2024-02-282023/24:FöU5 · p.2FöUDefence
A developed strategy for signal intelligence
A developed strategy for signals intelligence
What's at stake: Signals intelligence capability is central to Sweden's independent foreign and security policy and to strengthening information security in critical infrastructure. The decision affects how quickly, and in what way, Sweden develops and maintains its capability in this field.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is whether the government should draw up a dedicated, developed strategy for Sweden's signals intelligence capability now, or whether this should wait until the ongoing review of the Signals Intelligence Act is complete.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The Committee shares the government's assessment that the ongoing comprehensive review of the Signals Intelligence Act should be allowed to determine the way forward, and does not want to pre-empt that work with a separate strategy. The Committee therefore rejects the motion.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 1 (S)
The reservation (S) wants the government to draw up a developed strategy for signals intelligence rather than wait for the ongoing review. The reasoning is that signals intelligence and intelligence gathering are the foundation of a robust defence and crucial to an independent foreign and security policy, and that Sweden should maintain and develop its expertise in the field so that its capability stays at the forefront.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 1 by S.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
The decision would have gone the other way
Explicit commitments that contradicted the vote: MModeraterna
Ja 202–93Nej 143–152
Counterfactual: the parties above are moved to the position their own documents explicitly point at, carrying their whole contingent present. Every other party keeps its real figures, including dissenters and absentees.
How the AI parties would have voted
For each party: what its own plan – election manifesto and party programme – argues for in this case, next to how the party actually voted. The AI can only answer Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| AI | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | Yes | Yes 19/0/0/5 | match | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| S | No | No 0/92/0/14 | match | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| MP | Yes | Yes 15/0/0/3 | match | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| C | No | Yes 19/0/0/5 | differs | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| L | No | Yes 12/0/0/4 | differs | confidence: low | not addressed |
| KD | No | Yes 16/0/0/3 | differs | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| M | No | Yes 59/0/0/9 | differsagainst own programme | confidence: high | explicit |
| SD | No | Yes 61/0/0/11 | differs | confidence: medium | not addressed |
Committee proposal
Parliament rejects motion 2023/24:2564 by Peter Hultqvist et al. (S) item 20.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motion 2023/24:2564 av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S) yrkande 20.
Riksdag decision: Parliament has considered a government communication on privacy protection in signal intelligence in defence intelligence activities. Signal intelligence is part of Sweden's defence and protection against terrorism and is governed by law. It is the State Inspection of Defence Intelligence Activities, Siun, that oversees that defence intelligence activities are conducted in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. To protect an individual's personal privacy, there are clear rules for how signal intelligence may be conducted. The government considers that Siun's review of the signal intelligence conducted in 2022 has functioned well. Parliament shares the government's view that signal intelligence activities are a necessary and integrated part of Sweden's defence and protection against terrorism, and that in a democratic constitutional state, a well-functioning privacy protection is required in this context. Parliament laid the communication on file, that is, concluded the case. Parliament also said no to motion requests.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants the government to pursue a developed strategy for signals intelligence. (S) — Reservation 1
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The election manifesto stipulates that Sweden shall be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarization, and the party programme requires that growing surveillance and registration be counteracted and that the military system be subject to democratic control.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto stipulates that Sweden shall be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarization, and the party programme requires that growing surveillance and registration be counteracted and that the military system be subject to democratic control. The counter-proposal instead wants to expand signal intelligence capability now and put it in the front line. This goes against the plan's line, even though the plan shares the desire for an independent foreign policy.
Original (Swedish)
Valplattformen slår fast att Sverige ska vara en röst för fred och rättvisa, inte för ökad militarisering, och partiprogrammet kräver att växande övervakning och registrering motverkas och att det militära systemet underställs demokratisk kontroll. Motförslaget vill i stället bygga ut signalspaningsförmågan nu och lägga den i framkant. Det går emot planens linje, även om planen delar önskan om en självständig utrikespolitik.
- against increased militarizationdecisive»Vänsterpartiet anser att Sverige ska vara en röst för fred och rättvisa, inte för ökad militarisering.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Left Party believes that Sweden shall be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarization.”
- counteract surveillance»registrering ska motverkas.« (party programme ↗)“registration shall be counteracted.”
