2024-01-242023/24:FöU2 · p.4FöUDefence
Knowledge building
Building knowledge on information and cyber security
What's at stake: How knowledge-building is organized affects how well agencies, municipalities, businesses and the public are equipped to withstand cyber threats and disinformation, which in turn concerns trust in society's institutions.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is whether the government's ongoing work on skills-building measures and a new information and cyber security strategy is sufficient, or whether one or more agencies should instead be given a specific task to develop a national strategy against disinformation and propaganda to strengthen media and information literacy.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee welcomes the knowledge-building efforts already under way, including MSB's training for managers and information-security officers and the government's work on a new information and cyber security strategy, and does not consider a further statement calling for a dedicated disinformation strategy necessary.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 6 (MP)
The reservation wants one or more agencies tasked with developing a national strategy for strengthened resilience against disinformation and propaganda, to strengthen media and information literacy in society.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 6 by MP.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
What each plan points to — and how the party voted
For each party: the vote its own election manifesto and party programme point to in this case, next to how the party actually voted. A plan can only point to Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| Plan | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | No | Yes 19/0/0/5 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| S | No | Abstain 0/0/94/13 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| MP | No | No 0/15/0/3 | follows the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| C | No | Yes 20/0/0/4 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| L | No | Yes 12/0/0/4 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| KD | No | Yes 16/0/0/3 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
| M | No | Yes 60/0/0/8 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
| SD | No | Yes 62/0/0/10 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
Committee proposal
Parliament rejects motions 2023/24:422 by Tobias Andersson et al. (SD) demands 4 and 7, 2023/24:497 by Rashid Farivar et al. (SD) demand 12, 2023/24:880 by Markus Wiechel and Björn Söder (both SD), 2023/24:2450 by Emma Berginger et al. (MP) demand 7 and 2023/24:2564 by Peter Hultqvist et al. (S) demand 59.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2023/24:422 av Tobias Andersson m.fl. (SD) yrkandena 4 och 7, 2023/24:497 av Rashid Farivar m.fl. (SD) yrkande 12, 2023/24:880 av Markus Wiechel och Björn Söder (båda SD), 2023/24:2450 av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP) yrkande 7 och 2023/24:2564 av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S) yrkande 59.
Riksdag decision: Parliament has deliberated a letter from the government concerning the National Audit Office's review of the government's management of society's information and cyber security. The National Audit Office's overall conclusion is that the government's work in this area is not effectively designed. According to the National Audit Office, strategic considerations and priorities for information and cyber security work are lacking. The National Audit Office therefore provided recommendations to the government on how the new national information and cyber security strategy should be designed to address the shortcomings. In its letter, the government agrees with the National Audit Office's observations. It has taken a long time to establish the National Cyber Security Center (NCSC). The division of responsibility within the center also makes the operations difficult to manage and monitor. The Ministry of Defence has commissioned a person to both provide proposals on how the Swedish Defence Radio Institute (FRA) should be assigned primary responsibility for the NCSC and to review the center's organization and management. Parliament views positively the measures that the government announces in the letter. With this, Parliament placed the government's letter with the records, that is, concluded the matter.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants to increase cybersecurity in the public sector and in particularly critical parts of society. (MP) — Reservation 6
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The plan sees a time when right-wing populist forces try to control information and content ever harder, and responds with investments in public libraries, public education and an independent public service as a prerequisite for democracy.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan sees a time when right-wing populist forces try to control information and content ever harder, and responds with investments in public libraries, public education and an independent public service as a prerequisite for democracy. A task to develop a national strategy for resilience against disinformation and strengthened media and information literacy aligns with that commitment. The plan says nothing about which educational initiatives are already underway.
Original (Swedish)
Planen ser en tid där högerpopulistiska krafter försöker styra information och innehåll allt hårdare, och svarar med satsningar på folkbibliotek, folkbildning och ett oberoende public service som förutsättning för demokratin. Ett uppdrag att ta fram en nationell strategi för motståndskraft mot desinformation och stärkt medie- och informationskunnighet ligger i linje med det åtagandet. Planen säger inget om vilka utbildningsinsatser som redan pågår.
- resistance to information influencedecisive»Vi lever i en tid då högerpopulistiska krafter försöker styra information och innehåll allt hårdare.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We live in a time when right-wing populist forces try to control information and content ever harder.”
