2023-02-082022/23:FöU6 · p.5FöUDefence
Cyber policy
Cyber policy and the organisation of cyber defence
What's at stake: How cyber defence is organised affects Sweden's ability to respond to cyberattacks against government agencies, businesses and critical infrastructure, as well as what emergency-powers legislation is in place if resources need to be requisitioned during heightened alert or war.
Case texts and AI reasoning are AI-translated from the Swedish originals; the Swedish text is authoritative.
What the vote decides
The question concerns the shape of cyber defence - including whether cyber defence should be linked to psychological defence, made into its own defence branch, and whether the government should investigate special requisition legislation for the cyber domain - or whether the current approach, in which the armed forces already have the capability for both defensive and offensive cyber operations within the existing structure, should remain unchanged.
Yes Yes — the committee proposal
The committee notes that the armed forces already have the capability to conduct both defensive and offensive cyber operations against a qualified adversary, and therefore sees no reason to formally link cyber defence with psychological defence or to make cyber defence its own defence branch. The committee points to ongoing work on forms of cooperation between the cybersecurity field and other preparedness areas, to tailored training already offered to agency heads in the cyber field, and to the government soon deciding on the direction of the national cybersecurity centre - and accordingly rejects the motions, including the proposals for requisition legislation and a stronger state responsibility for cybersecurity.
No No — the reservations
Reservation 12 (C)
The reservation (C) calls for further developing the armed forces' capability for both defensive and offensive cyber operations and for linking cyber defence with psychological defence. The government should set up an inquiry into requisition legislation for the cyber domain so that it can take effect during heightened alert or war, as well as an inquiry into whether cyber defence should become its own defence branch, since organisational leaderships often lack strategic competence in cybersecurity and cyber issues today are treated merely as IT issues. Sweden should also more clearly identify which country is behind cyberattacks when attribution is possible.
Summarised from the committee report. Party labels in the summary come from the report, not from the vote.
What do the votes mean here?
Yes The committee proposal: rejecting the motions (keeping things as they are).
No Backing the counter-proposal: reservation 12 by C.
Abstain The party marks a position of its own that is not one of the two final alternatives.
The decision would have held
Explicit commitments that contradicted the vote: KDKristdemokraterna
Ja 202–19Ja 188–33
Counterfactual: the parties above are moved to the position their own documents explicitly point at, carrying their whole contingent present. Every other party keeps its real figures, including dissenters and absentees.
How the AI parties would have voted
For each party: what its own plan – election manifesto and party programme – argues for in this case, next to how the party actually voted. The AI can only answer Yes or No; a party can also abstain.
| AI | Vote | Confidence | Evidence | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | Yes | Yes 21/0/0/3 | match | confidence: medium | not addressed |
| S | No | Abstain 19/2/70/16 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| MP | Yes | Yes 13/0/1/4 | match | confidence: low | not addressed |
| C | No | No 0/17/0/7 | match | confidence: medium | derived |
| L | No | Yes 14/0/0/2 | differs | confidence: low | not addressed |
| KD | No | Yes 14/0/0/5 | differsagainst own programme | confidence: medium | explicit |
| M | No | Yes 60/0/0/8 | differs | confidence: medium | derived |
| SD | No | Yes 61/0/0/12 | differs | confidence: medium | not addressed |
Broke with the party line
| SAdrian Magnusson (S, Skåne läns södra) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SAida Birinxhiku (S, Hallands län) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SAnna-Belle Strömberg (S, Västernorrlands län) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SArdalan Shekarabi (S, Uppsala län) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SAzra Muranovic (S, Jönköpings län) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SBjörn Wiechel (S, Västerbottens län) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SDzenan Cisija (S, Göteborgs kommun) | No — party line: Abstain |
| SEwa Pihl Krabbe (S, Skåne läns norra och östra) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SHeléne Björklund (S, Blekinge län) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SIsak From (S, Västerbottens län) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SJohan Büser (S, Göteborgs kommun) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SJytte Guteland (S, Stockholms kommun) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SKadir Kasirga (S, Stockholms kommun) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SLars Isacsson (S, Dalarnas län) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SMarcus Andersson (S, Västra Götalands läns östra) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SMarkus Kallifatides (S, Stockholms kommun) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SNiklas Sigvardsson (S, Jönköpings län) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SPetter Löberg (S, Västra Götalands läns södra) | No — party line: Abstain |
| SSanna Backeskog (S, Gävleborgs län) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SSofia Skönnbrink (S, Värmlands län) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| SÅsa Karlsson (S, Västerbottens län) | Yes — party line: Abstain |
| MPLeila Ali Elmi (MP, Göteborgs kommun) | Abstain — party line: Yes |
MPs whose vote differs from their party's majority position in this division. Marked with a dark ring in the chamber view.
