2024-01-242023/24:FöU2 · p.2FöUDefence
The National Cybersecurity Centre
The role of the national cyber security centre
What's at stake: How the cyber security centre is organised and cooperates with industry and other actors affects how well society can prevent and handle cyberattacks, and where citizens and businesses should turn in cases of IT-related crime.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is how the role of the national cyber security centre should develop - including whether cooperation with industry should be strengthened and whether work against IT-related crime should instead be strengthened through a different body - or whether the direction already being pursued for the centre is sufficient.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee welcomes the measures aimed at further strengthening the national cyber security centre, views positively the ongoing work on cooperation between agencies and industry as well as skills development in the field, and therefore rejects the motions.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 3 (C)
The reservation (C) wants cooperation between the cyber security centre and industry to be strengthened, and for the government instead to work to strengthen the IT Crime Centre (It-brottscentrum) - which the reservation considers the most important body for citizens and businesses affected by IT-related crime - citing the National Audit Office's criticism of the government's governance: insufficient strategic prioritisation, no action taken when agencies failed to reach a shared view, inadequate operational knowledge, and certain actors, such as industry, not feeling included.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 3 by C.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
What each plan points to — and how the party voted
For each party: the vote its own election manifesto and party programme point to in this case, next to how the party actually voted. A plan can only point to Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| Plan | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | No | Yes 19/0/0/5 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
| S | No | Yes 94/0/0/13 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
| MP | No | Yes 15/0/0/3 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
| C | No | No 0/20/0/4 | follows the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| L | No | Yes 12/0/0/4 | departs from the plan | confidence: low | not addressed |
| KD | No | Yes 16/0/0/3 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| M | No | Yes 60/0/0/8 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| SD | No | Yes 62/0/0/10 | departs from the plan | confidence: medium | derived |
Committee proposal
The Riksdag rejects the motions 2023/24:422 by Tobias Andersson et al. (SD) amendment 3 and 2023/24:2765 by Mikael Larsson and Niels Paarup-Petersen (both C) amendments 1 and 2.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2023/24:422 av Tobias Andersson m.fl. (SD) yrkande 3 och 2023/24:2765 av Mikael Larsson och Niels Paarup-Petersen (båda C) yrkandena 1 och 2.
Riksdag decision: The Riksdag has reviewed a letter from the government concerning the National Audit Office's examination of the government's governance of society's information and cybersecurity. The National Audit Office's overall conclusion is that the government's work in this area is not effectively designed. According to the National Audit Office, strategic trade-offs and priorities for information and cybersecurity work are lacking. The National Audit Office therefore provided recommendations to the government on how the new national information and cybersecurity strategy should be designed to address the shortcomings. In its letter, the government agrees with the National Audit Office's findings. It has taken a long time to build up the National Cybersecurity Centre (NCSC). The distribution of responsibilities within the centre also makes the operations themselves difficult to manage and monitor. The Ministry of Defence has instructed a researcher to both propose how the Swedish Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) should be given main responsibility for the NCSC and to review the centre's organization and governance. The Riksdag views positively the measures announced by the government in the letter. With this, the Riksdag filed the government's letter with the records, that is, closed the matter.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants to strengthen cooperation between the cybersecurity center and business, and make the IT crime center the primary actor in combating cybercrime. (C) — Reservation 3
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The plan does not address cybersecurity's authority structure.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan does not address cybersecurity's authority structure. The nearest commitment is that the legal system shall be functioning and present and that police and customs resources shall increase, which argues for strengthening the crime-fighting function that meets citizens and companies hit by IT crime. The plan provides no support for letting a single authority be the sole spearhead.
Original (Swedish)
Planen behandlar inte cybersäkerhetens myndighetsstruktur. Närmast liggande åtagande är att rättsväsendet ska vara fungerande och närvarande och att polisens och tullens resurser ska öka, vilket talar för att stärka den brottsbekämpande funktion som möter medborgare och företag som drabbas av it-brott. Planen ger inget stöd för att låta en enskild myndighet vara ensam spjutspets.
