NATO Centre of Excellence on Russia

To start a process with NATO about establishing a knowledge centre in Sweden means a deepening of Swedish integration in the alliance. The plan sees fundamental problems with NATO's structure, aims to leave NATO and opposes ever-deeper military cooperation. According to the plan, the need for knowledge about Russia can be met through free research rather than through new NATO structures.

• aim to leave NATOdecisive»med sikte på att lämna Nato.« (party programme ↗)“with the aim of leaving NATO.”
• against deeper NATO cooperation»Därför är Vänsterpartiet motståndare till Sveriges allt djupare militära samarbete med NATO och EU, och vi är det enda riksdagspartiet som konsekvent värnar och vill återupprätta svensk alliansfrihet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Therefore the Left Party is opposed to Sweden's ever-deeper military cooperation with NATO and the EU, and we are the only parliamentary party that consistently values and wants to restore Swedish military non-alignment.”
• independence from great powers»Det är viktigt att Sverige kan agera självständigt från stormakter som« (party programme ↗)“It is important that Sweden can act independently of great powers such as”
• free knowledge building»självständiga akademier utan politisk styrning och vill se en« (party programme ↗)“independent academies without political control and want to see a”

The election manifesto states that the Swedish people are the target of influence campaigns and disinformation and demands that the ability to resist this be strengthened, as well as cyber defence and intelligence capability in continued international co-operation. A knowledge centre on Russia and its methods of influence is one way to build precisely this capability. The plan does not mention NATO's knowledge centre, so the position is derived.

• resistance to disinformationdecisive»Arbetet för att stärka förmågan att stå emot cyberattacker och desinformation ska stärkas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Work to strengthen the ability to resist cyber attacks and disinformation shall be strengthened.”
• influence campaigns as a threat»Svenska folket är måltavla för påverkanskampanjer och desinformation.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Swedish people are the target of influence campaigns and disinformation.”
• developed intelligence capability»Vi vill fortsätta internationella samarbeten och utveckla cyberförsvaret och underrättelseförmågan.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We want to continue international co-operation and develop cyber defence and intelligence capability.”
• defence against hybrid threats»Vi måste kunna försvara oss militärt, men också mot hybridattacker, spionage och cyberangrepp.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We must be able to defend ourselves militarily, but also against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyber attacks.”

The plan says nothing about knowledge centers, but its driving line on the NATO question is that Sweden shall retain military non-alignment and not build itself into the alliance's structures. Establishing a NATO body on Swedish territory goes in the opposite direction from this commitment. The party values knowledge about new threats, but according to the plan that preparedness should be national rather than part of NATO's structure, so the conclusion is uncertain and derived.

• military non-alignmentdecisive»Samtidigt vill vi att Sverige behåller sin militära alliansfrihet för att kunna fortsätta arbeta mot kärnvapen, för nedrustning och kunna bedriva en självständig utrikespolitik där vi står upp för mänskliga rättigheter.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“At the same time we want Sweden to retain its military non-alignment so that it can continue to work against nuclear weapons, for disarmament and conduct an independent foreign policy where we stand up for human rights.”
• against NATO membership»Miljöpartiet de gröna värnar om den militära alliansfriheten och är därför mot anslutning till NATO.« (party programme ↗)“The Green Party of Sweden values military non-alignment and is therefore against NATO membership.”
• national threat preparedness»Vi ska också själva ha en beredskap på hemmaplan för att kunna möta de olika slags hot som säkerhetspolitiken identifierar.« (party programme ↗)“We should also have preparedness on home ground to be able to meet the different kinds of threats that security policy identifies.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan lacks texts about NATO's knowledge centres, but the election manifesto explicitly commits to strengthening resilience against external influence and infiltration and to Sweden being rapidly armed against external threats. A knowledge centre on Russia and its methods of influence is a means for precisely this. The inference provides support for the counter-proposal's demand, but the strength is limited because the plan does not address the form.

• resilience against external influencedecisive»De politiska partierna är sårbara mot påverkan och infiltration. Reglerna för finansiering av politiska partier bör skärpas och deras motståndskraft mot yttre påverkan och infiltration rustas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Political parties are vulnerable to influence and infiltration. The rules for financing of political parties should be strengthened and their resilience against external influence and infiltration enhanced.”
• rapid arming against external threats»Sverige måste rustas snabbt och fokuserat; ingen ska kunna ta vårt demokratiska samhälle ifrån oss.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden must be rapidly and focused armed; no one shall be able to take our democratic society from us.”
• strengthened civil preparedness»Även det civila försvaret är livsviktigt. Vi måste rusta civilförsvaret och samhällets beredskap inför krig och kris.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Civil defence is also vital. We must arm civil defence and society's preparedness for war and crisis.”
• adaptation to new threats»Därför måste vi också anpassa vår försvarsförmåga efter nya hot mot landet.« (party programme ↗)“Therefore we must also adapt our defence capability to new threats to the country.”