- public education and public service»Därför är det särskilt viktigt att satsa på och utveckla folkbiblioteken, folkbildningen och public services oberoende ställning.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Therefore it is especially important to invest in and develop public libraries, public education and public service's independent position.”
- valued public service»tryckt press, men också till tidskrifter och andra medier. Public service« (party programme ↗)“printed press, but also to journals and other media. Public service”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan notes that the Swedish people are a target of influence campaigns and disinformation and commits to strengthening capacity to resist this.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan notes that the Swedish people are a target of influence campaigns and disinformation and commits to strengthening capacity to resist this. The counter-proposal's requirement for a national strategy for resilience against disinformation and strengthened media and information literacy is an instrument for the same commitment. The plan's view of public education and capacity to independently evaluate information supports building up knowledge in society systematically.
Original (Swedish)
Planen konstaterar att svenska folket är måltavla för påverkanskampanjer och desinformation och åtar sig att stärka förmågan att stå emot detta. Motförslagets krav på en nationell strategi för motståndskraft mot desinformation och stärkt medie- och informationskunnighet är ett instrument för samma åtagande. Planens syn på folkbildning och på förmågan att självständigt värdera information stöder att kunskapen i samhället byggs upp systematiskt.
- resilience against disinformationdecisive»Arbetet för att stärka förmågan att stå emot cyberattacker och desinformation ska stärkas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Work to strengthen capacity to resist cyberattacks and disinformation shall be strengthened.”
- influence campaigns as a threat»Svenska folket är måltavla för påverkanskampanjer och desinformation.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Swedish people are a target of influence campaigns and disinformation.”
- media and information literacy»ge redskapen att självständigt tolka och värdera information« (party programme ↗)“give the tools to independently interpret and evaluate information”
- public education strengthens democracy»Folkbildning ger stark demokrati och möjligheter till personlig utveckling vid sidan av den formella utbildningen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Public education gives strong democracy and opportunities for personal development alongside formal education.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan bases democracy defence on factual information, scrutiny and independent media, and wants to strengthen freedom of expression and support independent media throughout the country.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan bases democracy defence on factual information, scrutiny and independent media, and wants to strengthen freedom of expression and support independent media throughout the country. Libraries are highlighted for reading and democracy and school should practice critical thinking. A national strategy for resilience against disinformation and strengthened media and information literacy is a direct expression of these commitments.
Original (Swedish)
Planen bygger demokratiförsvaret på saklig information, granskning och oberoende medier, och vill förstärka yttrandefriheten och stödja oberoende medier i hela landet. Biblioteken lyfts fram för läsning och demokrati och skolan ska öva kritiskt tänkande. En nationell strategi för motståndskraft mot desinformation och stärkt medie- och informationskunnighet är ett direkt uttryck för dessa åtaganden.
- independent media strengtheneddecisive»förstärka yttrandefriheten och stödja oberoende medier i hela landet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“strengthen freedom of expression and support independent media throughout the country.”
- factual information for democracy»Ett demokratiskt samhälle kräver saklig information, aktiv samhällsgranskning och grävande« (party programme ↗)“A democratic society requires factual information, active social scrutiny and investigative”
- libraries for democracy»stärka biblioteken i deras viktiga arbete för läsning och demokrati.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“strengthen libraries in their important work for reading and democracy.”
- critical thinking in schools»kritiskt tänkande är viktiga inslag i undervisningen« (party programme ↗)“critical thinking are important elements of teaching”
The election manifesto makes the protection of liberal democracy against external and internal threats a priority and requires that Sweden be equipped rapidly and with focus, and that parties' resistance to external influence be strengthened.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto makes the protection of liberal democracy against external and internal threats a priority and requires that Sweden be equipped rapidly and with focus, and that parties' resistance to external influence be strengthened. The manifesto also highlights the importance of adult education when democratic values are questioned, which is close to media and information literacy. A national strategy against disinformation and propaganda thus aligns with the plan. The plan does not pronounce itself on the educational initiatives the committee refers to.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet gör skyddet av den liberala demokratin mot yttre och inre hot till en prioritering och kräver att Sverige rustas snabbt och fokuserat, samt att partiernas motståndskraft mot yttre påverkan rustas. Manifestet lyfter också folkbildningens betydelse när demokratiska värden ifrågasätts, vilket ligger nära medie- och informationskunnighet. En nationell strategi mot desinformation och propaganda ligger därmed i linje med planen. Planen uttalar sig inte om de utbildningsinsatser utskottet hänvisar till.