- functioning and present legal systemdecisive»Kriminaliteten behöver mötas både med ett fungerande och närvarande rättssystem som fler patrullerande poliser, arbete mot narkotikahandel, kamp mot tillgången till illegala skjutvapen och ett effektivt avhopparprogram« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Crime needs to be met both with a functioning and present legal system with more patrolling police, work against drug trafficking, fight against access to illegal firearms and an effective exit programme”
- increased crime-fighting resources»Tullens och polisens resurser måste öka för att komma åt de pengar som driver narkotikahandeln.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Customs and police resources must increase to address the money driving drug trafficking.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan commits to developing cyber defence and strengthening the capacity to resist cyber attacks, and it wants to remove confidentiality barriers so police and other actors can do their job.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan commits to developing cyber defence and strengthening the capacity to resist cyber attacks, and it wants to remove confidentiality barriers so police and other actors can do their job. The counter-proposal's demands for strengthened cooperation with industry and a stronger IT crime centre align with these commitments. The plan does not identify any specific agency structure, but it wants to consistently raise the overall capacity against IT crime and cyber threats.
Original (Swedish)
Planen åtar sig att utveckla cyberförsvaret och att stärka förmågan att stå emot cyberattacker, och den vill riva sekretesshinder så att polis och andra aktörer kan göra sitt jobb. Motförslagets krav på stärkt samverkan med näringslivet och på ett starkare it-brottscentrum ligger i linje med dessa åtaganden. Planen pekar inte ut någon enskild myndighetsstruktur, men den vill genomgående höja den samlade förmågan mot it-brottslighet och cyberhot.
- developed cyber defencedecisive»Vi vill fortsätta internationella samarbeten och utveckla cyberförsvaret och underrättelseförmågan.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We want to continue international cooperation and develop cyber defence and intelligence capacity.”
- strengthened resilience against cyber attacks»Arbetet för att stärka förmågan att stå emot cyberattacker och desinformation ska stärkas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The work to strengthen the capacity to resist cyber attacks and disinformation shall be strengthened.”
- cooperation between agencies»Sekretesshinder mellan myndigheter ska rivas så att polisen och andra yrkesgrupper kan göra sitt jobb.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Confidentiality barriers between public agencies shall be removed so police and other professionals can do their job.”
- strengthened fight against crime»Vi behöver förstärka det internationella arbetet mot brottsligheten.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We need to strengthen international work against crime.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan identifies threats to IT and communication systems as a growing threat and wishes to increase appropriations for crisis preparedness and civil defence.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan identifies threats to IT and communication systems as a growing threat and wishes to increase appropriations for crisis preparedness and civil defence. It also warns that society relies on large-scale technical infrastructure and prefers more complementary solutions instead of one spearhead. To strengthen collaboration with the private sector and build up an IT crime centre alongside the cybersecurity centre follows from that line, even though the plan does not mention the agencies.
Original (Swedish)
Planen pekar ut hot mot IT- och kommunikationssystem som ett växande hot och vill öka anslagen till krisberedskap och det civila försvaret. Den varnar också för att samhället förlitar sig på storskalig teknisk infrastruktur och förordar fler kompletterande lösningar i stället för en enda spjutspets. Att stärka samverkan med näringslivet och bygga upp It-brottscentrum vid sidan av cybersäkerhetscentret följer av den linjen, även om planen inte nämner myndigheterna.
- strengthened civil crisis preparednessdecisive»satsa en större andel av försvarets pengar på det civila försvaret, och öka anslagen till krisberedskap.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“allocate a larger share of defence funds to civil defence, and increase appropriations for crisis preparedness.”
- IT threat as security threat»energibrist, terrorism och hot mot IT- och andra« (party programme ↗)“energy shortage, terrorism and threats to IT and other”
- several complementary solutions»vi att fler alternativa och lokala lösningar skapas« (party programme ↗)“we that more alternative and local solutions are created”
- reduced vulnerability»bli mer självförsörjande och mindre sårbara.« (party programme ↗)“become more self-sufficient and less vulnerable.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The election manifesto requires that civil defence and society's preparedness be strengthened and that the entire chain of justice be reinforced, and the party programme states that the rule of law must exist even in the digital sphere.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto requires that civil defence and society's preparedness be strengthened and that the entire chain of justice be reinforced, and the party programme states that the rule of law must exist even in the digital sphere. The manifesto also highlights measures against crimes against businesses as a prerequisite for business life. The counter-proposal's demand for strengthened cooperation with business and a stronger IT crime centre aligns with these commitments. The plan, however, does not take a position on how the cybersecurity centre is organized.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet kräver att civilförsvaret och samhällets beredskap rustas och att hela rättskedjan stärks, och partiprogrammet slår fast att rättssamhället måste finnas även i den digitala sfären. Manifestet lyfter dessutom krafttag mot brott mot företag som en förutsättning för näringslivet. Motförslagets krav på stärkt samverkan med näringslivet och ett starkare it-brottscentrum ligger i linje med dessa åtaganden. Planen tar däremot inte ställning till hur cybersäkerhetscentret organiseras.
