are opening, more soldiers are being trained and defence equipment is being manufactured and procured.”
• state ownership in the public interest»Stärkt samhällsintresse i styrningen av de statliga bolagen.« (party programme ↗)“Strengthened public interest in the management of state-owned enterprises.”

The plan states that the Swedish weapons industry and weapons exports must never undermine work for peace, democratization and human rights, and that Sweden shall work for long-term global disarmament. The counter-proposal's package with export support agency, state ownership and easier direct procurement drives in the opposite direction. The plan also explicitly prioritizes civil defence over increased equipment spending.

• weapons industry must not undermine peacedecisive»Den svenska vapenindustrin, importen och exporten« (party programme ↗)“The Swedish weapons industry, imports and exports”
• global disarmament»verkar för en långsiktig global nedrustning« (party programme ↗)“work for long-term global disarmament”
• civil defence prioritized»satsa en större andel av försvarets pengar på det civila försvaret, och öka anslagen till krisberedskap.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“invest a greater share of defence spending in civil defence and increase crisis preparedness funding.”
• restrictive weapons exports»Sverige ska inte exportera vapen till diktaturer eller länder där allvarliga kränkningar av« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall not export weapons to dictatorships or countries where serious violations of”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan's decisive commitment is to strengthen military defence quickly, powerfully, and long-term and for Sweden to be strengthened in a focused way. Measures such as more submarines, faster procurement of equipment, and a coordinator for the defence industry serve that goal. The plan, however, speaks against state ownership in business, which pulls in the other direction and dampens the confidence in the assessment.

• quick and powerful strengtheningdecisive»Sverige ska försvaras. Vi vill rusta det militära försvaret snabbt, kraftfullt och långsiktigt. Sverige behöver satsa två procent av BNP på försvaret så snart det är praktiskt möjligt och gå med i Nato.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden must be defended. We want to strengthen military defence quickly, powerfully, and long-term. Sweden must invest two per cent of GDP in defence as soon as practically possible and join NATO.”
• rapid defence capability»Sverige måste rustas snabbt och fokuserat; ingen ska kunna ta vårt demokratiska samhälle ifrån oss.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden must be strengthened quickly and in a focused way; no one should be able to take our democratic society from us.”
• own territorial defence»Sverige måste därför kunna försvara sitt eget territorium.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden must therefore be able to defend its own territory.”
• no to state ownership in business»Offentlig verksamhet kan med fördel konkurrensutsättas för att ge det privata näringslivet möjlighet att skapa« (party programme ↗)“Public activities can be advantageously opened to competition to give the private business sector the opportunity to create”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan requires significantly stronger military defense, defense appropriations of two percent of GDP and that new equipment is supplied to strengthen the army, navy and air force. Submarines, fighter jets and coordinated equipment supply are precisely such measures. The plan is at the same time restrictive on state business ownership, which makes support for the whole package uncertain.

• strengthened defense branchesdecisive»Vi vill därför redan 2025 se ett försvarsanslag om 2 procent av BNP och därmed skapa tillräckliga förutsättningar att stärka både armen, marinen och flygvapnet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We therefore want to see by 2025 defense appropriations of 2 percent of GDP and thereby create sufficient conditions to strengthen both the army, navy and air force.”
• new equipment supplied»Antalet anställda och värnpliktiga i krigsorganisationen ska öka, ny materiel tillföras och det civila försvaret stärkas i samma takt som det militära.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The number of employees and conscripts in the military organization shall increase, new equipment shall be supplied and civil defense shall be strengthened at the same pace as the military.”
• increased defense capability»Sveriges nationella försvarsförmåga måste öka.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden's national defense capability must increase.”
• restrictive state ownership»Det offentliga ska endast driva affärsverksamhet om det finns ett starkt samhällsintresse.« (party programme ↗)“The public sector shall only operate commercial activities if there is a strong public interest.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan states that the defence's tasks require defence material competence within the country, which presupposes a domestic defence industry. The counter-proposal's demands for submarine procurement, influence over the next generation fighter aircraft, streamlined procurement from domestic industry and export support follow from this commitment, as do requirements that total defence has sufficient resources. The proposal for state ownership lies however in tension with the plan's emphasis on personal ownership, and export support is limited by the requirement for carefully controlled weapons exports.

• domestic defence industrydecisive»förutsätter en inhemsk försvarsindustri.« (party programme ↗)“presupposes a domestic defence industry.”
• defence material competence in the country»Som en följd av försvarets uppgifter krävs en försvarsmateriell kompetens inom landet« (party programme ↗)“As a consequence of the defence's tasks, defence material competence within the country is required”
• sufficient resources for total defence»Det samlade totalförsvaret måste ha tillräckliga resurser för att kunna garantera« (party programme ↗)“The combined total defence must have sufficient resources to be able to guarantee”
• controlled weapons exports»Vapenexporten ska begränsas till demokratiska« (party programme ↗)“Weapons exports shall be limited to democratic”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan wants to strengthen the army, air force and navy in both capacity and materiel and particularly highlights fighter jets and submarines as Swedish areas of strength that shall serve all of NATO. The counter-proposal's demand for more submarines, control over next-generation fighter jets and a stronger domestic defence industry aligns with that line. State ownership, however, lies outside what the plan undertakes.

• strengthened capacity and materieldecisive(2022 manifesto)
• Swedish areas of strength submarine and fighter jet»Vi kan bidra mer än de allra flesta exempelvis när det gäller stridsflyg och ubåtar, men även inom telekom och artificiell intelligens.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We can contribute more than most for example when it comes to fighter jets and submarines, but also within telecom and artificial intelligence.”
• strong domestic defence industry»Verka för att Sveriges teknologiska kunnande och kompetenta försvarsindustri kommer hela Nato till del« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Ensure that Sweden's technological expertise and competent defence industry serve all of NATO”
• increased defence spending»Verka för att försvarsanslagen uppgår till motsvarande 2 procent av BNP redan år 2025« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Advocate that defence expenditure amounts to equivalent to 2 percent of GDP already in 2025”

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The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The counter-proposal wants to strengthen the domestic defence industry through more submarines, easier direct procurement from Swedish suppliers, export support and a memorandum of understanding with Finland. The election manifesto explicitly commits to strengthening Swedish defence industry through investments in domestic defence technology and to more clearly valuing Swedish suppliers' strategic interest in materiel procurement, and to working for a defence alliance with Finland. The demands thus coincide with the plan.

• domestic defence industry strengtheneddecisive»Svensk försvarsindustri ska också stärkas genom att fortsatt satsa på inhemsk försvarsteknologi och att tydligare värdera det strategiska intresset av svenska leverantörer vid inköp av försvarsmateriel.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Swedish defence industry shall also be strengthened by continuing to invest in domestic defence technology and by more clearly valuing the strategic interest of Swedish suppliers in defence materiel procurement.”
• materiel procurement»Satsa på uppgradering, nyanskaffning och vidmakthållande av materiel« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Invest in upgrading, new acquisition and maintenance of materiel”
• deepened cooperation with Finland»Verka för ett försvarsförbund med Finland« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Work for a defence alliance with Finland”
• long-term defence financing»Garantera den långsiktiga finansieringen av ett starkt försvar« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Guarantee the long-term financing of a strong defence”

The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.