Committee proposal
The Riksdag rejects the motions 2022/23:848 by Niels Paarup-Petersen et al. (C) demands 2 and 12-15, 2022/23:948 by Sven-Olof Sällström et al. (SD) demand 42, 2022/23:1160 by Per-Arne Håkansson (S) demand 1 and 2022/23:2020 by Markus Kallifatides et al. (S).
Original (Swedish)
Riksdagen avslår motionerna 2022/23:848 av Niels Paarup-Petersen m.fl. (C) yrkandena 2 och 12-15, 2022/23:948 av Sven-Olof Sällström m.fl. (SD) yrkande 42, 2022/23:1160 av Per-Arne Håkansson (S) yrkande 1 och 2022/23:2020 av Markus Kallifatides m.fl. (S).
Riksdag decision: The Riksdag rejected all motions on defense policy and total defense from the general motion period 2022. The motions addressed, for example, military and civil defense, cyber policy and procurement of military equipment. The Riksdag considers, among other things, that work is already underway in the areas covered by the motions.
Counter-proposals
- The counter-proposal wants the entire country to be defensible with a whole-nation perspective. (C) — Reservation 12
Plan vs actual vote
Every party, in chamber order: what its own plan pointed to, how it voted, and the reasoning behind both. Highlighted rows are where the two differ — but a vote that follows the plan is a result too, so the reasoning is there for every party.
The plan establishes that Sweden shall be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarization, and works for the dissolution of military alliances and general disarmament.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan establishes that Sweden shall be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarization, and works for the dissolution of military alliances and general disarmament. Expanding offensive cyber capability and making cyber defense its own defense branch is an expansion of the military apparatus. The plan therefore speaks against the counter-proposal's requirements.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår fast att Sverige ska vara en röst för fred och rättvisa, inte för ökad militarisering, och arbetar för militäralliansernas upplösning och allmän avrustning. Att bygga ut offensiv cyberförmåga och göra cyberförsvaret till en egen försvarsgren är en utbyggnad av den militära apparaten. Planen talar därför mot motförslagets krav.
- against increased militarizationdecisive»Vänsterpartiet anser att Sverige ska vara en röst för fred och rättvisa, inte för ökad militarisering.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Left Party believes that Sweden shall be a voice for peace and justice, not for increased militarization.”
- disarmament and alliance dissolution»Vänsterpartiet arbetar för militäralliansernas upplösning« (party programme ↗)“The Left Party works for the dissolution of military alliances”
- democratic control of military»Det är av yttersta vikt att det militära systemet underställs en demokratisk kontroll.« (party programme ↗)“It is of utmost importance that the military system is subject to democratic control.”
- defense with maintained neutrality»försvaret ska med bibehållen neutralitet fortlöpande anpassas till« (party programme ↗)“defense shall with maintained neutrality continually be adapted to”
The plan states that cyber defence and intelligence capability shall be developed and that the capacity to withstand cyberattacks and disinformation shall be strengthened.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan states that cyber defence and intelligence capability shall be developed and that the capacity to withstand cyberattacks and disinformation shall be strengthened. It also explicitly links defence against hybrid attacks with the fact that the Swedish people are targets of influence campaigns, which supports linking cyber defence and psychological defence. The counter-proposal's fact-finding requirement thus aligns with the plan's direction.
Original (Swedish)
Planen slår fast att cyberförsvaret och underrättelseförmågan ska utvecklas och att förmågan att stå emot cyberattacker och desinformation ska stärkas. Den kopplar också uttryckligen samman försvaret mot hybridattacker med att svenska folket är måltavla för påverkanskampanjer, vilket stöder att cyberförsvar och psykologiskt försvar knyts ihop. Motförslagets utredningskrav ligger därmed i planens riktning.
- develop cyber defencedecisive»Vi vill fortsätta internationella samarbeten och utveckla cyberförsvaret och underrättelseförmågan.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We want to continue international cooperation and develop cyber defence and intelligence capability.”
- withstand cyberattacks»Arbetet för att stärka förmågan att stå emot cyberattacker och desinformation ska stärkas.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The work to strengthen the capacity to withstand cyberattacks and disinformation shall be strengthened.”
- defence against hybrid threats»Vi måste kunna försvara oss militärt, men också mot hybridattacker, spionage och cyberangrepp.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“We must be able to defend ourselves militarily, but also against hybrid attacks, espionage and cyberattacks.”
