2026-04-012025/26:FöU6 · p.2FöUDefence
The conditions of signal intelligence operations
Signals-intelligence capability and expertise (FRA)
What's at stake: The question concerns Sweden's ability to conduct an independent foreign, security, and defence policy based on reliable intelligence, and how responsibility for security, development, and resilience in signals intelligence should be organized going forward.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question is whether the government should take a special initiative - including an inventory of how the work and division of responsibility are organized today - to maintain and develop Sweden's signals-intelligence competence and capability, or whether the funding increases already approved and special assignments given to FRA are sufficient.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee holds that a strong defence-intelligence capability, with signals intelligence as an important part of it, is essential for an independent foreign, security, and defence policy, points to the substantial funding increases and special assignments already given to FRA to strengthen capability, and sees no reason for further measures; the motion (S) should be rejected.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 1 (S)
The reservation (S) wants the government to take a special initiative to maintain and develop competence and capability in the signals-intelligence field, including an inventory of how the work is done today and who holds overall responsibility for security, development, and resilience, arguing that reliable, ongoing intelligence is essential for an independent foreign and security policy and that Swedish signals intelligence should stay at the forefront.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 1 by S.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
The decision would have gone the other way
Explicit commitments that contradicted the vote: MModeraterna
Ja 196–91Nej 141–146
Counterfactual: the parties above are moved to the position their own documents explicitly point at, carrying their whole contingent present. Every other party keeps its real figures, including dissenters and absentees.
How the AI parties would have voted
For each party: what its own plan – election manifesto and party programme – argues for in this case, next to how the party actually voted. The AI can only answer Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| AI | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | No | Yes 17/0/0/5 | differs | confidence: low | derived |
| S | No | No 0/90/0/16 | match | confidence: high | explicit |
| MP | No | Yes 15/0/0/3 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| C | No | Yes 19/0/0/5 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| L | No | Yes 12/0/0/4 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| KD | No | Yes 16/0/0/3 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| M | No | Yes 55/0/0/11 | differsagainst own programme | confidence: high | explicit |
| SD | No | Yes 59/0/0/11 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
Committee proposal
The Riksdag rejects motion 2025/26:3556 by Peter Hultqvist et al. (S) item 94.
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motion 2025/26:3556 av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S) yrkande 94.
Riksdag decision: The Riksdag has considered a government communication regarding privacy protection in signal intelligence operations in defense intelligence activities. Signal intelligence is closely regulated through laws and regulations, among other things to protect individuals' personal privacy. It is the State Inspection of Defense Intelligence Activities, Siun, that supervises that signal intelligence operations are conducted in accordance with the regulatory framework. The government assesses that Siun's review of the signal intelligence operations conducted in 2024 has functioned well and that Siun has had access to the information needed to fulfill its assignment. The Riksdag filed the communication with its records, which means the matter was concluded. Furthermore, the Riksdag rejected three proposals in motions concerning signal intelligence and intelligence operations. The Riksdag refers to the very significant appropriations that FRA, the Swedish Defence Radio Establishment, receives to strengthen signal intelligence operations. Furthermore, the Riksdag believes there is no reason to anticipate proposals on intelligence operations that the government intends to submit in 2026.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants Sweden to maintain and develop competence in signals intelligence. (S) — Reservation 1
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The plan requires that the Armed Forces and the police are clearly incorporated into democratic structures with functioning accountability, and wants Sweden to be able to act independently from the great powers.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan requires that the Armed Forces and the police are clearly incorporated into democratic structures with functioning accountability, and wants Sweden to be able to act independently from the great powers. An inventory of how signals intelligence is organized and who bears overall responsibility is in line with that requirement for clear democratic governance. The plan, however, does not address signals intelligence, and the party's emphasis on personal integrity also calls for caution.
Original (Swedish)
Planen kräver att Försvarsmakten och polisen är tydligt inordnade i demokratiska strukturer med fungerande ansvarsutkrävande, och vill att Sverige kan agera självständigt från stormakterna. En inventering av hur signalspaningen organiseras och vem som bär det samlade ansvaret ligger i linje med det kravet på tydlig demokratisk styrning. Planen behandlar dock inte signalspaning, och partiets betoning av personlig integritet manar samtidigt till försiktighet.
- democratic control of the defencedecisive»vara tydligt inordnade i demokratiska strukturer.« (party programme ↗)“be clearly incorporated into democratic structures.”