- equip against threats to democracydecisive»Sverige måste rustas snabbt och fokuserat; ingen ska kunna ta vårt demokratiska samhälle ifrån oss.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden must be equipped rapidly and with focus; no one shall be able to take our democratic society from us.”
- adult education protects democracy»En fristående folkbildning har mycket stor betydelse i tider då demokratiska värden ifrågasätts.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Independent adult education is of very great importance in times when democratic values are questioned.”
- resistance to external influence»Reglerna för finansiering av politiska partier bör skärpas och deras motståndskraft mot yttre påverkan och infiltration rustas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Rules for financing political parties should be tightened and their resistance to external influence and infiltration strengthened.”
- strengthen civil preparedness»Även det civila försvaret är livsviktigt. Vi måste rusta civilförsvaret och samhällets beredskap inför krig och kris.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Civil defence is also vital. We must equip civil defence and society's preparedness for war and crisis.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan makes defending liberal democracy a main task: democracy must be explained and won for new generations, scrutinizing media must be protected and the threat of extremism must be met.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan makes defending liberal democracy a main task: democracy must be explained and won for new generations, scrutinizing media must be protected and the threat of extremism must be met. The counter-proposal's demand for a national strategy for resilience against misinformation and strengthened media and information literacy is a means for precisely this. The plan speaks of critical thinking and democratic defence but not of a strategy as such, therefore derived.
Original (Swedish)
Planen gör försvaret av den liberala demokratin till en huvuduppgift: demokratin måste förklaras och vinnas för nya generationer, granskande medier värnas och extremismens hot mötas. Motförslagets krav på en nationell strategi för motståndskraft mot desinformation och stärkt medie- och informationskunnighet är ett medel för just detta. Planen talar om kritiskt tänkande och demokratiskt försvar men inte om en strategi i sig, därför härlett.
- democracy must be won anewdecisive»Den svenska demokratin och våra medborgerliga rättigheter måste förklaras och vinnas för nya generationer.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Swedish democracy and our civil rights must be explained and won for new generations.”
- scrutinizing media protected»Mediernas oberoende roll och kritiska granskning är grunden i varje demokrati.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The media's independent role and critical scrutiny are the foundation of every democracy.”
- critical thinking in school»Kunskap, kreativitet och kritiskt tänkande ska genomsyra skolan.« (party programme ↗)“Knowledge, creativity and critical thinking shall permeate the school.”
- extremism threatens democracy»högerextremismen och den islamistiska extremismen utgör ett hot mot demokratin.« (party programme ↗)“right-wing extremism and Islamist extremism pose a threat to democracy.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan does not directly address disinformation, but lays down that popular education has an indispensable role in vitalizing democracy and that citizens through increased knowledge gain tools to participate in social life.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan does not directly address disinformation, but lays down that popular education has an indispensable role in vitalizing democracy and that citizens through increased knowledge gain tools to participate in social life. It also requires the ability to meet attacks on society's vulnerability. A task to develop a strategy for strengthened media and information literacy is in line with these principles.
Original (Swedish)
Planen behandlar inte desinformation direkt, men slår fast att folkbildningen har en omistlig roll för att vitalisera demokratin och att medborgarna genom ökad kunskap får verktyg att delta i samhällslivet. Den kräver också förmåga att möta angrepp mot samhällets sårbarhet. Ett uppdrag att ta fram en strategi för stärkt medie- och informationskunnighet ligger i linje med dessa principer.
- popular education strengthens democracydecisive»Ett rikt kulturliv vitaliserar även demokratin. I detta sammanhang spelar folkbildningen en omistlig roll.« (party programme ↗)“A rich cultural life also vitalizes democracy. In this context, popular education plays an indispensable role.”