- psychological defence»Svenska folket är måltavla för påverkanskampanjer och desinformation.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The Swedish people are targets of influence campaigns and disinformation.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The plan prioritizes human security over territorial, states that no nation can threaten itself into security and wants to shift resources to civil defense and crisis preparedness.
Plan documents: party programme · 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The plan prioritizes human security over territorial, states that no nation can threaten itself into security and wants to shift resources to civil defense and crisis preparedness. It recognizes threats to IT systems as a new threat, but the counter-proposal's demands for developed offensive cyber capability and cyber defense as a separate defense branch represent military rearmament that the plan does not support. The plan therefore speaks against the counter-proposal.
Original (Swedish)
Planen sätter mänsklig säkerhet före territoriell, slår fast att ingen nation kan hota sig till säkerhet och vill flytta resurser till civilt försvar och krisberedskap. Den erkänner hot mot IT-system som ett nytt hot, men motförslagets krav på utvecklad offensiv cyberförmåga och cyberförsvaret som egen försvarsgren är en militär upprustning som planen inte ger stöd för. Planen talar därför mot motförslaget.
- human security over militarydecisive»Vi vill se en politik som sätter mänsklig säkerhet« (party programme ↗)“We want to see a policy that prioritizes human security”
- disarmament over rearmament»Ingen nation kan hota sig till säkerhet eller« (party programme ↗)“No nation can threaten itself into security or”
- civil defense is prioritized»satsa en större andel av försvarets pengar på det civila försvaret, och öka anslagen till krisberedskap.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“allocate a larger share of defense spending to civil defense, and increase appropriations for crisis preparedness.”
- IT threats recognized in threat picture»terrorism och hot mot IT- och andra« (party programme ↗)“terrorism and threats to IT and other”
The plan wants to strengthen defence quickly and forcefully and states that defence capability must be adapted to new threats, not only state and military ones.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan wants to strengthen defence quickly and forcefully and states that defence capability must be adapted to new threats, not only state and military ones. It also links military and civil defence as equally vital parts of society's preparedness. The counter-proposal's requirements for further developed cyber capability, connection to psychological defence and investigations into disposal legislation and military branches follow from these commitments.
Original (Swedish)
Planen vill rusta försvaret snabbt och kraftfullt och slår fast att försvarsförmågan måste anpassas efter nya hot, inte bara statliga och militära. Den kopplar också ihop det militära och civila försvaret som lika livsviktiga delar av samhällets beredskap. Motförslagets krav på vidareutvecklad cyberförmåga, koppling till psykologiskt försvar och utredningar om förfogandelagstiftning och försvarsgren följer av dessa åtaganden.
- rapid strengtheningdecisive»Sverige ska försvaras. Vi vill rusta det militära försvaret snabbt, kraftfullt och långsiktigt.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden shall be defended. We want to strengthen military defence quickly, forcefully and long-term.”
- adaptation to new threats»Därför måste vi också anpassa vår försvarsförmåga efter nya hot mot landet.« (party programme ↗)“Therefore we must also adapt our defence capability to new threats to the country.”
- strengthen civil defence»Även det civila försvaret är livsviktigt. Vi måste rusta civilförsvaret och samhällets beredskap inför krig och kris.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Civil defence too is vital. We must strengthen civil defence and society's preparedness for war and crisis.”
- protection of democracy»Sverige måste rustas snabbt och fokuserat; ingen ska kunna ta vårt demokratiska samhälle ifrån oss.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden must be strengthened quickly and in a focused manner; no one shall be able to take our democratic society from us.”
The plan does not address cyber defence's organization, but it requires that Sweden's defence capability increases significantly and that civil defence is strengthened at the same pace as the military.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto · party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The plan does not address cyber defence's organization, but it requires that Sweden's defence capability increases significantly and that civil defence is strengthened at the same pace as the military. It also sees threats to societally important infrastructure from undemocratic states from a security policy perspective. Derived from that, the plan supports that cyber capability is developed further, linked to psychological defence and that organizational issues are investigated.
Original (Swedish)
Planen behandlar inte cyberförsvarets organisation, men den kräver att Sveriges försvarsförmåga ökar betydligt och att det civila försvaret stärks i samma takt som det militära. Den ser också hot mot samhällsviktig infrastruktur från odemokratiska stater i ett säkerhetspolitiskt perspektiv. Härlett därifrån stöder planen att cyberförmågan utvecklas vidare, kopplas till det psykologiska försvaret och att organisationsfrågorna utreds.
- stronger military defencedecisive»Sverige behöver ett betydligt starkare militärt försvar än i dag.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Sweden needs a significantly stronger military defence than today.”