- clear responsibility in the defence»Försvarsmakten spelar roller i samhället som innebär att de behöver« (party programme ↗)“The Armed Forces play roles in society that mean they need”
- independent security policy»Det är viktigt att Sverige kan agera självständigt från stormakter som« (party programme ↗)“It is important that Sweden can act independently from great powers such as”
- personal integrity»har rätt till skydd av sin personliga integritet.« (party programme ↗)“have the right to protection of their personal integrity.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The election manifesto establishes that intelligence capabilities and cyber defence shall be developed and that Sweden must be able to defend itself also against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyber attacks.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto establishes that intelligence capabilities and cyber defence shall be developed and that Sweden must be able to defend itself also against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyber attacks. An initiative to maintain and develop expertise in signals intelligence, with clarified responsibility for security and robustness, is precisely this commitment implemented in practice. The plan therefore supports the counter-proposal's requirement.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet slår fast att underrättelseförmågan och cyberförsvaret ska utvecklas och att Sverige måste kunna försvara sig också mot hybridattacker, spionage och cyberangrepp. Ett initiativ för att vidmakthålla och utveckla kompetensen inom signalspaning, med klarlagt ansvar för säkerhet och robusthet, är just detta åtagande omsatt i praktiken. Planen stöder därför motförslagets krav.
- developed intelligence capabilitiesdecisive»Vi vill fortsätta internationella samarbeten och utveckla cyberförsvaret och underrättelseförmågan.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We want to continue international cooperation and develop cyber defence and intelligence capabilities.”
- defence against espionage and cyber attacks»Vi måste kunna försvara oss militärt, men också mot hybridattacker, spionage och cyberangrepp.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We must be able to defend ourselves militarily, but also against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyber attacks.”
- preparedness against hybrid threats»Beredskap mot hybridattacker.« (party programme ↗)“Preparedness against hybrid attacks.”
- independent security policy»Sveriges säkerhetspolitik syftar till att bevara vårt lands fred, vår demokrati och vår suveränitet.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden's security policy aims to preserve our country's peace, our democracy and our sovereignty.”
The plan requires that Sweden's NATO membership is reconciled with an independent foreign and security policy and that both the military and civil defence have the capability to protect the country.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan requires that Sweden's NATO membership is reconciled with an independent foreign and security policy and that both the military and civil defence have the capability to protect the country. An initiative that maintains expertise in signals intelligence and inventories who bears responsibility for security and robustness serves the independent intelligence capability. The plan at the same time requires strong and independent oversight of secret coercive measures, which such an accountability inventory lies in line with.
Original (Swedish)
Planen kräver att Sveriges Natomedlemskap förenas med en självständig utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik och att både det militära och civila försvaret har förmåga att skydda landet. Ett initiativ som vidmakthåller kompetensen inom signalspaning och inventerar vem som bär ansvaret för säkerhet och robusthet tjänar den självständiga underrättelseförmågan. Planen kräver samtidigt stark och oberoende tillsyn över hemliga tvångsmedel, vilket en sådan ansvarsinventering ligger i linje med.
- independent security policydecisive»Sveriges medlemskap i Nato måste förenas med en självständig utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden's NATO membership must be reconciled with an independent foreign and security policy.”
- credible total defence»Därför behövs både militärt och civilt försvar för att effektivt skydda Sverige mot angrepp och kriser.« (party programme ↗)“Therefore both military and civil defence are needed to effectively protect Sweden against attacks and crises.”
- oversight and clear responsibility»Ett sätt att värna integriteten är en stark, oberoende tillsyn över användningen av exempelvis hemliga tvångsmedel – för att säkerställa rättssäkerhet, proportionalitet och demokratiskt ansvarstagande.« (party programme ↗)“One way to protect integrity is strong, independent oversight of the use of, for example, secret coercive measures – to ensure rights-security, proportionality and democratic accountability.”
- prioritised civil defence»satsa en större andel av försvarets pengar på det civila försvaret, och öka anslagen till krisberedskap.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“invest a larger proportion of the defence budget in civil defence, and increase the appropriations for crisis preparedness.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The election manifesto wants to strengthen the military defence quickly, powerfully and in the long term, and the party programme states that defence capability must be adapted to new threats against the country.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto wants to strengthen the military defence quickly, powerfully and in the long term, and the party programme states that defence capability must be adapted to new threats against the country. To maintain and develop expertise in signals intelligence and clarify responsibility for its robustness is a direct application of these commitments. The plan's no to preventive surveillance concerns domestic crime prevention and does not affect the defence intelligence capability.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet vill rusta det militära försvaret snabbt, kraftfullt och långsiktigt, och partiprogrammet slår fast att försvarsförmågan måste anpassas efter nya hot mot landet. Att vidmakthålla och utveckla kompetensen inom signalspaning och klargöra ansvaret för dess robusthet är en direkt tillämpning av dessa åtaganden. Planens nej till preventiv avlyssning rör inhemsk brottsbekämpning och träffar inte försvarsunderrättelseförmågan.