- resilience against attacks»möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet, terrorism, cyberkrigföring« (party programme ↗)“meet attacks from international crime, terrorism, cyberwarfare”
- protect freedom of expression»Ett starkt skydd för yttrande- och meddelarfriheten« (party programme ↗)“Strong protection for freedom of expression and freedom of information”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan wants an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and strengthened defence intelligence capacity, which is close to the counter-proposal's demand for a national strategy against disinformation and propaganda.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan wants an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and strengthened defence intelligence capacity, which is close to the counter-proposal's demand for a national strategy against disinformation and propaganda. At the same time the plan points out free and independent media as the most important counter-measure to disinformation campaigns, which makes a government agency assignment a complement rather than the plan's main approach. Support is therefore derived and uncertain.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vill ha en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och en stärkt försvarsunderrättelseförmåga, vilket ligger nära motförslagets krav på en nationell strategi mot desinformation och propaganda. Samtidigt pekar planen ut fria och oberoende medier som det viktigaste motmedlet mot desinformationskampanjer, vilket gör ett myndighetsuppdrag till ett komplement snarare än till planens huvudspår. Stödet är därför härlett och osäkert.
- action plan against hybrid threatsdecisive»Införa en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och cyberattacker« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Introduce an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyberattacks”
- free media against disinformation»Det är också det viktigaste motmedlet mot företeelser såsom ”fake news” och desinformationskampanjer.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“It is also the most important counter-measure against phenomena such as "fake news" and disinformation campaigns.”
- strengthened intelligence capacity»Stärka försvarsunderrättelseförmågan« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen defence intelligence capacity”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan wishes to strengthen preparedness against all types of crises and means that citizens need better knowledge about how to act in crises, which bears the counter-proposal's requirement for a strategy for resistance to misinformation and propaganda.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan wishes to strengthen preparedness against all types of crises and means that citizens need better knowledge about how to act in crises, which bears the counter-proposal's requirement for a strategy for resistance to misinformation and propaganda. At the same time, the plan warns against the state influencing information flows for political reasons, which sets a limit on how such a strategy may be designed. The support therefore applies to the substantive requirement, not every possible design.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vill stärka beredskapen mot alla typer av kriser och menar att medborgarna behöver bättre kunskap om hur de ska agera i kriser, vilket bär motförslagets krav på en strategi för motståndskraft mot desinformation och propaganda. Samtidigt varnar planen för att staten påverkar informationsflöden utifrån politiska intressen, vilket sätter en gräns för hur en sådan strategi får utformas. Stödet gäller därför sakkravet, inte varje möjlig utformning.
- increased public knowledgedecisive»Medborgarna behöver också bättre kunskap om hur de ska agera vid olika typer av kriser, vilken beredskap som förväntas av hushållen och hur enskilda kan bidra till samhällets förmåga att möta det oväntade.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Citizens also need better knowledge about how to act in various types of crises, what preparedness is expected of households and how individuals can contribute to society's ability to meet the unexpected.”
- broad crisis preparedness»Sverigedemokraterna vill stärka samhällets beredskap för alla typer av kriser som kan uppstå.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden Democrats wish to strengthen society's preparedness for all types of crises that may occur.”
- counter hybrid threats»Förstärka det europeiska samarbetet mot islamistiska organisationer, hybridhot och terrorism« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen European cooperation against Islamist organizations, hybrid threats and terrorism”
- no state opinion management»Minska möjligheten för staten eller privata storbolag att påverka informationsflöden utifrån politiska intressen« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Reduce the possibility for the state or large private companies to influence information flows for political reasons”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2023/24:FöU2)
- Committee report full text (HB01FöU2)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2023/24:1903 — Stärka Sveriges försvarsförmåga av Peter Hedberg och Malin Larsson (båda S)
- Motion 2023/24:2450 — En förstärkning av det civila försvaret och krisberedskapen av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2023/24:2564 — Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2023/24:2765 — med anledning av skr. 2023/24:26 Riksrevisionens rapport om regeringens styrning av samhällets informations- och cybersäkerhet av Mikael Larsson och Niels Paarup-Petersen (båda C)
- Motion 2023/24:415 — Post och it i hela landet av Jimmy Ståhl m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2023/24:422 — En framtidsinriktad it-politik av Tobias Andersson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2023/24:461 — Cybersäkerhet av Hanna Gunnarsson m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2023/24:497 — En tillförlitlig, konkurrenskraftig och hållbar svensk AI-politik av Rashid Farivar m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2023/24:880 — Granskning av svenskarnas användning av känslig teknik av Markus Wiechel och Björn Söder (båda SD)
- Regeringens skrivelse 2023/24:26 — Riksrevisionens rapport om regeringens styrning av samhällets informations- och cybersäkerhet
Source: The Swedish Parliament