- civil defence at the same pace»Antalet anställda och värnpliktiga i krigsorganisationen ska öka, ny materiel tillföras och det civila försvaret stärkas i samma takt som det militära.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“The number of employees and conscripts in the war organization shall increase, new materiel be added and civil defence be strengthened at the same pace as the military.”
- security perspective on infrastructure»hamnar, elnät eller liknande, måste ses i ett säkerhetspolitiskt perspektiv.« (party programme ↗)“harbours, electricity grids or similar, must be seen from a security policy perspective.”
- increased defence capability»Sveriges nationella försvarsförmåga måste öka.« (party programme ↗)“Sweden's national defence capability must increase.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The counter-proposal wants to develop capacity for defensive and offensive cyber operations, link cyber defense to psychological defense and investigate disposition legislation and a separate defense branch.
Plan documents: party programme
Reasoning and quotes
The counter-proposal wants to develop capacity for defensive and offensive cyber operations, link cyber defense to psychological defense and investigate disposition legislation and a separate defense branch. The party programme explicitly establishes that Sweden must be able to face attacks from, among other things, cyber warfare and that new threats require an expanded security concept, and that crises must be met with all of policy's preventive options. The plan therefore supports a further developed cyber defense capacity.
Original (Swedish)
Motförslaget vill utveckla förmågan till defensiva och offensiva cyberoperationer, koppla cyberförsvaret till det psykologiska försvaret och utreda förfogandelagstiftning och en egen försvarsgren. Principprogrammet slår uttryckligen fast att Sverige måste kunna möta angrepp från bland annat cyberkrigföring och att nya hot kräver ett vidgat säkerhetsbegrepp, samt att kriser ska mötas med politikens alla preventiva möjligheter. Planen stöder därför en vidareutvecklad cyberförsvarsförmåga.
- capacity against cyber attacksdecisive»möta angrepp från internationell kriminalitet, terrorism, cyberkrigföring, biologiska vapen, kemiska vapen« (party programme ↗)“face attacks from international crime, terrorism, cyber warfare, biological weapons, chemical weapons”
- expanded security concept»Nya typer av konflikter och hot leder till ett vidgat« (party programme ↗)“New types of conflicts and threats lead to an expanded”
- preventive crisis management»Kriser måste mötas med politikens alla preventiva« (party programme ↗)“Crises must be met with all of policy's preventive”
- total defence readiness»delta i hanteringen av katastrofer och andra svåra påfrestningar i samhället« (party programme ↗)“participate in managing disasters and other severe strains in society”
Worldstate weighed in: The Chinese balloon incident over the USA — Emphasizes the plan's requirement for capacity against new state threats and attribution
The stance rests on the quoted commitment in the party's own documents; the actual vote deviated. Click the quote to verify it in the document.
The election manifesto explicitly promises to develop cyber defence and to introduce an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyberattacks, and states that defence must account for rapid technological development.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The election manifesto explicitly promises to develop cyber defence and to introduce an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyberattacks, and states that defence must account for rapid technological development. The counter-proposal's demand for continued development of defensive and offensive cyber capability, linking to psychological defence, and clearer attribution is in line with this. The demand is supported.
Original (Swedish)
Valmanifestet lovar uttryckligen att utveckla cyberförsvaret och att införa en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och cyberattacker, och slår fast att försvaret måste ta höjd för den snabba teknikutvecklingen. Motförslagets krav på fortsatt utveckling av defensiv och offensiv cyberförmåga, koppling till psykologiskt försvar och tydligare attribuering ligger i linje med detta. Kravet stöds.
- developed cyber defencedecisive»Utveckla cyberförsvaret« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Develop cyber defence”
- action plan against hybrid threats»Införa en handlingsplan med konkreta åtgärder mot hybridhot och cyberattacker« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Introduce an action plan with concrete measures against hybrid threats and cyberattacks”
- technology-driven defence development»Vidare behöver det svenska försvaret i ökad utsträckning ta höjd för de möjligheter och risker som den allt snabbare teknikutvecklingen innebär.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Furthermore, Swedish defence needs increasingly to account for the opportunities and risks that increasingly rapid technological development entails.”
- protection against state cyberattacks»Ge företag som är engagerade i säkerhetskänslig verksamhet bättre stöd från staten att kunna möta cyberattacker, spionage och stöldförsök från främmande makt« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Give companies engaged in security-sensitive activities better support from the state to be able to meet cyberattacks, espionage, and theft attempts from foreign powers”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
The counter-proposal wants to develop defensive and offensive cyber capabilities, link cyber defense to psychological defense and investigate disposal legislation at heightened readiness.