- rapid defence strengtheningdecisive»Vi vill rusta det militära försvaret snabbt, kraftfullt och långsiktigt.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We want to strengthen the military defence quickly, powerfully and in the long term.”
- adapt defence to new threats»Därför måste vi också anpassa vår försvarsförmåga efter nya hot mot landet.« (party programme ↗)“Therefore we must also adapt our defence capability to new threats against the country.”
- defend own territory»Sverige måste därför kunna försvara sitt eget territorium.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden must therefore be able to defend its own territory.”
- no to preventive surveillance»Vi säger därför nej till visitationszoner, kollektiv bestraffning, omvänd bevisbörda, anonyma vittnen, preventiv avlyssning och inskränkningar av religionsfriheten.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We therefore say no to search zones, collective punishment, reversed burden of proof, anonymous witnesses, preventive surveillance and restrictions on religious freedom.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The party programme establishes that Sweden's national defence capability must increase and that total defence needs to be greatly strengthened in the most difficult security policy situation since the Second World War, and the election manifesto wants to raise defence spending to two per cent of GDP.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The party programme establishes that Sweden's national defence capability must increase and that total defence needs to be greatly strengthened in the most difficult security policy situation since the Second World War, and the election manifesto wants to raise defence spending to two per cent of GDP. Maintaining and developing expertise in signals intelligence is part of that capability. The plan's integrity principle simultaneously requires that measures in this area are effective and proportionate.
Original (Swedish)
Partiprogrammet slår fast att Sveriges nationella försvarsförmåga måste öka och att totalförsvaret behöver stärkas kraftigt i det svåraste säkerhetspolitiska läget sedan andra världskriget, och valmanifestet vill höja försvarsanslaget till två procent av BNP. Att vidmakthålla och utveckla kompetensen inom signalspaning är en del av den förmågan. Planens integritetsprincip kräver samtidigt att åtgärder på området är effektiva och proportionerliga.
- increased defence capabilitydecisive»Sveriges nationella försvarsförmåga måste öka.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden's national defence capability must increase.”
- greatly strengthened total defence»I ett säkerhetspolitiskt läge som är det svåraste sedan andra världskrigets slut behöver Sveriges totalförsvar stärkas kraftigt.« (party programme ↗)“In a security policy situation that is the most difficult since the Second World War, Sweden's total defence must be greatly strengthened.”
- increased defence appropriations»Vi vill därför redan 2025 se ett försvarsanslag om 2 procent av BNP och därmed skapa tillräckliga förutsättningar att stärka både armen, marinen och flygvapnet.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We therefore want to see a defence budget of 2 per cent of GDP already in 2025 and thus create sufficient conditions to strengthen both the army, navy and air force.”
- integrity assessment of measures»Åtgärder som påverkar den personliga integriteten negativt är endast berättigade om ett motstående intresse väger uppenbart tyngre och åtgärden är effektiv.« (party programme ↗)“Measures that negatively affect personal integrity are only justified if a countervailing interest weighs significantly more and the measure is effective.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan establishes that a successful security and defense policy is built on early warning systems and that Sweden must be able to meet threats such as terrorism and cyber warfare, with a total defense that has sufficient resources.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan establishes that a successful security and defense policy is built on early warning systems and that Sweden must be able to meet threats such as terrorism and cyber warfare, with a total defense that has sufficient resources. An initiative to maintain expertise in signals intelligence and clarify responsibility for security and robustness addresses this. The plan simultaneously requires that personal integrity be protected.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår fast att en framgångsrik säkerhets- och försvarspolitik bygger på tidiga varningssystem och att Sverige måste kunna möta hot som terrorism och cyberkrigföring, med ett totalförsvar som har tillräckliga resurser. Ett initiativ för att vidmakthålla kompetensen inom signalspaning och klargöra ansvaret för säkerhet och robusthet svarar mot detta. Planen kräver samtidigt att den personliga integriteten värnas.