The plan says nothing about a NATO knowledge centre on Russia in Sweden. The closest relevant commitments are that Sweden shall actively contribute within NATO, including with infrastructure, that the threat to the security order from Russia is described as acute and that knowledge and research shall be strengthened. Derived from this the plan speaks for initiating a dialogue with NATO about such a centre, but the basis is weak.

• active Swedish contribution within NATOdecisive»Sverige ska inom Nato särskilt kunna bidra med den infrastruktur som behövs för att skapa ett nödvändigt och strategiskt djup för försvaret av Finland och Baltikum.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall within NATO particularly be able to contribute with the infrastructure needed to create the necessary and strategic depth for the defence of Finland and the Baltic region.”
• acute threat from Russia»Med det ryska anfallskriget mot Ukraina – detta angrepp mot hela Europa – är hotet mot vår säkerhetsordning akut.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“With the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine – this attack on all of Europe – the threat to our security order is acute.”
• strengthened Swedish knowledge base»Vi vill öka forskningsanslagen och både skapa bättre karriärvägar för yngre forskare och se riktade satsningar på att svenska universitet ska kunna locka hit världens främsta forskare.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We want to increase research funding and both create better career paths for younger researchers and see targeted investments so that Swedish universities can attract the world's leading researchers.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan requires that Sweden be able to meet a broadened threat picture including cyber warfare and that security policy be forward-looking and preventive. It also makes close NATO cooperation a natural part of security policy and wants Sweden to be at the forefront in knowledge and research investments. A centre of expertise on Russia in dialogue with NATO aligns with these commitments.

• meet broadened threatsdecisive»möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet, terrorism, cyberkrigföring, biologiska vapen, kemiska vapen« (party programme ↗)“meet attacks from international crime, terrorism, cyber warfare, biological weapons, chemical weapons”
• preventive security policy»Kriser måste mötas med politikens alla preventiva« (party programme ↗)“Crises must be met with all politics' preventive”
• close NATO cooperation»med NATO bör, givet nämnda kriterier, vara en naturlig del av svensk säkerhetspolitik.« (party programme ↗)“with NATO should, given the mentioned criteria, be a natural part of Swedish security policy.”
• knowledge investments prioritized»ligga i främsta ledet när det gäller satsningar på forskning och utbildning.« (party programme ↗)“be at the forefront when it comes to investments in research and education.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan sets a high level of ambition for Sweden in NATO: the country should be a security producer in the neighborhood and get the most possible benefit from membership, and Swedish knowledge should be shared with the whole alliance. A knowledge center on Russia in Sweden is precisely such a concrete contribution with existing expertise. The plan's commitments to strengthened defense intelligence capability and measures against hybrid threats point in the same direction, even though the documents do not mention a knowledge center.

• active NATO memberdecisive»Sverige ska som medlem i Nato vara en säkerhetsproducent i vårt närområde och även få ut mesta möjliga effekt av medlemskapet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden as a member of NATO shall be a security producer in our neighborhood and also get the most possible benefit from membership.”
• Swedish expertise to NATO»Verka för att Sveriges teknologiska kunnande och kompetenta försvarsindustri kommer hela Nato till del« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Work to ensure that Sweden's technological knowledge and competent defense industry benefit the whole NATO”
• strengthened intelligence capability»Stärka försvarsunderrättelseförmågan« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen defense intelligence capability”
• counter hybrid threats»Införa en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och cyberattacker« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Introduce an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyber attacks”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan wants to strengthen European cooperation against hybrid threats and develop policy to prevent Russian and Chinese advances, which requires precisely increased knowledge of Russia's methods of influence. A knowledge centre established in dialogue with NATO aligns with the plan's will to deepen defence and security cooperation. The plan's general aversion to new prestige projects pulls partly in the opposite direction, which makes the assessment uncertain.

• cooperation against hybrid threatsdecisive»Förstärka det europeiska samarbetet mot islamistiska organisationer, hybridhot och terrorism« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen European cooperation against Islamist organizations, hybrid threats and terrorism”
• prevent Russian advance»En tydlig Arktispolitik ska tas fram som hindrar ryska och kinesiska framflyttningar och bejakar svenska ekonomiska intressen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“A clear Arctic policy should be developed that prevents Russian and Chinese advances and affirms Swedish economic interests.”
• deepened security cooperation»Fördjupa det nordiska försvars- och säkerhetssamarbetet« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Deepen Nordic defence and security cooperation”
• no prestige projects»Satsa på välfärden istället för politiska prestigeprojekt« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Invest in welfare instead of political prestige projects”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.