- strengthen civil preparednessdecisive»Även det civila försvaret är livsviktigt. Vi måste rusta civilförsvaret och samhällets beredskap inför krig och kris.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Civil defence is also vital. We must strengthen civil defence and society's preparedness in the face of war and crisis.”
- rule of law in the digital sphere»Samtidigt måste rättssamhället finnas även i den digitala sfären.« (party programme ↗)“At the same time, the rule of law must exist even in the digital sphere.”
- measures against crimes against businesses»satsningar på forskning och utveckling och krafttag mot brott emot företag« (2022 manifesto ↗)“investments in research and development and measures against crimes against businesses”
- resources to chain of justice»mer resurser till polis, åklagare, domstolar och kriminalvården« (2022 manifesto ↗)“more resources to police, prosecutors, courts and criminal care”
The plan does not address the cybersecurity centre's organization, but states that civil defence shall be strengthened at the same pace as military defence and that crime-fighting against cross-border IT crime shall be expanded.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan does not address the cybersecurity centre's organization, but states that civil defence shall be strengthened at the same pace as military defence and that crime-fighting against cross-border IT crime shall be expanded. The counter-proposal's demands for strengthened cooperation with industry and for a stronger actor for those affected by IT crime are in line with these commitments and with the plan's demands for effective information sharing between authorities. The position is derived.
Original (Swedish)
Planen behandlar inte cybersäkerhetscentrets organisation, men slår fast att det civila försvaret ska stärkas i samma takt som det militära och att brottsbekämpningen mot gränsöverskridande it-brottslighet ska byggas ut. Motförslagets krav på stärkt samverkan med näringslivet och på en starkare aktör för dem som drabbas av it-brott ligger i linje med dessa åtaganden och med planens krav på effektivt informationsutbyte mellan myndigheter. Ställningstagandet är härlett.
- strengthened crime-fighting against IT crimedecisive»Sverige ska delta fullt ut i EU:s brottsbekämpning och den europeiska polismyndigheten Europol ska ges ett tydligare operativt mandat att bekämpa internationell brottslighet och terrorism.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall participate fully in the EU's crime-fighting and the European police agency Europol shall be given a clearer operational mandate to combat international crime and terrorism.”
- strengthened civil defence»det civila försvaret stärkas i samma takt som det militära« (2022 manifesto ↗)“civil defence is strengthened at the same pace as military defence”
- international cooperation against crime»I ett samhälle med öppnare gränser krävs också starkare internationell samverkan mot brott.« (party programme ↗)“In a society with more open borders, stronger international cooperation against crime is also required.”
- effective authority cooperation»myndigheter effektivt kan dela information med varandra.« (party programme ↗)“authorities can effectively share information with each other.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan establishes that Sweden must be able to meet attacks from international crime and cyber warfare and that the entire justice system needs to be expanded so that crimes can be solved.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan establishes that Sweden must be able to meet attacks from international crime and cyber warfare and that the entire justice system needs to be expanded so that crimes can be solved. The counter-proposal's requirements for strengthened cooperation with industry and a strengthened IT crime centre for those affected by IT crimes follows from this. The plan does not single out a single authority as the sole spearhead.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår fast att Sverige måste kunna möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet och cyberkrigföring och att hela rättsväsendet behöver byggas ut för att brott ska klaras upp. Motförslagets krav på stärkt samverkan med näringslivet och ett stärkt it-brottscentrum för dem som drabbas av it-brottslighet följer av detta. Planen pekar inte ut en enskild myndighet som ensam spjutspets.
- preparedness against cyber threatsdecisive»möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet, terrorism, cyberkrigföring« (party programme ↗)“meet attacks from international crime, terrorism, cyber warfare”
- expanded justice system»Hela rättsväsendet behöver byggas ut. Fler poliser kräver fler åklagare, domstolar på fler platser i landet och en kraftigt utbyggd kriminalvård.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The entire justice system needs to be expanded. More police require more prosecutors, courts in more places in the country and a greatly expanded criminal care system.”
- expanded concept of security»Nya typer av konflikter och hot leder till ett vidgat« (party programme ↗)“New types of conflicts and threats lead to an expanded”
- cooperation against cross-border crime»motverka allvarlig gränsöverskridande brottslighet« (party programme ↗)“counteract serious cross-border crime”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan explicitly commits to giving companies in security-sensitive activities better state support against cyberattacks and espionage, which is precisely the cooperation with business that the counter-proposal seeks.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan explicitly commits to giving companies in security-sensitive activities better state support against cyberattacks and espionage, which is precisely the cooperation with business that the counter-proposal seeks. The plan also wants an action plan against hybrid threats and cyberattacks and a police focused on detecting, investigating and clearing up crime, which speaks for strengthening IT crime prevention and not just one agency. The plan, however, does not single out any specific center as the spearhead.