- early warning in security policydecisive»bygger på tidiga varningssystem« (party programme ↗)“is built on early warning systems”
- broadened threat picture»Sverige måste kunna möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet, terrorism« (party programme ↗)“Sweden must be able to meet attacks from international crime, terrorism”
- resources for total defense»Det samlade totalförsvaret måste ha tillräckliga resurser« (party programme ↗)“The integrated total defense must have sufficient resources”
- integrity protection»skyddet för den personliga integriteten värnas« (party programme ↗)“the protection of personal integrity is safeguarded”
Worldstate weighed in: Deteriorated security situation in the region and attacks against Iran in late February 2026 — Increases the importance of the plan's demands for early warning and intelligence capabilities
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The election manifesto explicitly commits to strengthening defence intelligence capability and developing cyber defence, and states that defence must increasingly take into account the opportunities and risks that rapid technological development entails.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto explicitly commits to strengthening defence intelligence capability and developing cyber defence, and states that defence must increasingly take into account the opportunities and risks that rapid technological development entails. An initiative to maintain and develop expertise in signals intelligence, including an inventory of responsibility and robustness, is a direct application of that commitment. The plan therefore supports the requirement.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet åtar sig uttryckligen att stärka försvarsunderrättelseförmågan och att utveckla cyberförsvaret, och slår fast att försvaret i ökad utsträckning måste ta höjd för den snabba teknikutvecklingen. Ett initiativ för att vidmakthålla och utveckla kompetensen inom signalspaning, inklusive en inventering av ansvar och robusthet, är en direkt tillämpning av det åtagandet. Planen stöder därför kravet.
- strengthened defence intelligence capabilitydecisive»Stärka försvarsunderrättelseförmågan« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Strengthen defence intelligence capability”
- developed cyber defence»Utveckla cyberförsvaret« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Develop cyber defence”
- technological development poses demands»Vidare behöver det svenska försvaret i ökad utsträckning ta höjd för de möjligheter och risker som den allt snabbare teknikutvecklingen innebär.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Furthermore, Swedish defence must increasingly take into account the opportunities and risks that ever-faster technological development entails”
- unified security responsibility»Inrätta ett nationellt säkerhetsråd på Statsrådsberedningen« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Establish a national security council at the Prime Minister's Office”
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The plan wishes to rearm Sweden for the new security situation and restore total defense with long-term guaranteed financing, which presumes a maintained intelligence capability.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan wishes to rearm Sweden for the new security situation and restore total defense with long-term guaranteed financing, which presumes a maintained intelligence capability. The plan also highlights intelligence work, information gathering and surveillance as necessary tools. An initiative to inventory and develop signal intelligence's competence and responsibilities therefore aligns with the documents.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vill rusta Sverige inför den nya säkerhetspolitiska situationen och återupprätta ett totalförsvar med långsiktigt garanterad finansiering, vilket förutsätter en vidmakthållen underrättelseförmåga. Planen framhåller dessutom underrättelsearbete, informationsinhämtning och avlyssning som nödvändiga verktyg. Ett initiativ för att inventera och utveckla signalspaningens kompetens och ansvarsförhållanden ligger därför i linje med dokumenten.
- stärkt säkerhetsförmågadecisive»Rusta Sverige inför en ny säkerhetspolitisk situation i vårt närområde« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Rearm Sweden for a new security situation in our near region”
- underrättelseverktyg»Åtgärder ska vidtas för att bättre kunna kartlägga gängaktiva genom t.ex. underrättelsearbete och informationsinhämtning, spaning, kameraövervakning och avlyssning.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Measures shall be taken to better map gang members through, for example, intelligence work and information gathering, surveillance, camera monitoring and eavesdropping.”
- återupprättat totalförsvar»Återupprätta ett totalförsvar som är rustat för krig« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Restore a total defense that is armed for war”
- långsiktig försvarsfinansiering»Garantera den långsiktiga finansieringen av ett starkt försvar« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Guarantee long-term financing of strong defense”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2025/26:FöU6)
- Committee report full text (HD01FöU6)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2025/26:3405 — Ökad civil försvarsförmåga och stärkt krisberedskap av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2025/26:3556 — Totalförsvarets beredskap av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S)
- Regeringens skrivelse 2025/26:70 — Integritetsskydd vid signalspaning i försvarsunderrättelseverksamhet
Source: The Swedish Parliament