Cloud services

The plan wants to reclaim socially important infrastructure into common ownership, demands that public ownership is strong within communications and other infrastructure and that the state increases its control over infrastructure, and that the state ensures digital access throughout the country. Measures to secure the state's insight and control over security-sensitive information in cloud services follow from this. The plan says nothing about the committee's reasons that ongoing strategic work is sufficient.

• reclaim privatized infrastructuredecisive»Det är hög tid att agera och ta tillbaka den samhällsviktiga verksamhet och infrastruktur som har privatiserats.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“It is high time to act and reclaim the socially important activities and infrastructure that have been privatized.”
• public ownership in key sectors»transportsystem, kommunikationer och övrig infrastruktur, finansiell sektor« (party programme ↗)“transport systems, communications and other infrastructure, financial sector”
• state responsibility for digital infrastructure»Staten måste säkerställa att det över hela landet« (party programme ↗)“The state must ensure that throughout the country”
• state control over infrastructure»Staten måste öka sin kontroll över infrastruktur och resurser som behövs för att genomföra klimatomställningen.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The state must increase its control over infrastructure and resources needed to implement the climate transition.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan establishes that Sweden must be able to defend itself against espionage and cyber attacks and that the capacity to resist cyber attacks shall be strengthened, while the civil defence's readiness shall be built out. Measures to secure the state's insight and control over security-sensitive information in cloud services follow directly from this, since critical infrastructure must function in crisis and war. The plan also emphasises society's obligation to protect personal integrity.

• protection against espionagedecisive»Vi måste kunna försvara oss militärt, men också mot hybridattacker, spionage och cyberangrepp.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We must be able to defend ourselves militarily, but also against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyber attacks.”
• strengthened cybersecurity»Arbetet för att stärka förmågan att stå emot cyberattacker och desinformation ska stärkas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Work to strengthen the capacity to resist cyber attacks and disinformation shall be strengthened.”
• protection of critical infrastructure»störningar av kritisk infrastruktur som el« (party programme ↗)“disruptions of critical infrastructure such as electricity”
• protection for personal integrity»Det är samhällets absoluta skyldighet att skydda friheten och den personliga integriteten« (party programme ↗)“It is society's absolute obligation to protect freedom and personal integrity”

The plan counts threats to IT and communication systems among the new security threats and demands that Sweden and local communities become less vulnerable and more self-sufficient, with preparedness at home against the threats identified. To secure state insight and control over security-sensitive information in cloud services and servers follows from this, as well as from the plan's demand for protection of privacy against both state and commercial actors. The demand is therefore supported.

• threats to IT systemsdecisive»energibrist, terrorism och hot mot IT- och andra« (party programme ↗)“energy shortages, terrorism and threats to IT and other”
• reduce vulnerability»bli mer självförsörjande och mindre sårbara.« (party programme ↗)“become more self-sufficient and less vulnerable.”
• protection for privacy»Vi vill värna människors rätt till integritet och« (party programme ↗)“We want to protect people's right to privacy and”
• strengthened civil preparedness»satsa en större andel av försvarets pengar på det civila försvaret, och öka anslagen till krisberedskap.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“invest a larger share of defense spending on civil defense, and increase appropriations for crisis preparedness.”

Worldstate weighed in: Elevated threat picture against Sweden and war in Europe — Makes state control over security-sensitive information in cloud services more urgent

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan requires that civil defence and society's preparedness for war and crisis be strengthened, which directly supports demands for measures that secure the state's oversight and control of security-sensitive information in cloud services. The plan also states that the rule of law must exist even in the digital sphere and that strong privacy protection is an essential part of a democratic society. The plan therefore supports the counter-proposal's demands in substance.

• strengthen civil preparednessdecisive»Även det civila försvaret är livsviktigt. Vi måste rusta civilförsvaret och samhällets beredskap inför krig och kris.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Civil defence is also vital. We must strengthen civil defence and society's preparedness for war and crisis.”
• rule of law even digitally»Samtidigt måste rättssamhället finnas även i den digitala sfären.« (party programme ↗)“At the same time, the rule of law must exist even in the digital sphere.”
• strong privacy protection»Ett starkt integritetsskydd är därför en omistlig del av ett öppet och demokratiskt samhälle.« (party programme ↗)“Strong privacy protection is therefore an essential part of an open and democratic society.”
• arm against external threats»Sverige måste rustas snabbt och fokuserat; ingen ska kunna ta vårt demokratiska samhälle ifrån oss.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden must be armed quickly and in focused fashion; no one shall be able to take our democratic society from us.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan's security policy commitment is that dependence on undemocratic states for strategic goods shall be seen as a risk for political extortion, and that civil defence shall be strengthened at the same pace as military defence. Security-sensitive information in cloud services outside the country's borders is precisely such a dependence. The plan simultaneously wishes Sweden to be a leader regarding IT infrastructure, which assumes state oversight and control.