Plan documents: 2022 manifesto
Reasoning and quotes
The counter-proposal wants to develop defensive and offensive cyber capabilities, link cyber defense to psychological defense and investigate disposal legislation at heightened readiness. The plan requires that total defense be restored, that special crisis legislation be developed and that vulnerability in an increasingly digitalized society be better evaluated. The counter-proposal's requirements therefore lie in the plan's direction.
Original (Swedish)
Motförslaget vill utveckla den defensiva och offensiva cyberförmågan, koppla cyberförsvaret till det psykologiska försvaret och utreda förfogandelagstiftning vid höjd beredskap. Planen kräver att totalförsvaret återupprättas, att en särskild krislagstiftning tas fram och att sårbarheten i ett allt mer digitaliserat samhälle utvärderas bättre. Motförslagets krav ligger därför i planens riktning.
- evaluate digital vulnerabilitydecisive»Samhällets sårbarhet behöver bättre utvärderas, inkluderat hur ett allt mer elektrifierat och digitalt samhälle påverkar utsattheten vid en kris eller störning.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Society's vulnerability needs to be better evaluated, including how an increasingly electrified and digital society affects exposure during a crisis or disruption.”
- special crisis legislation»Ta fram en särskild krislagstiftning« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Develop special crisis legislation”
- total defense equipped for war»Återupprätta ett totalförsvar som är rustat för krig« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Restore a total defense that is equipped for war”
- protection against system attacks»Störningar i elektroniska system, betaltjänster eller elnät kan uppstå på grund av naturfenomen, angrepp eller fel och skulle kunna få oöverskådliga följder relativt snabbt.« (2022 manifesto ↗)“Disruptions in electronic systems, payment services or power grids can occur due to natural phenomena, attacks or errors and could have unpredictable consequences relatively quickly.”
The plan takes no explicit position on what the committee actually decided — often because the committee's reason was procedural. The stance is derived and fully cited, but it does not show the party broke a commitment.
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Sources and documents
- The committee report on riksdagen.se (2022/23:FöU6)
- Committee report full text (HA01FöU6)
- Per-MP voting data (API)
- Case status (API)
Documents under consideration
- Motion 2022/23:100 — Sydsvenskt försvar av Hans Wallmark m.fl. (M)
- Motion 2022/23:1160 — Ökad satsning på cybersäkerhet av Per-Arne Håkansson (S)
- Motion 2022/23:1202 — Livsmedelsstrategi av Mattias Ottosson m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2022/23:1261 — Granskning av svenskarnas användning av känslig teknik av Markus Wiechel och Björn Söder (båda SD)
- Motion 2022/23:1654 — Säkerhetspolitiskt orienterad doktrin för energi och livsmedel av Anders Ådahl (C)
- Motion 2022/23:1685 — Nationella beredskapslager av Eric Westroth och Ann-Christine From Utterstedt (båda SD)
- Motion 2022/23:1760 — Utländska uppköp av Johan Löfstrand m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2022/23:1764 — Säkerhetspolitik av Aron Emilsson m.fl. (SD)
- Motion 2022/23:2012 — Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap av Peter Hultqvist m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2022/23:2020 — Nationell strategi för global cyberpolitik av Markus Kallifatides m.fl. (S)
- Motion 2022/23:2262 — Stärk det civila försvaret och krisberedskapen av Emma Berginger m.fl. (MP)
- Motion 2022/23:266 — Stärkt försvarsförmåga i Västernorrland av Peter Hedberg och Malin Larsson (båda S)
- Motion 2022/23:315 — Internationellt kris- och hälsosamarbete av Markus Wiechel (SD)
- Motion 2022/23:319 — Beredskapslag av Markus Wiechel (SD)
- Motion 2022/23:51 — Godkännande av utländska investeringar av strategisk betydelse av Robert Stenkvist (SD)
- Motion 2022/23:663 — Stärkt försvar av Göteborg av David Josefsson och Marie-Louise Hänel Sandström (båda M)
- Motion 2022/23:780 — Försvaret på Gotland av Jesper Skalberg Karlsson (M)
- Motion 2022/23:782 — Utbyggnad av den civila beredskapen av Thomas Ragnarsson (M)
- Motion 2022/23:848 — En bättre digital säkerhet - stärkt cybersäkerhet för nutid och framtid av Niels Paarup-Petersen m.fl. (C)
- Motion 2022/23:850 — Ett mer krigsdugligt militärt försvar i hela landet av Mikael Larsson m.fl. (C)
Source: The Swedish Parliament