- democratic control of the military»Det är av yttersta vikt att det militära systemet underställs en demokratisk kontroll.« (party programme ↗)“It is of the utmost importance that the military system be subject to democratic control.”
- protection of privacyweak support»Alla människor har rätt till en bred privat sfär« (party programme ↗)“All people have the right to a broad private sphere”
flags: citat_svagt
The election manifesto commits to developing cyber defence and intelligence capability as part of the reorganization of security policy, and specifically points to espionage and hybrid attacks as threats to Sweden.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto commits to developing cyber defence and intelligence capability as part of the reorganization of security policy, and specifically points to espionage and hybrid attacks as threats to Sweden. The counter-proposal's demand that a developed strategy for signals intelligence be developed now so that the capability is at the forefront is the same thing in substance. The plan speaks to the capability, not to the order in which the work should be prepared.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet åtar sig att utveckla cyberförsvaret och underrättelseförmågan som en del av omläggningen av säkerhetspolitiken, och pekar särskilt ut spionage och hybridattacker som hot mot Sverige. Motförslagets krav på att en utvecklad strategi för signalspaning tas fram nu, så att förmågan ligger i framkant, är samma sak i sak. Planen uttalar sig om förmågan, inte om i vilken ordning arbetet ska beredas.
- strengthened intelligence capabilitydecisive»Vi vill fortsätta internationella samarbeten och utveckla cyberförsvaret och underrättelseförmågan.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We want to continue international cooperation and develop cyber defence and intelligence capability.”
- defence against espionage»Vi måste kunna försvara oss militärt, men också mot hybridattacker, spionage och cyberangrepp.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We must be able to defend ourselves militarily, but also against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyberattacks.”
- withstand cyberattacks»Arbetet för att stärka förmågan att stå emot cyberattacker och desinformation ska stärkas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The work to strengthen the ability to withstand cyberattacks and disinformation shall be strengthened.”
- increased defence appropriations»Anslagen till det militära försvaret ska öka till motsvarande två procent av BNP.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Appropriations for military defence shall increase to two percent of GDP.”
The plan turns against expanded surveillance and requires that policy safeguards integrity, and it prioritizes civil defence and crisis preparedness over expanded military intelligence capacity.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan turns against expanded surveillance and requires that policy safeguards integrity, and it prioritizes civil defence and crisis preparedness over expanded military intelligence capacity. The counter-proposal wants instead for signal intelligence capacity to be rapidly developed and leads the way. This lacks support in the plan's commitments, which lack any ambition to strengthen signal intelligence.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vänder sig mot utbyggd övervakning och kräver att politiken slår vakt om integriteten, och den prioriterar civilt försvar och krisberedskap framför utbyggd militär underrättelseförmåga. Motförslaget vill i stället att signalspaningsförmågan snabbt utvecklas och ligger i framkant. Det saknar stöd i planens åtaganden, som saknar varje ambition att stärka signalspaningen.
- no to privacy infringementdecisive»Vi motsätter oss alla lagar som innebär oproportionerliga ingrepp i integriteten.« (party programme ↗)“We oppose all laws that entail disproportionate infringements on privacy.”
- protect privacy against surveillance»De ökade möjligheterna till övervakning kräver att politiken slår vakt om människors möjlighet att värna sin integritet.« (party programme ↗)“The increased opportunities for surveillance require that policy safeguards people's ability to protect their privacy.”
- civil defence prioritized»satsa en större andel av försvarets pengar på det civila försvaret, och öka anslagen till krisberedskap.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“invest a larger share of defence money on civil defence, and increase appropriations for crisis preparedness.”
- prohibition against improper surveillance»Ingen otillbörlig registrering eller övervakning baserad på politiska åsikter eller demokratisk verksamhet får förekomma.« (party programme ↗)“No improper registration or surveillance based on political opinions or democratic activity may occur.”
The plan requires that defence is armed quickly, forcefully and long-term with two per cent of GDP and NATO membership, and the party programme requires that defence capability is adapted to new threats to the country.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan requires that defence is armed quickly, forcefully and long-term with two per cent of GDP and NATO membership, and the party programme requires that defence capability is adapted to new threats to the country. Strengthened intelligence capability follows from these commitments, even though the plan does not mention signals intelligence. The plan's no to preventive wiretapping meanwhile limits support to the capability as such, not to expanded coercive measures.