• protection of strategic goodsdecisive»odemokratiska eller rentav totalitära stater förvärvar strategiska tillgångar« (party programme ↗)“undemocratic or indeed totalitarian states acquire strategic goods”
• risk of political extortion»Det finns en tydlig risk för att dessa utnyttjas för politisk utpressning.« (party programme ↗)“There is a clear risk that these are used for political extortion.”
• strengthened civil defence»Antalet anställda och värnpliktiga i krigsorganisationen ska öka, ny materiel tillföras och det civila försvaret stärkas i samma takt som det militära.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The number of employees and conscripts in the war organisation shall increase, new equipment be supplied and civil defence be strengthened at the same pace as military defence.”
• strong Swedish IT infrastructure»Sverige ska vara en föregångare vad gäller IT-infrastruktur.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden shall be a leader regarding IT infrastructure.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan requires capability to meet cyber warfare and that total defence can handle severe strains on society, which points to measures that secure state insight and control over security-sensitive information in cloud services. According to the plan, reliable electronic communications with high performance are a prerequisite for society's function. The plan also requires great caution when handling personal data.

• capability against cyber attacksdecisive»möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet, terrorism, cyberkrigföring« (party programme ↗)“meet attacks from international crime, terrorism, cyber warfare”
• preparedness in crisis»delta i hanteringen av katastrofer och andra svåra påfrestningar i samhället« (party programme ↗)“participate in managing disasters and other severe strains on society”
• reliable digital infrastructure»tillförlitliga elektroniska kommunikationer med hög prestanda« (party programme ↗)“reliable electronic communications with high performance”
• caution with personal data»vid hantering av personuppgifter.« (party programme ↗)“when handling personal data.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The plan wants to provide security-sensitive operations with better government support against espionage and theft attempts by foreign powers and requires concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyberattacks. Securing the state's oversight and control over security-sensitive information in cloud services and servers is such a measure, especially when information is moved outside the country's borders. The plan treats digital infrastructure as a national matter and states that the state's core is not negotiable.

• protection against foreign powersdecisive»Ge företag som är engagerade i säkerhetskänslig verksamhet bättre stöd från staten att kunna möta cyberattacker, spionage och stöldförsök från främmande makt« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Provide companies engaged in security-sensitive operations with better government support to meet cyberattacks, espionage, and theft attempts from foreign powers”
• measures against hybrid threats»Införa en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och cyberattacker« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Introduce an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyberattacks”
• digital infrastructure as a national matter»Klassa bredband som nationell infrastruktur och prioritera därefter« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Classify broadband as national infrastructure and prioritise accordingly”
• the state's core»Statens hårda kärna får aldrig vara förhandlingsbar.« (party programme ↗)“The state's core shall never be negotiable.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.

The counter-proposal wants to secure state oversight and control over security-sensitive information in cloud services and servers, since digital infrastructure is crucial in crisis and war. The plan points to disruptions in electronic systems as a threat with rapid and incalculable consequences, requires better evaluation of vulnerabilities in a digitalized society and means that essential infrastructure should be under state control. The demand therefore follows from the plan.

• digital disruptions as threatdecisive»Störningar i elektroniska system, betaltjänster eller elnät kan uppstå på grund av naturfenomen, angrepp eller fel och skulle kunna få oöverskådliga följder relativt snabbt.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Disruptions in electronic systems, payment services or electrical grids may occur due to natural phenomena, attacks or errors and could have unpredictable consequences relatively quickly.”
• state control of infrastructure»försvar och väsentliga delar av vår infrastruktur bör stå under statlig kontroll« (party programme ↗)“defence and essential parts of our infrastructure should be under state control”
• evaluated digital vulnerability»Samhällets sårbarhet behöver bättre utvärderas, inkluderat hur ett allt mer elektrifierat och digitalt samhälle påverkar utsattheten vid en kris eller störning.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Society's vulnerability needs to be better evaluated, including how an increasingly electrified and digital society affects vulnerability in a crisis or disruption.”
• strengthened crisis management capability»Anslagen till de myndigheter som har övergripande ansvar för civilförsvar, krisledning och beredskap bör öka och stödet till civilorganisationer med samhällsuppdrag ska stärkas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Appropriations to agencies with overall responsibility for civil defence, crisis management and preparedness should increase and support for civil organizations with government assignments should be strengthened.”

The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.