Original (Swedish)
Planen åtar sig uttryckligen att ge företag i säkerhetskänslig verksamhet bättre statligt stöd mot cyberattacker och spionage, vilket är just den samverkan med näringslivet som motförslaget efterfrågar. Planen vill också ha en handlingsplan mot hybridhot och cyberattacker samt en polis som fokuserar på att utreda och klara upp brott, vilket talar för att stärka it-brottsbekämpningen och inte enbart en myndighet. Planen pekar däremot inte ut något enskilt center som spjutspets.
- state support to companiesdecisive»Ge företag som är engagerade i säkerhetskänslig verksamhet bättre stöd från staten att kunna möta cyberattacker, spionage och stöldförsök från främmande makt« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Give companies engaged in security-sensitive activities better support from the state to be able to meet cyberattacks, espionage and theft attempts by foreign powers”
- action plan against cyber threats»Införa en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och cyberattacker« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Introduce an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyberattacks”
- the police's core criminal investigation mission»Renodla Polisens uppdrag med fokus på att upptäcka, utreda och klara upp brott« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Clarify the Police's mission with focus on detecting, investigating and clearing up crime”
- developed cyber defense»Utveckla cyberförsvaret« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Develop cyber defense”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan requires that the judicial system's cooperation between agencies and tools for detecting and prosecuting criminals be improved, and that crime affecting entrepreneurs be combated.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan requires that the judicial system's cooperation between agencies and tools for detecting and prosecuting criminals be improved, and that crime affecting entrepreneurs be combated. The counter-proposal's demand for strengthened cooperation with business and a stronger IT crime centre for affected citizens and companies follows from this. The plan also sees the digital society's vulnerability as a preparedness problem that must be better evaluated.
Original (Swedish)
Planen kräver att rättsväsendets samverkan mellan myndigheter och verktygen för att upptäcka och lagföra kriminella förbättras, och att den brottslighet som drabbar företagare bekämpas. Motförslagets krav på stärkt samverkan med näringslivet och ett starkare it-brottscentrum för drabbade medborgare och företag följer av detta. Planen ser också det digitala samhällets sårbarhet som ett beredskapsproblem som måste utvärderas bättre.
- improved agency cooperationdecisive»Rättsväsendets samverkan mellan myndigheter och verktyg för att upptäcka och lagföra kriminella ska förbättras.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The judicial system's cooperation between agencies and tools for detecting and prosecuting criminals shall be improved.”
- protection for entrepreneurs»Bekämpa brottslighet som drabbar företagare« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Combat crime affecting entrepreneurs”
- police preconditions»Ge polisen förutsättningarna för att bekämpa brottslighet« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Give the police the conditions to combat crime”
- digital vulnerability evaluated»Samhällets sårbarhet behöver bättre utvärderas, inkluderat hur ett allt mer elektrifierat och digitalt samhälle påverkar utsattheten vid en kris eller störning.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Society's vulnerability needs to be better evaluated, including how an increasingly electrified and digital society affects vulnerability in a crisis or disruption.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2023/24:FöU2)
- Committee report full text (HB01FöU2)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2023/24:1903 — Stärka Sveriges försvarsförmåga av Peter Hedberg och Malin Larsson (båda S)
- Motion 2023/24:2450 — En förstärkning av det civila försvaret och krisberedskapen av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2023/24:2564 — Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2023/24:2765 — med anledning av skr. 2023/24:26 Riksrevisionens rapport om regeringens styrning av samhällets informations- och cybersäkerhet av Mikael Larsson och Niels Paarup-Petersen (båda C)
- Motion 2023/24:415 — Post och it i hela landet av Jimmy Ståhl m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2023/24:422 — En framtidsinriktad it-politik av Tobias Andersson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2023/24:461 — Cybersäkerhet av Hanna Gunnarsson m.fl. (V)
- Motion 2023/24:497 — En tillförlitlig, konkurrenskraftig och hållbar svensk AI-politik av Rashid Farivar m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2023/24:880 — Granskning av svenskarnas användning av känslig teknik av Markus Wiechel och Björn Söder (båda SD)
- Regeringens skrivelse 2023/24:26 — Riksrevisionens rapport om regeringens styrning av samhällets informations- och cybersäkerhet
Source: The Swedish Parliament