Original (Swedish)
Planen kräver att försvaret rustas snabbt, kraftfullt och långsiktigt med två procent av BNP och Nato-medlemskap, och idéprogrammet kräver att försvarsförmågan anpassas efter nya hot mot landet. En stärkt underrättelseförmåga följer av dessa åtaganden, även om planen inte nämner signalspaning. Planens nej till preventiv avlyssning begränsar samtidigt stödet till förmågan som sådan, inte till utvidgade tvångsmedel.
- swift and forceful defence rearmamentdecisive»Sverige ska försvaras. Vi vill rusta det militära försvaret snabbt, kraftfullt och långsiktigt. Sverige behöver satsa två procent av BNP på försvaret så snart det är praktiskt möjligt och gå med i Nato.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall be defended. We want to arm the military defence quickly, forcefully and long-term. Sweden needs to spend two per cent of GDP on defence as soon as it is practically possible and join NATO.”
- capability adapted to new threats»Därför måste vi också anpassa vår försvarsförmåga efter nya hot mot landet.« (party programme ↗)“Therefore we must also adapt our defence capability to new threats to the country.”
- independent territorial defence capability»Sverige måste därför kunna försvara sitt eget territorium.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden must therefore be able to defend its own territory.”
- integrity sets limits»Vi säger därför nej till visitationszoner, kollektiv bestraffning, omvänd bevisbörda, anonyma vittnen, preventiv avlyssning och inskränkningar av religionsfriheten.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We therefore say no to patrol zones, collective punishment, reversed burden of proof, anonymous witnesses, preventive wiretapping and restrictions on freedom of religion.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan does not discuss signals intelligence per se, but its decisive commitment is a significantly stronger defence with defence spending at two per cent of GDP and civil defence strengthened at the same pace as military defence.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan does not discuss signals intelligence per se, but its decisive commitment is a significantly stronger defence with defence spending at two per cent of GDP and civil defence strengthened at the same pace as military defence. Intelligence capacity is part of the overall defence capability the plan wants to increase, and a developed strategy maintaining competence is in line with this. The position is derived, and the plan's privacy principle constitutes a qualified but not decisive objection.
Original (Swedish)
Planen talar inte om signalspaning i sig, men dess avgörande åtagande är ett betydligt starkare försvar med försvarsanslag på två procent av BNP och ett civilt försvar som stärks i samma takt som det militära. Underrättelseförmågan är en del av den samlade försvarsförmåga planen vill höja, och en utvecklad strategi som vidmakthåller kompetensen ligger i linje med detta. Ställningstagandet är härlett, och planens integritetsprincip utgör en kvalificerande men inte avgörande invändning.
- stronger military defencedecisive»Sverige behöver ett betydligt starkare militärt försvar än i dag.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden needs a significantly stronger military defence than today.”
- increased national defence capability»Sveriges nationella försvarsförmåga måste öka.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden's national defence capability must increase.”
- civil defence at the same pace»det civila försvaret stärkas i samma takt som det militära« (2022 manifesto ↗)“civil defence is strengthened at the same pace as military defence”
- privacy protection as framework»Skyddet för den enskildes integritet ska stärkas.« (party programme ↗)“Protection of the individual's privacy shall be strengthened.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan bases security and defence policy on early warning systems and requires the ability to meet an expanded threat spectrum, including cyber warfare and terrorism.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan bases security and defence policy on early warning systems and requires the ability to meet an expanded threat spectrum, including cyber warfare and terrorism. It also requires that Swedish military deployments be decided independently, which presupposes its own intelligence capability. Developing a strategy for signals intelligence is in line with this, even though the plan does not explicitly mention signals intelligence.
Original (Swedish)
Planen bygger säkerhets- och försvarspolitiken på tidiga varningssystem och kräver förmåga att möta ett vidgat hotspektrum, inklusive cyberkrigföring och terrorism. Den kräver också att svenska militära insatser beslutas självständigt, vilket förutsätter egen underrättelseförmåga. Att utveckla en strategi för signalspaning ligger i linje med detta, även om planen inte nämner signalspaning uttryckligen.
- expanded security conceptdecisive»möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet, terrorism, cyberkrigföring, biologiska vapen, kemiska vapen« (party programme ↗)“meet attacks from international crime, terrorism, cyber warfare, biological weapons, chemical weapons”
- early warning systems»försvarspolitik bygger på tidiga varningssystem och« (party programme ↗)“defence policy is based on early warning systems and”
- war-deterrent defence capability»Försvarsmakten ska ha en sådan styrka,« (party programme ↗)“The armed forces shall have such strength,”
- independent Swedish decisions»tära insatser ska genomföras först efter självständiga« (party programme ↗)“tary deployments shall be carried out only after independent”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The election manifesto explicitly promises to strengthen defense intelligence capability and develop cyber defense, and emphasizes that defense must increasingly account for rapid technological development.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto explicitly promises to strengthen defense intelligence capability and develop cyber defense, and emphasizes that defense must increasingly account for rapid technological development. The counter-proposal's requirement that signals intelligence capability be maintained and developed now, as a basis for a robust defense and an independent security policy, follows directly from these commitments. They are moreover supported by the requirement for defense spending corresponding to two percent of GDP already in 2025.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet lovar uttryckligen att stärka försvarsunderrättelseförmågan och utveckla cyberförsvaret, och betonar att försvaret i ökad utsträckning måste ta höjd för den snabba teknikutvecklingen. Motförslagets krav på att signalspaningsförmågan vidmakthålls och utvecklas nu, som grund för ett robust försvar och en självständig säkerhetspolitik, följer direkt av dessa åtaganden. De backas dessutom av kravet på försvarsanslag motsvarande två procent av BNP redan 2025.
- strengthened intelligence capabilitydecisive»Stärka försvarsunderrättelseförmågan« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen defense intelligence capability”
- technology advantage in defense»Vidare behöver det svenska försvaret i ökad utsträckning ta höjd för de möjligheter och risker som den allt snabbare teknikutvecklingen innebär.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Further, Swedish defense must increasingly account for the opportunities and risks that increasingly rapid technological development entails.”
- developed cyber defense»Utveckla cyberförsvaret« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Develop cyber defense”
- increased defense spending»Verka för att försvarsanslagen uppgår till motsvarande 2 procent av BNP redan år 2025« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Work for defense spending to correspond to 2 percent of GDP already in 2025”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The plan does not specifically mention signals intelligence, but the guiding line is that total defence should be restored and that Sweden should be equipped for a deteriorated security situation in the neighbouring region.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan does not specifically mention signals intelligence, but the guiding line is that total defence should be restored and that Sweden should be equipped for a deteriorated security situation in the neighbouring region. Intelligence capability is part of precisely the capability the plan wants to maintain and develop, and the plan also emphasizes Swedish independence in decisions. Therefore, the plan supports that a strategy is developed now.
Original (Swedish)
Planen nämner inte signalspaning särskilt, men den bärande linjen är att totalförsvaret ska återupprättas och att Sverige ska rustas för ett försämrat säkerhetsläge i närområdet. Underrättelseförmåga är en del av just den förmåga planen vill vidmakthålla och utveckla, och planen betonar dessutom svenskt oberoende i besluten. Därför stöder planen att en strategi tas fram nu.
- restore total defencedecisive»Sverigedemokraterna vill återupprätta totalförsvaret och att Sverige ska ha förmåga att möta potentiella angripare.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden Democrats want to restore total defence and for Sweden to have the capability to meet potential attackers.”
- equip for new security situation»Rusta Sverige inför en ny säkerhetspolitisk situation i vårt närområde« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Equip Sweden for a new security-political situation in our neighbouring region”
- maintained defence capability»Satsa på uppgradering, nyanskaffning och vidmakthållande av materiel« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Invest in upgrading, acquisition and maintenance of equipment”
- independent decision-making»Bejaka och stärka det svenska folkstyrets oberoende« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Embrace and strengthen the independence of Swedish democracy”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2023/24:FöU5)
- Committee report full text (HB01FöU5)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2023/24:2450 — En förstärkning av det civila försvaret och krisberedskapen av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2023/24:2564 — Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S)
- Regeringens skrivelse 2023/24:70 — Integritetsskydd vid signalspaning i försvarsunderrättelseverksamhet
Source: The Swedish Parliament